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NYAMTAI, Uganda, Apr 3 2026 (IPS) - Environmental activists and farmer groups opposed to the construction of the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP), the world’s longest heated oil pipeline, are mounting a last-ditch legal effort meant to stop its construction in a suit they plan to have filed in London, UK, believing that it stands a chance to stop the controversial project despite being at the 78 percent completion stage.
The groups have engaged the services of the London law firm of Leigh Day, one of the UK’s leading environmental and public interest litigation firms, which in the past has won landmark compensation cases for northern Kenyan communities affected by unexploded UK military munitions, among others.
With the pipeline construction said to be nearly 80 percent complete, the groups believe their petition stands a good chance of success since EACOP is owned by a company registered at the Companies House in London – the EACOP Ltd.
This is despite the controversial 1,443 km pipeline, principally owned by TotalEnergies with a 62 percent stake, meant to evacuate crude from Western Uganda oilfields to the Indian port of Tanga in Tanzania, which has survived several suits filed in the region and in France and, despite the withdrawal of several would-be financiers, looks all set for completion later in the year, with the first oil exports due in October 2026.
Other owners of the pipeline are the governments of Uganda and Tanzania via the Uganda National Oil Company (UNOC – 15 percent) and the Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC – 15 percent), and the Chinese multinational China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC – 8 percent).
The plaintiffs, who include project-affected persons (PAPs) from across Uganda, are buoyed by the support of the global campaign group Avaaz, which in February initiated a fundraising effort to help with costs of the suit, ahead of its expected commencement in May.
They claim that the pipeline will violate rights protected by the Ugandan Constitution, which gives every citizen the right to a clean and healthy environment.
The local farmers allege that the construction and operation of the pipeline will have a material impact on global temperatures with severe consequences both worldwide and in Uganda. Further, they alleged that the pipeline is in breach of EACOP Ltd’s own legal obligations under Uganda’s National Environment Act and National Climate Change Act.
Snaking through Uganda and Tanzania, it will tear through some of the planet’s “most wondrous ecosystems”, carving up elephant sanctuaries, protected forests, and more than 200 rivers.
In addition, the massive infrastructure, also the longest crude oil pipeline in Africa, will result in almost 400 million tonnes of emissions over its lifetime and have a major impact on climate change, they claim.
Besides, they argue that the emissions released by oil carried by the pipeline will ‘materially’ contribute to global warming and fear the impact this will have on them and their livelihoods, as well as on the environment and the health of Ugandans.
EACOP is expected to result in more than 372 million tonnes of CO₂e, or greenhouse gas, emissions—more than 58 times Uganda’s total annual emissions, they contend.
Uganda is particularly impacted by climate change, having already suffered from “record-breaking occurrences of floods, devastating and frequent droughts and erratic rainfall patterns”, according to a report sent by the Ugandan government to the UN, which will only increase as climate change worsens.
“The case is one of a growing number of legal claims seeking to hold global energy companies and infrastructure providers to account for the emissions resulting from their extraction of fossil fuels,” Leigh Day said in a statement.
“Our clients believe the EACOP pipeline will result in enormous damage to the global climate as well as severe damage to their local environment. The EACOP will lead to a huge amount of oil being burnt in a world where the UN has confirmed there are already far more fossil fuels slated for extraction than required if we are to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement, said Leigh Day solicitor Joe Snape, who will represent the group.
The fact that the pipeline is operated and financed by a UK-registered company highlights the role UK corporates often have in fossil fuel extraction projects in the Global South, he added
He further noted, “Our clients are already living on the frontline of the climate crisis and argue this pipeline will only exacerbate the impact they, and other vulnerable communities around the world, experience on their lives and livelihoods. They are calling for the pipeline construction and operations to be halted to stop this damaging impact on the climate in Uganda and elsewhere around the world.”
While around a third (460 km) of the pipeline will run through the basin of Lake Victoria, Africa’s largest lake, local environmentalists warn that a spill or leak could potentially result in catastrophic effects for the lake, which is a vital water resource in the region and a significant source for the River Nile.
The pipeline will also run through and disturb important habitats and nature reserves, including Murchison Falls National Park, the Taala Forest Reserve, and the Bugoma Forest. The pipeline will reportedly disturb around 2,000 square kilometres of protected habitats, impacting rare and endangered species that inhabit them, such as Eastern Chimpanzees and African Elephants.
For its part, Avaaz said its fundraising effort will support the “groundbreaking” court helping expose the environmental abuses and climate devastation that this project will cause. Further, it will help to defend land rights for Indigenous and frontline communities and “continue the quest to protect life on Earth.”
“With help from Avaaz members, communities in East Africa have already fought this project through regional courts — but their case was dismissed on a technicality. This new lawsuit in the UK is the last remaining path to stopping this monster pipeline. Legal experts believe it offers a far better shot at a fair, independent hearing — with a real possibility of success,” the campaign noted.
The group promised to “stage an epic media stunt” around the launch of the court case, increasing pressure on insurance companies to walk away from the project, and support families in Uganda and Tanzania who are fighting evictions, providing cash assistance for food, medicine and other basic necessities.
The USD 5.6 billion project was initiated in 2016 amid delays, resistance, and scrutiny. Over the past two years, EACOP has accelerated, with infrastructure taking shape along its route and at its two key oil fields: Tilenga, awarded to TotalEnergies, and Kingfisher, awarded to CNOOC.
IPS UN Bureau Report
MEXICO CITY, Apr 3 2026 (IPS) - In Asunción, Paraguay last month, finance ministers, central bank presidents, and private sector leaders gathered for the Inter-American Development Bank’s (IDB) Annual Meetings to talk about growth.
In a session titled “Seizing Opportunities, Stimulating Growth” hosted by IDB Invest, the bank’s private sector institution, they discussed how investment and innovation could strengthen agribusiness and food systems across Latin America.
One place to start is clear: the IDB Invest should exclude industrial livestock production from its portfolio. Industrial animal agriculture is a leading driver of deforestation, water pollution, and greenhouse gas emissions in the region.
It puts profits in the hands of a few, while rural and Indigenous communities are left to deal with dirty water, damaged land, and fewer ways to earn a living. Yet at the very session dedicated to agribusiness, livestock was conspicuously absent from the conversation.
If the IDB Invest won’t even acknowledge the problem, it’s obviously not trying to solve it. Public development money shouldn’t be funding an industry that worsens the climate crisis and harms communities.
Equally troubling is the lack of transparency when projects do move forward. When the IDB Invest supports a project, communities have a right to understand its risks, impacts, and benefits. That did not happen, for example, in the case of Pronaca, an Ecuadorian agribusiness company that received a $50 million loan from IDB Invest.
An independent investigation by the Bank’s own accountability mechanism found seven violations of environmental and social safeguards, including failures to disclose critical information and assess the company’s role in the contamination of a local river that the Indigenous Tsáchila community rely on for food and hygiene, and which holds deep spiritual significance within their cosmology.
But key environmental documents were classified as confidential, and meaningful information was never shared. This isn’t just a problem with the IBD’s internal procedures. It can have real impacts on human rights.
Perhaps most importantly, the IDB Invest must ensure the effective participation of affected communities from the very beginning of any project. In the Pronaca case, the investigation found no evidence that nearby Indigenous communities were consulted at all, even though one community is located just a few hundred meters from a facility.
This absence of consultation wasn’t accidental, but instead part of a deep imbalance of power, where decisions are made in boardrooms and imposed on territories without consent. Communities must have a seat at the table, not as an afterthought, but as decision-makers with the ability to shape, or reject, projects that affect their futures. Anything less is incompatible with the IDB Invest’s stated mission to reduce inequality.
This month’s meeting in Paraguay showed that the IDB Group is quite ambitious when it comes to growth in Latin America. However, it would be a mistake for the IDB to believe that growth is the only measure of progress and should be the priority no matter the cost.
Right now, the IDB has the opportunity and the responsibility to pursue a sustainable growth agenda by excluding harmful industries, committing to full transparency, and including the impacted communities at every step of the process. To do that, the IDB must listen to those who were not in the room, and must recognize that economic growth cannot be built on weakened ecosystems and silenced communities.
Claudia Escorza, the Latin America Regional Coordinator for “Stop Financing Factory Farming (S3F) coalition, is based in Mexico City, and advocates sustainable food systems.
IPS UN Bureau
JOHANNESBURG, South Africa, Apr 3 2026 (IPS) - By Easter 2026 it was still not clear when – or how – the war initiated by Israel and the US against Iran would end. But what was already clear was that it would harm Africa in a number of ways.
Firstly, it would adversely affect the global supply and prices of oil and gas, fertilisers and food. Secondly, local currencies would be affected. More than a month after the war had started a number of African currencies had begun to lose value against the US dollar.
Thirdly, interest rates stopped falling and further rate increases were highly likely. Fourth, there will be a decline in access to affordable foreign financing.
How should Africa respond?
African countries cannot avoid being harmed by the current Gulf war. Nevertheless, based on my work in international economic law and global economic governance, I think there are two lessons that, if followed, can help the continent emerge from the crisis in a better place.
First, governments and societies need to be pragmatic. Their first priority must be to do whatever they can to mitigate the impact of the war, particularly on their most vulnerable citizens. This will require governments to make trade-offs.
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They will have to reallocate budgets to at least maintain the level of imports necessary to meet the society’s basic needs. They will need to convince their creditors to help finance their necessary imports. They will also need to persuade them to be flexible enough that they leave governments with at least some policy space.
Second, states and societies need to identify opportunities within the crisis for actions that over the medium term can help them meet their financing, economic, environmental and social challenges. This requires collaboration between the state and its non-state stakeholders. Business, labour, religious groups, civil society organisations and international organisations all have something to contribute.
Oil price surge is hurting African economies: scholars in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa take stock
Action in the short run
The focus of Africa’s efforts in the short term must be on minimising the negative effects of the war and on managing the state’s external debts in the most sustainable and effective way.
This is easy to state, but hard to implement. This is particularly the case in the current international environment, in which it is not realistic to expect donor countries and other international sources of finance to be particularly generous.
African countries will need to convince their creditors to acknowledge that this crisis is beyond Africa’s control and that they should not compound the pain that’s being experienced. This will require, at a minimum, that the creditors agree to suspend debt payments for the next year.
Creditors have already accepted the principle that debt payments can be suspended when debt challenges arise from sources beyond the debtor’s control. Many of them have accepted clauses requiring such action under specific conditions in their most recent debt contracts. They also did this during COVID.
Second, African countries, which are already heavily indebted, should challenge their multilateral creditors to accept the consequences of being among the biggest creditors for the continent. This includes the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the African Development Bank. By custom these institutions are treated as preferred creditors.
This means that they get paid before all other creditors. Instead of participating in any debt restructurings, they also make new loans to the debtor in crisis. This shifts the debt restructuring burden onto the debtor’s other creditors. It also increases the total amount owed to the multilaterals.
This cannot continue. These institutions need to be more creative in providing Africa to financing. This should include:
• Using their financial resources to guarantee the financial transactions of African countries so that they can reduce their borrowing costs and attract new equity investments.• More generously supporting innovative debt for development swaps. These involve creditors agreeing with African sovereign debtors to convert a portion of the existing debts into financing for specific local projects, for example in health or education.
• Helping African governments convert their foreign exchange denominated debts into local currency debts at affordable interest rates.
Third, governments should work with the Alliance of African Multilateral Financial Institutions to use these institutions more effectively to finance African development. For example:
• They should require the institutions to only undertake transactions that are consistent with their development mandates. This means no more opaque transactions like the recent one that the African Finance Corporation concluded with Senegal.• African governments should take the necessary action to activate the African Financial Stability Mechanism that they agreed to establish last year. This would create a useful financial safety net for the continent.
Fourth, African governments must build on the efforts they began last year to become a more effective advocate for African development financing interests at the international level. Among these efforts was the initiative by African ministers of finance to develop common African positions on sovereign debt restructurings. Another was South Africa’s launch of the African Expert Panel that proposed a number of initiatives on African debt and development financing.
In the medium term
African countries should advocate for the IMF to review its governance arrangements so that it becomes more accountable and responsive to developing countries, including African states and societies.
They should also advocate for the IMF to more use its existing resources, including its gold reserves, more creatively to support Africa.
Second, Africa should call for a debate on the preferred creditor status of multilateral financial institutions. This has become particularly relevant because the members of the Alliance of African Multilateral Financial Institutions are claiming that, like all other multilateral financial institutions, they are entitled to this status.
It is not clear that there are good arguments for excluding these institutions from preferred creditor status while protecting the position of the legacy institutions. This suggests that there is a need for some general principles that help determine which institutions should be treated as preferred creditors. These should be acceptable to all multilateral financial institutions and other market participants.
Third, African societies must make every effort to demonstrate that they are taking control of their own development. They should demand that their governments and all other actors in African development finance behave responsibly in regard to the financial, economic, environmental and social aspects of these transactions.
Another medium-term objective should be to limit the illicit financial flows that are so often associated with international trade and investment. This goal would be advanced by the successful conclusion of the current efforts to agree on a UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation.
Prof Daniel D. Bradlow, Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for the Advancement of Scholarship at the University of Pretoria, was Senior Non-Resident Fellow, Global Development Policy Center, Boston University and Professor Emeritus, American University Washington College of Law
Source: Conversation Africa
IPS UN Bureau
UNITED NATIONS, Apr 2 2026 (IPS) - Global human migration is at record-high levels, as the World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that roughly 1 in 8 people—about one billion individuals—are on the move. Many of these migrants and refugees face harsh living conditions and heightened challenges, such as poverty, insecurity, and limited access to basic services. With the number of international migrants having doubled since 1990, new findings from WHO call for expanding health systems to meet the growing scale of needs.
“Refugees and migrants are not just recipients of care, they are also health workers, caregivers and community leaders,” said Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-General of WHO. “Health systems are only truly universal when they serve everyone. “Like anyone else, refugees and migrants need uninterrupted, affordable, and equitable access to health services wherever they are.”
WHO estimates that there are approximately 304 million international migrants worldwide, including 170 million migrant workers. Roughly 117 million of those are persons who have been forcibly displaced, 49 million are children, and 2.3 million have been born as refugees.
More than 71 percent of the world’s international migrants find refuge in low to middle-income countries, which often face the most severe resource constraints and protection challenges. Marginalized groups are disproportionately affected: women and girls are especially vulnerable to gender-based violence and often lack access to related services; unaccompanied children face heightened risks of exploitation, abuse, and neglect; and persons with disabilities face elevated barriers to accessibility and increased exposure to discrimination.
Refugees and migrants have been found to experience greater exposure to health risks, in part driven by conditions that restrict movement and access to care, as well as persistent discrimination and language and cultural barriers. These challenges are exacerbated by ongoing conflict and climate-related disasters, leaving millions around the world increasingly vulnerable to infectious and chronic diseases, mental health issues, and dangerous living and working conditions.
“We cannot talk about refugee and migrant health without also addressing emergencies,” said Dr Chikwe Ihekweazu, WHO’s executive director for health emergencies. “Whether it’s a conflict, a climate-related crisis, or an epidemic that forces movement, these crises expose the fragility of health systems and magnify the vulnerabilities of all those already at risk.”
On March 26, WHO launched its World Report on Promoting the Health of Refugees and Migrants: Monitoring Progress on the WHO Global Action Plan, establishing what it describes as the first global baseline for tracking progress toward inclusive, migrant-responsive health systems. Based on data from more than 93 Member States, the report highlights both a growing shift in national responses to migrant and refugee health needs and the persistent structural gaps that continue to hinder progress toward equitable access.
WHO found that out of the member states surveyed, only 42 percent reported having emergency preparedness and disaster reduction or response programs in place for migrant or refugee communities. Just 40 percent indicated that they provide training for health workers in culturally responsive care, while only 37 percent reported having systems to collect, monitor, and analyze migration-related health data—information that is rarely disseminated enough to support a more coordinated global response.
Discrimination remains widespread in low- and middle-income countries that host large numbers of refugees and migrants, with misinformation and disinformation continuing to fuel negative perceptions of these communities. Only 30 percent of surveyed countries reported having communication campaigns in place to counter these misconceptions and discriminatory language.
Anti-migrant sentiment remains particularly pronounced, with internally displaced persons, migrant workers, international students, and migrants under irregular circumstances being far less likely to access health services. Additionally, refugees and migrants are largely unrepresented in governance and decision-making processes that shape their access to health rights in most surveyed countries.
“The phenomena of displacement is unfortunately happening more frequently in countries with fragile systems, fragile economies and limited domestic resources,” said Dr Santino Severoni, head of WHO’s Special Initiative on Health and Migration and lead author of the report. “There is almost no mention of irregular migrants in those emergency plans and response or in disease risk reductions, there is no systematic approach in assessing the system to see how their system is really functioning, how efficient and effective it is. This is really a call for action to keep the promise of sharing a bit of responsibility in managing those emergencies.”
Over the past year, international support for refugee health has seen considerable declines. Figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) show that their 2025 response plan has secured only 23 percent of its USD 10.6 billion goal. The agency projects that this could cause over 12.8 million displaced persons to lose access to lifesaving health interventions this year.
Global responses have been polarizing. Some countries have adopted inclusive policies that support migrant communities—such as Chile— which has supplied municipal health councils for migrants and refugees with community representatives. Other countries, such as the United States and Canada, have cut health insurance coverage for undocumented migrants, forcing them to pay out of pocket for lifesaving care and increasing protection risks.
Through the report, WHO called for greater inclusion of refugee and migrant voices in decision-making processes, as well as improved coordination between governments. With a smoother flow of data between Member States, WHO will be able to more effectively shape health, employment, housing, and protection services.
WHO emphasized that responses should be specifically tailored to the needs of different migrant subgroups, while remaining committed to countering misinformation and discrimination through “evidence-based action.” Investment in refugee and migrant health systems has been found to deliver significant returns, fostering improved social and economic cohesion, revitalizing fragile health systems, and boosting global security, all while reducing long-term costs by promoting these communities to contribute back to society.
“The health of refugees and migrants is not a marginal concern: it is a defining issue of our time,” said Severoni. “By acting now, countries can ensure that refugees and migrants are not left behind, and that health systems are stronger, fairer and more prepared for the future.”
IPS UN Bureau Report
Apr 2 2026 (IPS) -
CIVICUS discusses Italy’s restrictive immigration policies with Eleonora Celoria, a researcher at FIERI (Forum Internazionale ed Europeo di Ricerche sull’Immigrazione), a research centre on migration, and a member of the Association for Legal Studies on Immigration (ASGI), an Italian legal organisation that defends migrants’ and asylum seekers’ rights through advocacy, public awareness and strategic litigation.
Eleonora Celoria
What are the main objectives of the new migration bill?
The bill introduces a 30-day naval blockade mechanism, extendable to six months, for ships deemed to pose a ‘serious threat to public order or national security’, including on the grounds of ‘exceptional migratory pressure’. It goes beyond European Union (EU) frameworks and is designed to restrict civil society organisations conducting search and rescue operations.
The blockade is really a prohibition on entering Italian waters, and ships that violate it would face fines of up to €50,000 (approx. US$ 57,000), with repeat offenders facing confiscation. Since civil society rescue vessels are the only ships making multiple trips in and out of Italian waters, they are the primary target. This is not simply a border management tool; it’s a deliberate escalation of state control over maritime arrivals.
More significantly, the bill would make the Italy-Albania protocol permanent: migrants intercepted at sea would be transported directly to Italian-run processing centres in Albania, bypassing Italian mainland ports entirely. Their asylum claims would be determined outside Italy’s jurisdiction. Because they never reach Italian soil, they wouldn’t access Italian legal protections or independent judicial review. The government is determined to use this mechanism. Albanian facilities held only 10 to 15 people due to adverse court rulings, but the government has recently ramped up transfers to take the number to around 80.
How does the bill change asylum and border management practices?
The bill focuses on criminalisation, deportations and removals rather than asylum procedures. It introduces stricter rules for immigration detention centres (Centri di Permanenza per i Rimpatri, CPRs), expands expulsion grounds to include minor criminal convictions and ramps up criminal penalties for people facing expulsion. This effectively criminalises irregular status itself.
Critically, the bill eliminates special protection, a form of national protection that Italian courts have frequently recognised for people who don’t meet narrow refugee criteria but face serious risks if they are returned. This has been one of the few remaining meaningful pathways to legal status. Stricter eligibility criteria would reduce judicial discretion, trapping more people in legal irregularity.
Finally, the bill implements the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, a package of EU laws overhauling asylum and border procedures across the bloc, which member states must transpose by 12 June. It does so through legislative delegation, giving the government wide discretion to enact implementing measures by decree. Italy’s approach is the most restrictive possible. The Albania externalisation model is the primary mechanism, prioritising rapid removal over thorough examination. Changes to asylum procedures will be determined through executive action, with limited parliamentary scrutiny.
What is remigration, and why does it concern civil society?
Remigration is a white supremacist concept that calls for the forced removal of immigrants, refugees and their descendants, including legal residents and naturalised citizens, on grounds of ethnicity, race or perceived failure to ‘assimilate’. It targets people for who they are, not what they have done, violating the non-discrimination principle that underpins human rights law and the rule of law.
What makes this dangerous is that remigration has moved from marginal to mainstream political discourse. A far-right petition on remigration has recently gathered enough signatures to force a parliamentary debate. When such concepts gain mainstream legitimacy, they push other parties towards increasingly restrictive policies. Italy’s current bills move precisely in that direction.
From a legal perspective, remigration violates international human rights conventions and Italy’s constitution, which guarantees non-discrimination and solidarity. A policy based on ethnic or racial identity would also be incompatible with Italy’s international obligations.
Where do these measures conflict with international law?
The measures create serious tensions with several binding legal instruments: the 1951 Geneva Convention, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and EU primary law including the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Expanded administrative detention in Italy and Albania risks being arbitrary where the legal basis is insufficiently precise or subject to inadequate judicial review. Documented conditions in Italian CPRs and foreseeable conditions in Albanian centres expose people to inhuman and degrading treatment in violation of Article 3 of the ECHR. The externalisation model creates a direct risk of violating the non-refoulement principle, the absolute prohibition on returning people to places where they face persecution.
The government will argue these measures align with the EU Pact. But alignment with the pact does not guarantee compatibility with the ECHR or the Geneva Convention. ASGI will respond with litigation, through individual cases and strategic cases targeting CPR detention and the Italy-Albania deal, and documentation of the human costs of these policies.
What risks do these policies pose for migrants’ and asylum seekers’ rights?
Under the proposed legislation, Italy would intercept boats and transfer rescued migrants to extraterritorial centres without assessing their health status, protection needs or vulnerabilities. Victims of persecution, torture and trafficking may never get to present their claims or be identified as needing protection.
The bill criminalises irregular migrants by allowing both administrative detention in CPRs and criminal imprisonment in prisons, a dual-track approach that multiplies the risk of fundamental rights violations and exposure to degrading conditions. Detention in existing CPRs is already documented as dangerous. Conditions in the Albanian centres, with minimal oversight and no independent monitoring, would predictably be worse.
The result is a system designed to process people quickly rather than accurately. Trafficking victims, torture survivors and people with severe mental health conditions — people who most need careful assessment and legal support — are unlikely to be identified and protected. Compressed timelines and limited access to lawyers amount to a serious restriction on the right to effective judicial protection.
CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.
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UNITED NATIONS, Apr 2 2026 (IPS) - UN Member States made progress toward the UN80 initiative by adopting a resolution that would implement a mandate review, which is set to pave the way to strengthen the process of mandate creation and implementation.
The resolution was brought forth by the informal ad hoc Working Group on Mandate Implementation Review, co-chaired by the UN Permanent Representatives of New Zealand and Jamaica. It was put to a vote on March 31, with 168 votes in favor, four votes against and zero abstentions.
Mandates are considered a core component of UN operations, as they are the decisions that guide the work of the United Nations as determined by member states. Mandates provide the basis for the work of the UN system across 1,100 locations around the world. The resolution sets out to strengthen the full mandate life cycle by introducing measures that will improve the creation, implementation, and review of mandates to ensure further cohesion, effectiveness, and transparency.
A Report of the Mandate Implementation Review
UN Secretary-General António Guterres congratulated the adoption of this “historic resolution,” stating in his remarks that it “translates the ambition of the UN80 Initiative into concrete, practical action.”
“The resolution adopted today reflects a shared understanding of the full mandate lifecycle—and a shared commitment to strengthen each step of it,” said Guterres on Tuesday.
The President of the General Assembly, Annalena Baerbock, also welcomed the adoption of the resolution, saying that it was “one step in a much larger UN80 process” that was “long overdue and increasingly urgent.”
“In a time of heavy pressure, not only out in the world but also on this institution, the General Assembly is underlining that it is here to act. Willing but also able to reform and to modernize,” said Baerbock.
The resolution is the culmination of deliberations held with member states and the UN Secretariat over a six-month period, starting in September 2025. The mandate implementation review is the core of the second workstream under the UN80 initiative, which included a call to establish the informal ad hoc working group that would be led by member states.
Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the UN Carolyn Schwalger has said that this resolution will have a broad scope with practical measures. This includes developing a mandate registry that would improve visibility of existing mandates across the system in an accessible format for member states and for implementation review clauses to be included in new mandates going forward. Member states and the Secretariat shoulder the responsibility to deliver on mandate reforms. As the resolution outlines, member states hold the sovereign right to bring forth issues to the UN, but also to exercise discipline and accountability, while the Secretariat has the responsibility to support member states with the appropriate resources and tools.
During a press briefing on April 1, Schwalger and Brian Wallace, Permanent Representative of Jamaica to the UN, remarked on the collective responsibility to deliver on the demands from the Secretariat and the international community that was calling for reforms to the UN as it faces “unprecedented challenges.”
“We knew that the mandates resolution process was an opportunity to show our political decision-makers, our citizens, but also ourselves as a UN family that we are up to the challenge of reform and up to transforming in a way that can take on contemporary global challenges,” said Schwalger.
The adoption of the resolution by a large majority demonstrates member states’ willingness to “hold itself to account for its decision-making”, Wallace remarked. It was an indication that member states recognized the need for greater effectiveness and efficiency in the UN so that it can deliver the greatest impact for the people.
“We remain committed to this organization and doing whatever it takes to make sure that we not only remain relevant but improve our connection with our citizens,” Wallace said.
The process is intended to encourage a more disciplined approach to introducing mandates and a streamlining of pre-existing mandates as they face review for whether there are duplications or if the mandate has already been fulfilled.
The informal working group officially concluded its work on March 31. However, the mandate implementation review is expected to continue under the umbrella of a formal Ad Hoc Working Group on Mandate Implementation Review, which will begin one month from now on May 1. The president of the General Assembly is set to appoint two new co-chairs for the formal working group, whose tasks will include developing better practical templates, stronger review clauses and further review of existing mandates.
IPS UN Bureau Report
YAOUNDE, Cameroon, Apr 2 2026 (IPS) - The WTO’s 14th Ministerial Conference (MC14), which took place from 26 to 30 March 2026 in Cameroon, was reported as a collapse resulting from the stand-off between Brazil and the United States on the extension of the e-commerce moratorium. This is one screen shot of a bigger unfolding story where the US is attempting to enforce its will on the organization, while some are resisting.
The Trump administration did not pull the US out of the WTO so that it can complete a project of remaking the organization into one that fits the US’s vision of a new international order serving its ‘national security interests’. Since the Trump administration came into office, they made clear that their approach to foreign relations will be based on brutal power and politics of coercion. The WTO 14th ministerial conference is one international forum where these politics manifested.
The US vision for remaking the organization, as reflected in its submissions under the ‘WTO reform’ negotiations, along with the statement of US Trade Representative in Yaoundé, embody an attack on the raison d’etre of the organization, which is multilateralism.
Multiple US administrations had maintained a fairly consistent approach to the WTO, undermining some of its key functions, such as through paralyzing the dispute settlement function, and pushing for a self-judging non-reviewable national security exception.
The latter could effectively become an opt-out mechanism for the US from its obligations under the WTO rules including the most-favoured-nation (MFN) principle, and secure an immunity from questioning for any US unilateral trade measures packaged as a security issue.
The Trump administration’s talk at the WTO did not hide behind diplomatic or legal jargon. The US submissions made it clear that they are out to dismantle the fundamental pillar that holds the multilateral trading system together – that of non-discrimination and the MFN principle.
They want to strip away the system from an effective ‘special and differential treatment’, a core part of the original bargain that made the WTO establishment possible and that reflected in trade law an acknowledgment that one-size-fits-all rules do not work given the varying levels of development among Members.
The US vision is to turn the WTO from a multilateral organization where each Member, big or small, have an equal voice, to a platform of deals among the big players where it can effectively control the setting of the agenda and focus the organization on US corporate interests.
This is effectively what the US attempted at MC14, where they focused attention on their proposal for a permanent moratorium on customs duties on electronic commerce transmissions.
In Yaoundé, the US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer suggested there “would be consequences,” if the US did not get this delivered. This was the US administration carrying forward the agenda of its tech corporate giants. Since 1998, the US had secured this moratorium against the growing concerns of developing countries that this practice costs them billions of dollars in forgone tariff revenue that is key for their development, industrialization and building of digital capacities.
Ironically, the Trump administration brought the multilateral trading system to its knees by its aggressive unjustified tariff policies and illegal bilateral tariff deals over the past year. In Yaoundé, the same administration denied the developing countries the legitimate use of tariff policy to advance developmental objectives and preserve digital sovereignty and policy space essential for developing their digital economy.
It is clear that the US’s fight at the WTO is not only against China. It seeks to erase any trajectory towards industrialization and competitive edge that any other developing country could potentially build under multilateralism.
With no decision on this issue nor on WTO reform, the LDC package, and the Moratorium on TRIPS non-violation complaints achieved in Yaoundé, the work will be brought back to Geneva. A question often posed in Geneva is how to keep the US engaged in the negotiations, which will become more prominent in light of what unfolded in Yaoundé.
When negotiations are overwhelmed by this question, the attention moves away from efforts to make the organization relevant for all its members, and a forum where negotiations could potentially lead to compromises and outcomes for members at different levels of development. Even decision makers in the WTO administrative body get geared towards ensuring the US stays on board. This adds to the distortions.
In this context, developing countries face the larger threats of fragmentation and distraction from their key concerns and interests. Yet, the costs of such fragmentation cannot be higher in the face of the unfolding project to remake the WTO.
Multiple US administrations showed WTO members how they can keep key negotiation agendas, like the dispute settlement reform, in limbo and block the functioning of the WTO appellate body against the will of the rest of the membership.
In this case, the US’s blocking is void of any justified principled position, but rather a brutal imposition of their will and narrow interests on the rest of the WTO membership.
In the face of the remake project of the WTO advanced by the US, and largely supported by the European Union, what Jane Kelsey calls “a coup underway at the WTO”, developing countries need to stand together despite the differences they might have on some negotiation portfolios where their national interests might dictate disparities in the negotiation positions.
In such an era, managing differences while leveraging the power of dialogue, cooperation and coalition building is crucial to maintain a voice and role in determining how the WTO will be functioning in the future.
A WTO focused on plurilaterals as a norm rather than exception will be a place where the voice of developing countries is eroded. Trade wars will potentially be imported into the WTO through simultaneous plurilateral counterinitiatives leading to further fragmentation of this trading regime. This will be a world where MFN is discarded, consensus decision-making undermined, and leverage points to advance issues of development and special and differential treatment eroded.
Developing countries should collectively assess the cost such a future hold for them and the WTO, its survival as a multilateral organization and its potential to deliver for Members at different levels of development.
IPS UN Bureau