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ANTALYA, Türkiye, Nov 18 2026 (IPS) - You cannot build a wind turbine, electric vehicle, battery or solar grid without critical minerals. Lithium, nickel, cobalt, graphite and rare earths are as essential to the clean-energy transition as renewable power itself.
Yet at COP31 in Antalya, where governments are negotiating how to deliver a “just transition” away from fossil fuels, critical minerals remain largely absent from the political spotlight. While negotiators debate fairness, jobs and decarbonisation, countries elsewhere are forging mineral alliances, securing supply chains and pursuing strategic resource deals outside the UN climate process.
The disconnect raises a central question: Can the global energy transition be called just if it fails to address where the minerals will come from, who controls them, and who bears the environmental and social costs of extracting them?
That question sits at the heart of an emerging debate at COP31. The transition to clean energy depends on a vast expansion of mineral extraction, yet the governance systems needed to ensure fairness, accountability and community participation remain fragmented and incomplete.

Joan Carling, leader of Indigenous Peoples Rights International (IPRI), warns that the current push for just transition will fail if critical minerals and indigenous peoples are not made central to the issue. Credit: Stella Paul/IPS
Whose Minerals, Whose Future?
For Indigenous peoples, the debate is not theoretical.
Joan Carling, a 2024 Right Livelihood Award laureate and executive director of Indigenous Peoples Rights International (IPRI), said the transition to a low-carbon economy must not come at the expense of Indigenous communities.
According to Carling, Indigenous territories hold an estimated 54 percent of critical mineral deposits. That makes Indigenous communities central to the energy transition, whether they are included in decisions or not.
Carling acknowledges an important breakthrough achieved at COP30 in Belém, where negotiators recognised Indigenous peoples’ rights to land, territories, resources, self-determination and free, prior and informed consent. It was a milestone, she says, but recognition alone is not enough.
“It’s our resources; it’s going to be our minerals, and our lands will be used for the transition. We’re not at the table. We’re not the ones taking the decisions,” Carling said.
Her concern extends beyond representation. As demand for transition minerals rises, she fears the world could simply replace one extractive model with another.
“Just moving away from fossil-fuel extractivism to extractivism again for critical minerals,” she said.
The consequences, she argues, are already visible in many Indigenous territories.
“We’ve already seen the legacy of mining, which has completely devastated our territories, destroyed our livelihoods and our food systems, and polluted rivers and water bodies,” she said.
For Carling, the issue is not merely whether mining should occur, but who gets to define the terms under which it takes place. Indigenous peoples, she argues, continue to be treated primarily as stakeholders to consult rather than as rights-holders with decision-making authority.
As global demand for critical minerals accelerates, many Indigenous leaders fear that climate goals could become the latest justification for projects imposed on communities without meaningful participation. In that scenario, the transition may reduce carbon emissions while reproducing long-standing patterns of exclusion and extractivism.

Participants discuss mechanisms of just transition at the Just Transition pavilion at COP31 in Antalya, Türkiye. Credit: Stella Paul/IPS
A Fight Over the Meaning of ‘Just’
Inside the COP31 negotiations, advocates are working to ensure that the transition is not discussed solely in technical or economic terms.
While critical minerals are largely absent from the draft political declaration, they have not disappeared entirely from the discussions.
Negotiators at COP31 are currently working to establish a Just Transition Mechanism intended to help countries translate broad commitments into practical action.
The mechanism is expected to be one of the principal outcomes of the COP31 talks, making debates over rights, participation and value addition especially important for mineral-producing communities.
Annabella Rosemberg, senior adviser on just transition at Climate Action Network (CAN), says the evolving Just Transition Mechanism includes references to mineral extraction, Indigenous rights, local participation and value addition.
For Rosemberg, however, the larger challenge is ensuring that social justice receives the same attention as technological deployment.
“There is much more talk about electrification than there is about just transition,” she said. “What needs to be rebalanced is not only talking about targets; it’s also talking about how we centre communities.”
She argues that climate negotiations can still play an important role by legitimising alternative development models that place local communities, Indigenous rights and equitable economic benefits at the center of the transition.
“This decision on minerals is at least giving legitimacy to a different story that needs to be told,” Rosemberg said. “Where rights are important, where community voices are important, and where value addition is important.”
Still, she warns that progress on language does not automatically translate into action.
“We’re getting great language on just transition,” she said. “But we need to have something that has some teeth to make it happen.”
That challenge runs through many of the discussions at COP31. Negotiators increasingly agree on broad principles, but implementation remains uncertain. Without stronger institutions, clearer accountability mechanisms and dedicated financial support, advocates fear that commitments to justice could remain largely aspirational.
The risk, Rosemberg says, is that communities see endless consultations, reports and policy statements while decisions continue to be made elsewhere.

Japan’s Minister of the Environment Hiroyoshi Sasagawa speaks on innovation and knowledge exchange for implementing climate decisions at COP31, while the prime minister of the country attended the QUAD summit, where critical minerals emerged as a leading subject. Credit: Stella Paul/IPS
Producer Countries Seek a Bigger Share
The debate extends beyond Indigenous communities to countries expected to supply the minerals needed for the energy transition.
Brazil, for example, possesses significant reserves of graphite, nickel, lithium, niobium and rare earths. In September 2026, the country adopted a National Policy on Critical and Strategic Minerals and established a dedicated council within the Presidency, signalling a growing recognition of the sector’s strategic importance.
“There is no energy transition without mining,” said Gabriella Salazar, a Brazilian mining law specialist.
As demand for minerals grows, countries like Brazil face a familiar dilemma. They possess the resources required by industrialised economies but risk remaining suppliers of raw materials while higher-value manufacturing and processing activities occur elsewhere.
Salazar argues that producer countries should have opportunities to capture more of the economic value generated by the transition.
“My suggestion would be for the COP31 just transition outcomes to formally recognise critical minerals as an integral part of the energy transition supply chain,” she said.
Such recognition, she argues, could help unlock investment, technical cooperation and capacity-building that would allow producing countries to move beyond extraction and into refining, processing and manufacturing.
The question of value addition has become a recurring theme among developing countries. Many governments see the clean-energy transition not only as an environmental necessity but also as a potential development opportunity. Whether that opportunity materialises may depend on how future supply chains are structured and who captures the greatest economic benefits.
COP Talks, ASEAN Acts
The debate has now spread beyond COP31 negotiations.
While negotiators in Antalya debate the principles of a just transition, governments elsewhere are moving to secure access to the minerals needed to power it.
On November 17, leaders gathered for the 46th ASEAN Summit in Manila, where critical minerals were among the issues expected to be discussed, according to Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese. Yet unlike artificial intelligence and regional economic cooperation, critical minerals did not emerge as a prominent feature of the summit’s official outcome statement.
That absence reflects a broader trend. Rather than being addressed through a dedicated multilateral framework, questions of mineral security, processing capacity and supply-chain resilience are increasingly being pursued through regional discussions, bilateral agreements and strategic partnerships.
An IISD analysis of more than 200 recent trade and economic agreements found that 139 contained critical-mineral provisions, highlighting how mineral diplomacy is largely advancing outside the UN climate process.
Among them is the France-Malaysia agreement on critical minerals cooperation, signed ahead of COP31, which aims to strengthen collaboration on mineral supply chains, processing and investment. Critical minerals have also featured prominently in discussions among the Quad countries, reflecting mounting concern over access to the resources needed for the energy transition.
The contrast with COP31 is striking. While negotiators in Antalya focus on emissions reductions, climate finance and the principles of a just transition, many of the practical decisions shaping future mineral supply chains are increasingly being made elsewhere.
The result is a widening governance gap. Climate negotiators are debating what a just transition should look like, while the architecture of the critical-minerals economy is taking shape beyond the COP process.
The Missing Global Rulebook
That fragmentation worries Michael Franczak, an economic governance researcher at the United Nations University Centre for Policy Research (UNU-CPR) and co-author of the recent report, Governing Critical Minerals: Advancing Global Cooperation in a Fragmented Landscape.
“Critical minerals may be absent from the official COP31 agenda, but they are hovering over everything,” Franczak said.
According to Franczak, no single institution currently governs the intersection of mining, energy, trade, investment, industrial strategy and development. Yet all of these sectors increasingly influence the success or failure of the global energy transition.
The absence of an overarching framework leaves countries, communities and companies navigating a rapidly evolving landscape shaped by overlapping institutions and competing priorities.
Rather than calling for a single new treaty, Franczak advocates a more pragmatic approach that is based on stronger coordination among existing organisations. Such a system could improve transparency, strengthen standards, expand participation by producing countries and create mechanisms for addressing cross-border challenges that no single institution can manage alone.
The goal, he argues, is not to slow the energy transition but to ensure that it unfolds in a fair, predictable and accountable manner.
Without that coordination, the world risks repeating mistakes that have long characterised global resource extraction, where wealth accumulates far from the places where resources are extracted.
A Race Against Time
As COP31 enters its final days, the question facing negotiators is no longer whether critical minerals matter to the energy transition.
The question is whether global governance can catch up with a rapidly accelerating mineral race before inequalities become embedded in the foundations of the green economy.
For Indigenous communities, the challenge is ensuring that rights are respected and consent is meaningful. For producer countries, it is securing a fair share of the economic opportunities created by the transition. For policymakers, it is designing institutions capable of connecting climate goals with trade, development and resource governance.
The energy transition may be essential for addressing climate change, but experts warn that its legitimacy will ultimately depend on how its benefits and burdens are distributed.
As governments rush to build the clean-energy economy, Franczak cautions against assuming that cleaner technologies automatically produce fairer outcomes.
“Without better rules and stronger cooperation, we risk repeating an old pattern: resources are extracted in developing countries, while much of the economic value is captured elsewhere and local communities bear the environmental and social costs,” he warns
IPS UN Bureau Report

Nov 18 2026 (IPS) -
CIVICUS discusses protests sparked by the mass removal of voters from India’s electoral rolls with Sanjana, a young development professional based in New Delhi who has joined the protests and volunteered at a voter helpdesk.

Sanjana
What’s wrong with the electoral roll revision?
For a start, it has no precedent. The Manual on Electoral Rolls of the Election Commission of India (ECI), published in March 2023, lists four types of revision, and the current ‘Special Intensive Revision’ (SIR) is not one of them. Yet the ECI presents it as routine, claiming it has been conducted eight times since independence.
The core problem is that the SIR is flipping the burden of proof. It used to be the state’s job to enrol every eligible adult. Now people have to prove they belong. The most controversial requirement is that voters prove they, their parents or grandparents appeared on the 2002 rolls. Software then checks these links for ‘logical discrepancies’, such as a parent who appears to have too many children.
The system flagged 13.1 million voters in West Bengal state and 23.5 million in Madhya Pradesh, 17 and 41 per cent of voters in those states. Within weeks, the Bengal figure fell to around 9.5 million because the ECI changed the criteria for what counted as a discrepancy partway through. In Goa, 97 voters were left off the final roll because of software issues, even after officials cleared them. In Uttar Pradesh, the software auto-generated 87,127 forms to delete voters without giving any reason.
There’s dissent even inside the ECI. Two commissioners recorded objections to decisions taken without their knowledge 14 times in 10 months. The ECI has also centralised control over the software, to the point that states have written to the central government to complain they have no access.
Who’s being excluded?
As many as 130 million names have been struck off the rolls across 30 states and territories, with Delhi the hardest hit. Almost 33 per cent of its voters were excluded at the draft stage.
In Bihar, the first state to go through the SIR, the exercise crashed the state’s elector-to-adult population ratio from 97 to 88 per cent, against 99 per cent nationwide. In Bengal, over nine million voters were deleted. In Karnataka, the figure was nearly 10 million, with Bengaluru alone losing over 4.3 million. Overall, at least 120 million eligible adults are likely to be left off the final SIR lists.
The appeals system barely works. In Bengal, of 2.22 million appeals seeking reinstatement, only 1,607 voters were restored in time to vote in the 2026 state election. Can the result be considered valid? Some ask whether those voters would have backed the Trinamool Congress, the main rival to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s party in the state. But the real problem is that they could not vote at all, whoever they would have chosen. In a democracy, every citizen’s vote should count.
Those struck off are the people least likely to have the right documents. First of all, women are affected. An analysis in The Hindu found that in the nine Bihar constituencies with the most deletions, 56 per cent of those deleted were women, mostly aged 18 to 39. This points to married women, since marriage is the main reason women move. A woman who moved to her husband’s village is now asked to trace herself back to a 2002 roll. The gender gap on the rolls had narrowed from two million to 700,000 women by early 2025. The SIR pushed it back up to 1.6 million.
Analysis of the Bihar SIR also shows that Muslims made up 24.7 per cent of the 6.5 million voters excluded from the draft rolls and 33 per cent of those deleted from the final list, despite comprising only 16.9 per cent of the state’s population. This matches what I saw at the helpdesk where I volunteered in Nizamuddin, a mostly Muslim neighbourhood of Delhi.
Migrant workers, urban poor people and displaced people have also been disproportionately affected. When your home is bulldozed, your address disappears with it. The problem is so widespread that Delhi’s election office had to hold special camps for people whose neighbourhoods had been demolished. The state demolishes your home and then asks you to prove where you live.
The ECI keeps saying a notice is not a deletion. But for a domestic worker who has to miss a day’s wages, find a lawyer and chase a landlord for a rental agreement, the notice is the punishment. The government is disenfranchising people without saying so.
How are civil society groups helping people get back on the rolls?
Civil society groups such as Voter Adhikar Manch have set up helpdesks close to where excluded groups live, with volunteers who help people file petitions and gather the documents they need to answer their notices.
Many people have been flagged for ‘logical discrepancies’ by software that had not been properly tested. In Nizamuddin, for instance, many cases carried the same flag: ‘You have been linked as son/daughter with someone who is claimed by six others as father, giving suspicion of a likely incorrect match’. That’s absurd in a country with a long history of large families. Many people who had moved house were put on the list of ‘absent, shifted or dead’ voters.
In Nizamuddin, there was a case of a domestic worker who’d received a notice in English, which she didn’t understand. She missed a day’s work to come to us. It turned out she had no document to prove her current address. Her old voter ID card listed Sunder Nagar, a settlement the government demolished in 2023. She’s lived in the same rented home in Nizamuddin since December 2023, but the landlord refuses to give her a rental agreement. The lawyer at the helpdesk offered to speak to the landlord, but she feared retaliation and losing her home. So the lawyer wrote a letter to the ECI asking for police verification of her residence instead.
So much effort, money and distress just to vote in a democracy. Of course this exercise will disenfranchise the poor. It’s an old authoritarian tactic. Helpdesks support people nearby, but India is vast and they cannot reach every neighbourhood. What happens to everyone else?
Who’s leading the protests and what are they demanding?
The protest movement against the SIR is a broad coalition. Alongside opposition leaders, leftist parties and left-wing student organisations such as the All India Students’ Association (AISA) and the Students’ Federation of India, it includes the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP).
CJP has mass appeal among Gen Z and draws a liberal crowd. Its pull was clear in the July protests calling for the education minister to resign over leaked papers in the national medical entrance exam. Because the protests focused on a single issue, the crowd swelled across ideological and party lines. After that success, CJP launched campaigns such as ‘Fix the Schools’, which flags failings in schools across rural India. Through these campaigns and an active social media presence, it has kept a spirit of dissent alive among large numbers of liberal young people.
The protest coalition wants Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar to resign and the SIR rolled back with its deletions declared void. But some groups go further. CJP wants an inquiry and criminal charges against Kumar, a freeze on the 2025 electoral rolls and elections held on those rolls. It also wants an independent body to select election commissioners. AISA wants wrongly deleted voters restored and the 2023 law on appointing election commissioners repealed, since it removed the Chief Justice from the selection panel and gave commissioners sweeping legal immunity. The Congress party and others such as the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam have also demanded a return to ballot papers.
Everyday people have taken to the streets, asking why the government is protecting Kumar when the ECI is supposed to be autonomous and the public is calling for his impeachment.
How have authorities responded?
The October protests at Jantar Mantar, Delhi’s designated protest site, were met with aggressive repression. Instead of holding Kumar to account, the government deployed 40,000 security personnel in Delhi to confront the people protesting against him, some of them pulled from sensitive security zones. Ahead of the protest, it shut 57 metro stations and cancelled trains to Delhi. It had CJP leaders arrested and several of their allies put under preventive detention or house arrest and made to sign ‘peace bonds’ barring them from future protests.
The state’s strategy of exhaustion also targets leaders beyond CJP. Neha Bora, a young AISA activist, has endured repeated illegal detentions and refuses to sign a peace bond. At a hearing on her case, a mob of 50 to 60 Hindu nationalist supporters chanted slogans such as ‘beat the traitors of the country with shoes’ and made direct threats, right outside a police station. Police have even picked up bystanders in the name of ‘keeping peace’.
How does the struggle for voting rights connect with other struggles?
Beyond Delhi, political momentum is building on many issues. Protests against caste discrimination in universities, against Google data centres and against land grabs share a common message: the people of India have had enough of the Modi regime.
These protests also face harsh repression. In Assam, Indigenous rights activist Pranab Doley, who has led protests against a proposed luxury hotel near Kaziranga National Park, was detained under the National Security Act, a preventive detention law, a day after he was granted bail. The project threatens people’s livelihoods and relationship with the area’s rich biodiversity. In Arunachal Pradesh, authorities have met protests against the Siang Upper Multipurpose Project, a planned mega-dam, with brutal repression. Police used teargas and authorities charged four activists under the state’s anti-terror law.
The movement needs to treat every protest as part of a broader anti-authoritarian wave. Anger over voting rights is intense, and the crowds it has brought onto the streets have opened space to speak out on many issues, including Palestine. But in this charged atmosphere, the movement must not lose sight of high unemployment, inflation, levels of income inequality that are worse than under British rule, women’s safety, land grabs, and caste-based atrocities and discrimination, which hit the most excluded people hardest. The movement in Delhi must connect with these struggles across the country.
What’s needed to protect voting rights?
The SIR must be halted completely and its irregularities examined by the judiciary. Kumar must resign, and the 2023 law that shields the ECI from action must be repealed. Then the Supreme Court must hear the case against those responsible, based on an audit by independent bodies that include civil society. Above all, the state must go back to registering every eligible voter instead of making people prove they have the right to vote.
Even if fewer people had been deleted, there would still be good reason to protest. What we object to is the intention behind the exercise, whatever the numbers. We defend the right of every citizen to vote.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.
India is currently on the CIVICUS Monitor watchlist, which identifies countries where a severe deterioration in the quality of civic space is taking place.
SEE ALSO
Gen Z protests: new resistance rises CIVICUS | State of Civil Society Report 2026
India’s revolt against disenfranchisement CIVICUS Lens 06.Nov.2026
India’s young people find their voice CIVICUS Lens 07.Aug.2026

ANTALYA, Türkiye & SONIPAT, India, Nov 18 2026 (IPS) - “Climate action has to deliver where people live,” COP31 President Murat Kurum said on Resilient Cities and Built Environment Day, part of the Leaders Summit. Cities, he said, are “where that implementation becomes real – in the homes people live in, the infrastructure they depend on and the energy they use every day.”
Kurum, who is also Türkiye’s environment and urbanisation minister, cited his country’s post-earthquake reconstruction as an example of resilient urban development.
The Presidency announced two initiatives: the Antalya Compact for Energy Efficient Buildings, which sets a voluntary target of reducing building energy intensity by 25% by 2035, and the Sustainable Urban Resilience Financing Facility (SURFF), intended to help cities turn climate plans into investment-ready projects. However, no budget or timeline was announced for the facility.
The question remains: will these commitments translate into funding for cities or remain declarations of intent?

A demonstrator at COP31 asks about the money. Credit: UN Climate Change/Kubilay Ciftci
A Long Climb Up the Agenda
Cities have gradually gained prominence in climate negotiations, largely through voluntary coalitions and initiatives rather than binding commitments.
COP26 Glasgow (2021) emphasised multilevel climate action and launched the Race to Resilience.
COP27 (2022) followed with the first-ever urban ministerial and launched the SURGe initiative.
COP28 (2023) introduced CHAMP, through which 64 countries agreed to involve cities in developing national climate plans. It also launched the Buildings Breakthrough, a 27-country initiative for near-zero-emission and resilient buildings by 2030.
COP29 (2024) in Baku established the Baku Continuity Coalition on Urban Climate Action and the MAP Declaration for resilient and healthy cities.
COP30 (2025) in Belém held the fourth Urbanisation Ministerial and introduced a heat-resilience initiative linked to the Global Cooling Pledge.
This attention is reflected in national climate plans. UN-Habitat found that 80% (2025-2026) of new climate plans have well-developed urban components, compared with 49% (2020-2021) earlier.
Yet only 47 of 128 plans identify a specific urban financing mechanism. Cities are increasingly part of climate commitments, but financial support has not kept pace.
What It Means for India
India illustrates the scale of this challenge. The World Bank estimates India’s cities will need around US$2.4 trillion by 2050, while private finance accounts for only about 5% of urban infrastructure investment.
WRI India estimates annual urban adaptation needs at US$67 billion. India’s 2031–35 climate plan supports resilient urban planning and efficient buildings but sets no specific targets for cities.
Aravind Unni, an urban practitioner and policy researcher, welcomes the attention but cautions against treating declarations as outcomes.
“Declarations are meant to signal the direction in which we may move,” he says. He considers the 25% building energy-intensity target something “that India would have anyways endorsed” and believes the country should “learn and use that in our domestic case”.
Unni is less convinced that the Presidency’s Climate Implementation Bridge, which aims to turn national plans into investment-ready projects, will address the needs of Indian cities.
Much of the work required, he argues, is “not really bankable”. “Adaptation and betterment of people’s lives cannot be dependent on private finance. It can be a part of the programme, but the huge section has to be reinvestment in cities through public finance.”
Private investment, in his assessment, will remain limited. The larger responsibility therefore rests with public finance, raising another question: who controls the money and decides how cities use it?

Civil society members demonstrate at COP31 in support of a liveable planet. Credit: UN Climate Change/Kubilay Ciftci
Money Needs Powers
For Unni, financing alone will not make cities resilient unless local governments have the authority to plan and implement climate action.
“Decentralisation is the key. Actual transfer of powers to the cities,” he says. He argues that the 74th Constitutional Amendment, implemented in 1993, which established the framework for urban local governments, needs to be “revisited and made better”.
Climate action is not explicitly listed among the 18 functions assigned to municipalities. However, urban planning, water supply, public health and urban forestry directly affect how cities prepare for heatwaves and floods.
Without adequate decision-making powers, cities remain dependent on higher levels of government, even when they bear the brunt of climate impacts. Unni argues that decentralisation is essential to ensure funding translates into local action.
Use What Is Already Being Built
India does not necessarily need to wait for new financing mechanisms to begin building climate resilience, Unni argues. Existing public investments in housing and infrastructure could incorporate climate adaptation.
“We are anyway constructing a lot of housing through public investments,” he says. The priority is to identify “what we can do within those schemes and projects.”
He points to Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana (PMAY), the government’s flagship housing scheme, as an opportunity. Homes could incorporate designs that lower indoor temperatures by three or four degrees at night, allowing residents to recover from daytime heat.
For Unni, the issue is “more of a justice and a comfort issue rather than an efficiency issue”. Housing must protect people from the climate conditions they increasingly face.
“We can’t build our way out of this,” he adds. Existing housing schemes and urban master plans must incorporate climate considerations from the outset.
The housing ministry’s climate adaptation cell is an encouraging development, he says. However, the housing and climate ministries need to work more closely to integrate adaptation into public investment and urban planning.
Heat Shows What Money Can Do
Heat is one area where Unni sees the possibility of translating climate commitments into action. According to the government, heat action plans have been prepared by 23 states, 195 districts and 64 cities.
Another development is the inclusion of heatwaves in India’s list of notified natural disasters. The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) says mitigation funds can now support heat action plans.
“Heat action now has money attached to it,” Unni says. The challenge is to ensure this funding leads to sustained action on the ground.
Ahmedabad offers an example. Following the 2010 heatwave, associated with 1,344 excess deaths, the city introduced India’s first heat action plan.
A study supported by the NRDC found that the plan contributed to approximately 1,000 fewer deaths annually on hot days in the years following its full implementation in 2013.
However, Unni argues that heat planning must move beyond preventing deaths to addressing the longer-term effects of rising temperatures on people’s lives and livelihoods.
“Heat is not only a threat to life; it also affects how comfortable people are at home, how well they can work, and how much they earn,” he says.
He proposes a dedicated government scheme and legislation focused on thermal comfort and access to shade. The housing ministry could lead efforts to improve indoor comfort, while the labour ministry addresses outdoor workers’ exposure to extreme heat.
Communities as the Cheaper Route
Unni believes that involving communities in climate planning could also reduce the cost of building urban resilience.
“We already have communities which work on this,” he says. People working across India, from NGOs to local groups, to make cities and spaces more climate resilient. Governments should invest in these existing networks and make climate planning more participatory.
Recognising local knowledge and strengthening community-led responses could bring down the often-quoted costs of urban climate action “by a huge number”. Financial constraints, he argues, should not become an excuse for inaction.
What Comes Next
COP31 has given cities greater visibility through the Antalya Compact, the proposed financing facility and renewed political attention to resilient urban development. But these remain largely voluntary commitments, with no clear indication of how much funding cities will receive or when.
Whether cities get money or simply more recognition will become clearer in the negotiated outcomes on adaptation and finance expected at the conference’s close on 20 November.
For India, the test will be whether governments use existing housing investments, disaster mitigation funds and urban planning mechanisms to make cities safer and more liveable as climate risks intensify.
IPS UN Bureau Report

DHAKA, Bangladesh, Nov 18 2026 (IPS) - Assam’s citizenship crisis is not over borders. It is a test of whether citizenship remains a constitutional right or becomes a status that officials may repeatedly place under suspicion. Bengali-speaking Muslims have disproportionately faced reported evictions, electoral-roll deletions, detention and expulsion, while language and faith risk being treated as evidence of doubtful belonging. Recent protests in Delhi against the Election Commission’s leadership have carried that warning to the national stage. The questions are stark: who may vote, who must endlessly prove eligibility, and who pays when the state gets it wrong?

Dr Mohammad Zaman
Assam’s history is difficult and cannot be wished away: colonial and postcolonial migration, conflict over language and land, and the 1985 Assam Accord all matter. India may regulate immigration and protect public land. What it may not do is blur the difference between an undocumented migrant and a citizen with imperfect papers, or between an unlawful occupant and a family that may be entitled to notice, hearing, rehabilitation or appeal. In the process, India may create its own Rohingya crisis in Assam. As a people, the Bengali Muslims in Assam are fighting for decades for recognition of their rights.
That distinction is being crushed by revived executive expulsion powers. A September 2025 Assam procedure reportedly allowed district officials to label people “illegal immigrants” and order expulsion if they could not prove citizenship within ten days. Analysts warn that officials may decide some cases without first referring them to Foreigners Tribunals, although unresolved cases can still be sent to a tribunal. Rights observers have documented cross-border “pushbacks” without formal deportation orders. When statelessness is the possible result, a ten-day ultimatum is not efficiency. It is due process emptied of meaning.
The electoral roll is now the next frontier of exclusion. Assam’s 2025–26 simplified Special Revision formally relied on door-to-door verification and a claims process, unlike the document-heavy Special Intensive Revision used elsewhere. Yet more than 2,000 people in and around Kachutali, a village located in the Sonapur revenue circle of Kamrup Metropolitan district in Assam, including members of families with long voting histories, were reportedly missing from the revised roll. In one family, a son remained enrolled while his father disappeared from the roll. Such contradictions do not merely reveal bureaucratic sloppiness. They make the ballot look like a favour granted by officials rather than a right secured by law.
That is why the ongoing Delhi protests against Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar cannot be waved away as partisan theatre. The Cockroach Janta Party (CJP), student groups, opposition parties and civil-society activists called a protest for 10 October against alleged voter deletions and irregularities in the Special Intensive Revision. The Election Commission did not create Assam’s citizenship regime, and state authorities—not election officials alone—conduct evictions and expulsions. But the Commission cannot hide behind that distinction when credible evidence points to wrongful deletion. It must disclose its methods, explain its decisions and correct errors before citizens lose the chance to vote.
The remedy is neither radical nor complicated. No one should be pushed across a border without a written order, verified nationality, legal representation and meaningful appeal. Eviction from public land must never serve as proof of foreignness. Electoral deletion must require individual notice, stated reasons and a workable route to restoration before polling. The Election Commission and Assam authorities must publish privacy-protected audit data, while independent legal-aid and civil-society observers monitor hearings and removals. Without these safeguards, administrative power becomes punishment without trial.
These demands do not deny Assam’s history or the state’s authority to enforce law. They reject the poisonous idea that identity can substitute for evidence. Bengali speech is not a border document. Muslim faith is not a land record. Poverty is not a confession of foreignness. Rules that look neutral can discriminate when the state knows who is least able to produce archival papers, hire counsel, receive notice or survive years of appeals. Equality before law requires procedures built to prevent that predictable exclusion.
The Delhi protest matters because Assam’s warning is national. Once citizenship can be unsettled by a hurried notice, a missing paper or a mass objection, no border contains the danger. The franchise becomes conditional on bureaucratic stamina, and citizenship becomes a status people must continually re-earn. The Election Commission will not restore credibility by demanding trust. It must earn trust through reasons, corrections, independent scrutiny and a presumption that no eligible voter should be excluded because the state’s own records are fractured.
The choice is not between indigenous security and minority rights. That is the false binary on which exclusion feeds. Assam can protect land, language and lawful borders without turning Bengali-speaking Muslims into permanent defendants in the court of national belonging. The constitutional question is not whether the state may identify a foreign national, revise a roll or remove an unlawful encroachment. It is whether power is constrained by evidence, hearing, proportionality and effective appeal—and whether officials answer for failure. A republic reveals its character not in slogans but in its treatment of those easiest to dispossess. If administrative suspicion is allowed to do the work that open discrimination cannot, every citizen’s rights are weakened. The state must not be permitted to convert prejudice into procedure and call the result lawful. Citizenship cannot remain meaningful if officials can erase it in practice before the law has proved otherwise.
Dr. Mohammad Zaman has closely followed the plight of Bengali-speaking Muslims since the controversial 2019 citizenship-screening drive and has written several op-eds examining how Assamese media have unfairly portrayed them as Bangladeshis. He can be reached at mqzaman.bc@gmail.com
IPS UN Bureau

ANTALYA, Türkiye, Nov 17 2026 (IPS) - The world is moving dangerously close to irreversible climate tipping points, making urgent action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions more critical than ever, warns Johan Rockström, Director of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research. He argues that protecting forests and accelerating emissions reductions must go hand in hand to prevent further warming and preserve the planet’s natural capacity to absorb carbon dioxide.
Speaking at COP31 in Antalya, Türkiye, Rockström also raises concerns about efforts to sideline climate science in international negotiations. He warns that undermining the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) could weaken countries’ climate commitments and delay action at a time when scientific evidence should be guiding political decisions.
“This is very worrying and, at the negotiation level, is something we’ve seen creeping in for quite some time. This is a deliberate effort to tone down and sideline the IPCC. Then you have an additional challenge: the next global stocktake is meant to be informed by the latest science, and there is a political effort to try and kind of misalign these so that the IPCC will not be able to have the results finished in order to inform the next global stocktake. This is also political gaming as a way of finding an excuse for not updating the nationally determined contributions properly,” Rockström says.

Johan Rockström | Director of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research
[VIDEO Interview]
IPS UN Bureau Report

Inter Press Service (IPS),
DAR ES SALAAM, Tanzania & ANTALYA, Türkiye, Nov 17 2026 (IPS) - Four countries have pledged or proposed a combined $200 million for global environment and climate funds at the COP31 talks in Antalya, as developing nations press for more help to cope with droughts, floods and rising seas.
The offers from Denmark, South Korea, Belgium and Germany will support three separately financed funds managed by the Global Environment Facility (GEF).
Denmark plans to contribute 800 million Danish kroner, about €107 million, to the GEF Trust Fund’s ninth replenishment. South Korea has pledged 4.5 million Special Drawing Rights, an international reserve asset. The GEF says the offers bring pledges to the fund to more than $4.5 billion for 2026–2030.
Belgium has pledged €50 million to the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF). Germany has proposed €10 million for the LDCF and €8 million for the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF).
“Both contributions remain subject to parliamentary approval,” Birgit Pickel, a senior official at Germany’s development ministry, said in the GEF announcement.
The LDCF provides grants to the world’s 44 least developed countries. The SCCF supports adaptation in small island developing states outside that group, as well as innovation and private-sector approaches. Both are financed separately from the GEF Trust Fund.
The GEF expects at least 80 per cent of the money in its latest Trust Fund replenishment to generate climate benefits. The funding also supports nature, land and water projects and is not all earmarked for adaptation.
Together, the LDCF and SCCF have provided nearly $3 billion for more than 580 projects since 2001, which are expected to benefit more than 100 million people directly, the GEF says.
A widening gapThe pledges come as developing countries face adaptation costs far beyond the funding available. The UN Environment Programme (UNEP) estimates that they will need about $305 billion a year by 2035. International public finance for adaptation amounted to between $28 billion and $32 billion in 2024.
The new offers cover several environmental funds and cannot be directly compared with a single year’s adaptation needs. But the gap between available finance and projected costs has become a central issue at the talks.
“Even tripling adaptation finance would meet less than 30 per cent of what is needed,” UN Secretary-General António Guterres told reporters at COP31.

UN Secretary-General António Guterres convenes a Grid Accelerator side event with dignitaries attending COP31. Credit: UN Climate Change/Kiara Worth)
Guterres also met the heads of international climate funds and called for less bureaucracy, according to UN News. Complex application procedures can make it harder for countries with small teams to secure funding.
The conference presidency’s draft cover decision, released on 16 November, expresses concern about the “decline in annual contributions to the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and Global Environment Facility” and calls on developed countries to increase support. The text remains under negotiation and has not been adopted.
The Least Developed Countries Group wants adaptation finance tripled to at least $120 billion a year well before 2035. It is also seeking simpler access and more predictable public grants for national adaptation plans.
“Ambition needs the means to deliver it,” the group’s chair, Ambassador Adão Soares Barbosa of Timor-Leste, said ahead of the talks.
The group also wants more funding for loss and damage: harm that communities cannot avoid through adaptation alone.
From Pledges to ProjectsIn Tanzania, an earlier LDCF-backed project shows what the funding can provide. The Ecosystem-based Adaptation for Rural Resilience project supported water access, landscape restoration and alternative livelihoods in communities facing drier conditions.
UNEP reported in 2024 that the project had drilled 15 boreholes, 12 of them solar-powered, helping to provide water to more than 35,000 people in five districts. It also supported tree planting and training in activities such as beekeeping.
“We used to face many challenges growing vegetables,” Malegesi Makene Chilongo, a resident of a village that received a borehole, told UNEP. The agency said the water source had enabled villagers to establish small farms.
In Bangladesh, a separate LDCF-supported project in preparation aims to restore mangroves and strengthen livelihoods in the Greater Sundarbans. The $8.84 million project is expected to benefit 43,050 people, half of them women, according to a GEF report to the climate convention.
The GEF announcement did not identify which projects would receive the new pledges.
GEF chief executive Diego Mesa Puyo said the institution was seeking to “catalyse greater private finance alongside public investment”. But early-warning systems and rural water supplies may offer little return for investors, while pumps and other infrastructure need money for maintenance.
UN climate chief Simon Stiell welcomed the pledges, saying, “Grant finance remains essential to protecting lives, livelihoods, and development gains.”
For the least developed countries, the test in Antalya will be whether the offers translate into predictable funding that governments and communities can access — and whether more donors follow before COP32 in Addis Ababa.
IPS UN Bureau Report

HANOVER, Germany, Nov 17 2026 (IPS) - The walls of a school assembly hall in Hanover are covered with photographs of Baloch people killed by the Pakistani state. Around a hundred people have gathered for a solemn, intimate ceremony. Candles are lit and flowers are laid in silence.
“On 13 November, we commemorate Baloch Martyrs’ Day. They gave their lives at different points in history to ensure the survival of our people,” Naseem Baloch tells IPS. The 46-year-old exile has been the elected president of the Baloch National Movement (BNM) since 2022.
The same methods of repression used in Balochistan, she adds, have recently begun spreading to other parts of Pakistan inhabited by minorities such as the Pashtuns, Kashmiris and Sindhis. Pakistan is often described as a postcolonial political entity. I would argue that it is simply a colonial state - Ayesha Siddiqa
The party campaigns for an “independent, secular, democratic and sovereign” Balochistan. Like other Baloch organisations with similar aims, it is outlawed in Pakistan.
The Baloch have their own language and culture. Numbering around 15 million, they inhabit a territory roughly the size of France, divided between Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Eastern Balochistan was forcibly annexed by Pakistan eight months after declaring independence in August 1947.
Today, several armed groups are waging a guerrilla war against what they regard as the occupation and plunder of their homeland, which holds vast reserves of gas, gold, uranium and other natural resources.
Yet Balochistan remains Pakistan’s least populated province, with the country’s highest rates of illiteracy and infant mortality, and the worst levels of violence.
Baloch himself has experienced that violence first hand. In 2005, while involved in a student movement, he was detained without charge and tortured for two months. Five years later, by then working as a doctor, he was imprisoned again for a similar period. The torture, he recalls, was “even worse”.
He has not returned to his homeland since leaving in 2011. Occasionally, however, there is good news. While travelling from his home in Grenoble to Hanover, he learnt that his father and two uncles had been released after nine months in detention.
“We had heard nothing from them since they were taken from their home on 2 February. We had reached the point of assuming they were dead, because that happens so often. I believe they abducted them to put pressure on me,” he says.

Naseem Baloch, president of the BNM, during his address in Hanover. All Baloch political parties are banned in Balochistan. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza/IPS
In its 2026 World Report, Human Rights Watch once again accuses Pakistan’s security forces of committing “serious human rights violations, including arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial killings”.
The Balochistan Human Rights Council, an NGO based in Balochistan and Sweden, publishes monthly figures. In 2025, it recorded 1,482 enforced disappearances and 598 killings, increases of 80 and 25 per cent respectively compared with 2024.
“This is terror inflicted on ordinary people by an increasingly powerful and authoritarian state,” Ayesha Siddiqa tells IPS at the gathering. A prominent Pakistani analyst and writer, she regularly contributes to international publications including The New York Times, Le Monde Diplomatique and Al Jazeera.
Invited by the organisers, Siddiqa has flown in from London, where she has lived for nine years after ruling out a return to her home in Islamabad “for security reasons”.
She sees a “clear parallel” between the mothers of the disappeared in Balochistan and Argentina’s Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo.
“In both cases, they were denied any information about their children and made invisible for years.”

A moment during the Hanover memorial event for victims of state repression. The conflict in Balochistan is an armed struggle that rarely makes international news. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza/IPS
The same methods of repression used in Balochistan, she adds, have recently begun spreading to other parts of Pakistan inhabited by minorities such as the Pashtuns, Kashmiris and Sindhis.
“Pakistan is often described as a postcolonial political entity. I would argue that it is simply a colonial state,” she concludes.
The brutality of the situation remains largely hidden from the outside world by an equally systematic media blackout. Foreign journalists are barred from the region, while local reporters risk imprisonment or even death for covering stories such as those of the disappeared.
In its World Press Freedom Index, Reporters Without Borders ranks Pakistan 153rd. The organisation describes a system in which “state institutions, political actors and economic pressures crush journalistic independence”.
The reality may be even grimmer. A report by Freedom Network, the local partner of Reporters Without Borders, documents the killing of 40 journalists over the past two decades.

Ayesha Siddiqa during her speech in Hanover. This renowned Pakistani analyst has been living in London for nine years and has decided not to return to her home in Islamabad for security reasons Credit: Karlos Zurutuza/IPS
Among those gathered in Hanover, it is difficult to find a Baloch person who has not lost at least one family member to disappearance or killing.
As chairs are stacked away, candles extinguished and photographs and other tributes taken down, Faizal Dost Mohamed tells IPS that he has heard nothing of his father since he was abducted by plainclothes agents in 2012.
Born in Oman, the young Baloch man has visited his homeland only twice, most recently in 2013. Despite this, his name appears on a wanted list.
Niaz Zehri Baloch will not be returning either. Three years after he left his homeland in 2011 to begin the long struggle for political asylum, every resident of his village was displaced and many houses were demolished, including his own.
He admits that seeing what remains of his village on Google Earth is painful. But even harder to bear is the loss of 13 family members.
Human rights organisations and local media report that counterterrorism operations carried out by the Pakistani army against Baloch insurgent groups frequently leave entire valleys and villages deserted.
Those affected denounce the operations as forced expulsions, while Islamabad describes them as “routine evacuations prompted by weather conditions or national security concerns”.
Droshum Baloch is one of the few people here who still believe they will be able to return. The 30-year-old Baloch woman is studying at a German university on a scholarship. For now, she prefers to conceal her real name and avoid disclosing any details that might reveal her identity. She has had no news of her father for two years.
In the almost empty assembly hall, she asks permission to have her photograph taken beside a display of portraits of the disappeared before it is dismantled. She then agrees to pose for IPS, wearing a surgical mask and a scarf covering her hair, but quickly changes her mind.
“You never know,” she says apologetically, surrounded by the faces of those caught up in a war that remains invisible to the outside world.





