The Human Consciousness Now...Our World in the Midst of Becoming...to What? Observe, contemplate Now.
ANTALYA, Türkiye, Nov 16 2026 (IPS) - A coalition of African civil society organisations, representatives from the Africa Institute of Resilience Studies (an independent organisation working in research, policy, training and capacity development), and representatives from the Bank–Civil Society Coalition, which brings together seven major regional networks and civil society organisations working on climate and energy, have launched the African Non-State Actors Working Group on Critical Minerals on the sidelines of COP 31 in Antalya, Türkiye.
The launch comes amid growing concerns over environmental degradation and social suffering among communities living in energy-transition mineral-rich areas in Africa, where people bear the burden of forced displacement, loss of livelihoods and human rights abuses, with very limited or sometimes no benefits at all.
“Our shared purpose is to advance accountable, people-centred and nature-positive critical mineral development in Africa, with decent work at its core,” said Dr Augustine Njamnshi, the Executive Director at the African Coalition for Sustainable Energy and Access (ACSEA).
“Africa’s mineral wealth must create lasting value within Africa through local processing, refining, manufacturing and regional value chains that strengthen productive capabilities, support African ownership and improve community wellbeing,” he told delegates attending the UN climate summit in Antalya (COP31).
From cobalt, copper, coltan, lithium and other strategic minerals in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and parts of Zambia, to lithium projects in Zimbabwe and graphite in Mozambique, communities in mining areas continue to face poverty, environmental damage, unsafe working conditions, displacement, conflict and limited participation in decisions affecting their land and livelihoods.
“I believe the new working group will bring additional energy if it places affected communities, Indigenous Peoples, artisanal miners and African civil-society organisations at the centre,” said Appolinaire Zagabe, the Executive Director at the DRC Climate Change Network (Réseau sur le Changement Climatique RDC – RCCRDC).
The working group committed to building an all representative and action-orientated platform for collective engagement, bringing together organised labour, frontline communities, women and youth organisations, researchers, environmental movements and other African non-state actors.
“We will organise our work around four connected functions based on ideas and evidence, policy and advocacy, accountability, and voice and participation,” said Njamnshi. “Our goal is to advance freedom of association and collective bargaining, living wages, safe workplaces, social protection, skills development and the inclusion of artisanal and small-scale miners,” he told the delegates in Antalya.
According to Philip Kilonzo, the Head of Policy, Advocacy and Communication at the Pan African Climate Justice Alliance (PACJA), the working group will help bridge existing gaps in evidence and coordinated advocacy on critical minerals and a just energy transition.
“It will strengthen our collective efforts to promote accountable governance of Africa’s critical mineral resources, ensuring that their exploitation contributes meaningfully to the development and well-being of African people,” he told IPS.
To kick off, the working group will begin by developing shared evidence and priorities through an African Critical Minerals Issues Paper, wider consultations and a common African Non-State-Actor’s position.
“We will explore a Labour and Just Transition Brief and an accountability framework or scorecard examining decision-making, ownership, working conditions, the distribution of benefits and responsibility for risks,” said Njamnshi. “These products will be developed through consultation and are not presented as completed instruments at this launch.”
Interested organisations and constituencies, including African civil society organisations, trade unions, mining-affected communities, Indigenous Peoples and local communities, women’s and youth organisations, researchers and other non-state actors have also been invited to contribute their knowledge, experience and proposals through the ACSEA secretariat.
At the same time, RCCRDC, as a national civil-society platform in DRC and an accredited observer to the UNFCCC and UNEP, has raised community concerns in climate and energy-transition discussions at COP 31.
“We advocate for early community participation, transparent mineral governance, environmental protection, decent employment, local value addition and enforceable benefit-sharing,” said Zagabe. “We have also proposed a legally binding one percent contribution on final products linked to critical and energy transition minerals to go to community development,” he told IPS.
So far, the DRC Mining Code provides for community development agreements and an annual allocation of 0.3% of mining companies’ turnover for community development. However, according to Zagabe, implementation, transparency and community oversight have always been inconsistent.
“Our central message is clear, that the global energy transition must not reproduce exploitation, conflict and inequality in mineral-producing countries,” he said. “Communities must have decision-making power, legal protection and a fair share of the wealth generated from their resources.”
As the world transitions to clean energy while reducing dependence on fossils, demand for critical energy transition minerals is growing every day, and Africa holds a significant share of them.
However, the continent constantly exports raw materials and semi-finished products to the developed world, while receiving very little share of the massive wealth created from the sector. According to a UN report, countries and mining communities are often left with degraded landscapes, limited services, a few lasting economic opportunities and very little to show from the harnessing of their mineral resource wealth.
And now, at COP 31, African leaders and civil society representatives say that it is time for Africa to take charge. “As Africa, the way to go is to ensure that we don’t just release our critical resources to the developed world, who eventually leave us with problems,” said Dr Benjamin Mandewere, the Principal Climate Change Adaptation Officer in the Ministry of Environment, Climate and Wildlife in Zimbabwe.
“We also have to ensure that environmental and social impact assessments not only look at particular places but also take local communities on board to ensure that their voices are heard and they also benefit from these resources,” he told the delegates in Antalya.
IPS UN Bureau Report

MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Nov 16 2026 (IPS) - Zimbabwe’s President Emmerson Mnangagwa, who took over when a miliary coup ended Robert Mugabe’s 37 years in power, has made clear he has no intention of limiting himself to a decade at the top. In July, he signed a constitutional amendment that lengthened the terms of the sitting president and parliament from five to seven years and pushed the next general election back from 2028 to 2030.
Zimbabwe is not alone. In several African countries and beyond, presidents are using constitutional amendments, courts and parliaments to stay in power beyond the original limits. They are extending terms, abolishing term and age limits, writing rivals out of the race and, in the boldest cases, removing voters from the equation altogether, while repressing those who stand up for democracy. These moves can achieve much the same outcome as a coup, but their legal veneer spares those behind them the consequences. A military takeover can get a country suspended from the African Union (AU), while presidents who rewrite the rules have so far faced no penalties at all.
Limits erased
In Djibouti, President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh has ruled since 1999. In October 2025, parliament voted unanimously to scrap the presidential age limit of 75, which Guelleh had already exceeded. In April 2026, he claimed a sixth term on an implausible 97.8 per cent in an election most opposition parties boycotted.
In Chad, where Mahamat Idriss Déby took power in 2021 after his father’s death and won a disputed election in 2024, parliament abolished presidential term limits in October 2025 and lengthened terms from five to seven years. The Republic of the Congo shows where this road leads. A decade after a referendum removed term and age limits that would have stopped Denis Sassou Nguesso running again, the 82-year-old claimed a fifth term in March 2026, on an official 94.82 per cent.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) may be next. President Félix Tshisekedi is constitutionally barred from a third term, but he has floated a constitutional revision and a possible delay to the 2028 election. On 23 October, the National Assembly passed a law allowing a referendum to be triggered by a ‘major dysfunction’ of state institutions and sent it to the Senate. The constitution still forbids any change to term limits, but civil society and the opposition see this law as a step towards indefinite rule.
Africa has no monopoly on this tactic. In El Salvador, Nayib Bukele used his party’s supermajority to purge the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Chamber, whose new judges reinterpreted the constitutional ban on consecutive re-election to clear his way to a second term in 2024. In July 2025, the Legislative Assembly abolished presidential term limits altogether.
Rivals off the ballot
Once limits are out of the way, rivals are next. In Côte d’Ivoire, President Alassane Ouattara argued that the 2016 constitution had reset his term count to zero. The Constitutional Council agreed, clearing him for a fourth term at 83, and struck several challengers off the ballot seven weeks before the October 2025 vote. With no viable contenders left, he won with around 90 per cent.
In Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega jailed every viable challenger ahead of the 2021 election. In July, he declared that the country would hold no more elections, and now he’s writing political exclusion into the constitution. An amendment approved on first reading in September, pending a second vote in January 2027, would permanently bar anyone accused of being a ‘traitor to the homeland’ or of supporting foreign sanctions from standing for public office.
Voters written out
The ultimate way to entrench power is to deprive voters of their say. Once Zimbabwe’s amendment has kept the 84-year-old Mnangagwa in office until 2030, a parliament his party dominates could renew his mandate indefinitely, without voters having any say.
In Cameroon, President Paul Biya, 93 and in power since 1982, claimed an eighth term in October 2025. In April, parliament voted 200 to 18 to reintroduce the vice-presidency, a post the president appoints and dismisses, whose holder would serve out any unfinished term, even though the constitution requires a fresh election. The law effectively hands Biya the power to choose his own successor. Opposition leader Maurice Kamto called it a ‘constitutional coup’.
Ongoing repression
Legal manipulation relies on repression. In Zimbabwe, police shut down the inaugural meeting of the Constitutional Defenders Forum and Human Rights Watch documented seven attacks on student leaders campaigning against the amendment, some of whom were abducted, tortured and handed to police. Ruling-party loyalists trapped journalists covering parliamentary hearings and forced them to delete footage of violence against activists.
In Chad, opposition leader Succès Masra was sentenced to 20 years in prison two months before term limits were removed. In Côte d’Ivoire, authorities banned protests and public meetings other than campaign events. In the DRC, police fired teargas at people marching against the referendum law and arrested dozens, and clashes in Kinshasa left an opposition politician dead.
An outdated rulebook
When soldiers removed Gabon’s president in August 2023, the AU suspended the country the next day. None of the presidents rewriting the rules to stay in power have faced anything comparable. The AU has the tools. Its African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance provides for sanctions when governments amend constitutions or legal instruments to stay in power, just as it does for a coup.
Yet the AU has only ever suspended states after military takeovers or, as in Côte d’Ivoire in 2010, when a defeated incumbent refused to leave, and never for rewriting a constitution. It did not even suspend Chad in 2021, when the army installed the younger Déby in breach of succession rules, the first step in a process that ended with the abolition of term limits.
Each manoeuvre that goes unanswered lowers the cost of the next one. As long as rewriting the rules brings no consequences, presidents determined to stay will keep doing it, and those who resist will keep paying the price.
Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also a Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.
For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org.

ANTALYA, Türkiye, Nov 16 2026 (IPS) - Today (November 15) marks the second week of negotiations at the United Nations climate summit in the resort city of Antalya, Turkey.
This two-week Conference of the Parties, or COP31, comes as scientists have warned that the world is approaching the 1.5C warming limit set by the Paris Agreement in 2015.
Although scientists measure the target over decades, not individual years, they found that the planet crossed that threshold for the first time over a full year in 2024.
Scientists predict that sustained breach of 1.5°C is now unavoidable, and existing policies could drive warming to 2.8°C this century, increasing the risk of extreme heat, floods and droughts, according to the UN Environment Programme (UNEP).
For the temperatures to fall back below 1.5C, much bigger cuts in emissions and removing large amounts of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere are required.
The latest climate plans would cut global emissions by just 6 percent by 2035 compared with 2019 levels – far short of what is needed, according to the UN’s climate change body.
With negotiations in the Mediterranean country in the second week, Africa made some progress but also lost some critical issues it was pushing.
Africa’s Wins
On the first day of COP31, negotiators from Africa and other developing countries secured a formal place for the Climate Finance Work Programme (CFWP) on the official agenda.
The CFWP matters to African countries because it focuses on scrutinising developed nations’ legal obligations under Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement to provide public and concessional climate finance to developing countries.
Wealthy nations did not want to establish a dedicated space to discuss climate finance.
For African nations, the CFWP helps press for concrete financial accountability, particularly on pledges such as the $300bn annual climate finance by 2035 agreed at COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan.
During COP31, the Leaf Coalition, a public-private global initiative designed to halt tropical deforestation by mobilising large-scale financial support for forest-protecting jurisdictions, announced that Ghana would be the first country to access finance for a carbon credit project.
Ghana will get millions of dollars as buyers transact credits. The REDD+ program covers approximately 2.5 million hectares of forest across 10 regions in southern and central Ghana, where forests are under threat from agricultural expansion, illegal logging and mining.
Climate activists have criticised the initiative as a false climate solution and greenwashing, saying it delays actual decarbonisation while allowing high-emitting companies to keep polluting.
Major Setbacks
Africa’s bid to create a dedicated, standalone agenda item for tripling adaptation finance did not make it to this year’s COP agenda after wealthy nations opposed it. This was a tremendous blow to African countries. Parties agreed to triple adaptation finance at COP30 in Belém, with a target year of 2035.
However, the agreement did not settle the critical questions such as scope, baseline, delivery timelines, milestones and accountability arrangements. The African Group of Negotiators (AGN) wanted the issue to be at the centre of COP31. Without clarity on these elements, tripling risks becoming another political promise without a practical mechanism for implementation.
It is unclear what the baseline for the tripling is. If it is tripling from the US$40bn agreed at COP26 in Glasgow, developed countries will triple adaptation finance to US$120bn annually by 2035.
This issue is important because African countries lose an average of 2% to 5% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) every year because of climate extremes. Yet governments in Africa spend up to 9% of their annual budgets on unplanned disaster relief and climate response.
Now, Africa is pushing for adaptation finance to be discussed under the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA). Anchoring tripling of adaptation finance in the GGA discussions would ensure that finance is driving clear implementation, including addressing the growing adaptation needs of developing countries, strengthening climate resilience and improving access to finance.
Another setback for Africa is the Belém Action Mechanism (BAM) – a global climate mechanism established to guide, coordinate, and support a just transition for workers, unions, and vulnerable communities as the world shifts to a low-carbon economy. It was a big win for the continent at COP30 in Belém, Brazil.
Parties should agree on its operational details at COP31.
The latest draft negotiating text on BAM does not show that it can deliver practical support for just transitions. Wealthy nations want the already overstretched UN climate secretariat and external institutions, including development banks, to take responsibility. Africa does not want another bureaucratic process.
IPS UN Bureau Report

UNITED NATIONS, Nov 16 2026 (IPS) - Somewhere tonight, a family that lost its home to the water is asleep in a school gymnasium. The tent, the blankets and the first meal arrived within hours. But a secure home will take years. Every climate disaster ends with the same question, and few climate budgets have a line for it: where will we sleep tonight?

Amy Pope, Director General of IOM, at COP31 in Antalya, Turkiye. Credit: IOM
The scale is no longer in doubt. In 2025, disasters caused 29.9 million internal displacements – 13% above the ten-year average. Almost 13.6 million people were living in displacement caused by disasters at year’s end, 37% more than a year earlier.2 Climate is rarely the only force at work, and conflict and violence triggered more displacements than disasters last year.3 However, climate can deepen these pressures – and people displaced for any reason need somewhere safe to live. We track emissions and estimate disaster losses. But we need a clearer picture of how long families wait for a safe home.

Anacláudia Rossbach, Executive Director, UN-Habitat, speaking at a High level Dialogue in COP31 in Antalya, Turkiye. Credit: UN-Habitat
We propose to give that gap a name and a number: time to home. It is the time between the day a family is displaced and the day it is living in a safe, affordable home with secure tenure – meaning protection against forced eviction – whether it chooses to return, settle where it is, or live elsewhere. Building on existing work on durable solutions to internal displacement, this measure would track one essential part of recovery. The idea is simple to grasp: make the wait visible, understand what prolongs it, and work to shorten it. Measuring that wait would bring together the expertise of our two organizations. IOM knows where people go and what they face on the way and where they first find shelter, as the agency that tracks displacement and co-leads the global Shelter, Land and Site Coordination Cluster. UN-Habitat knows what the land, the law and the city allow when they arrive. Working with governments and communities, we can build a clearer picture of the gap and what would help shorten it.
Behind the number lies a conviction we share. A safe home is a foundation for adapting to a changing climate and living with dignity. Without stable housing, people can face greater barriers to enrolling children in school, finding work, opening a bank account, or accessing support. Helping people stay safely, move safely, and find a secure home requires connected policies and investment.
At COP31 in Antalya, we ask governments for three commitments:
1. Put housing into adaptation plans. Include housing and secure tenure for people who stay and those who move in national adaptation plans and in the implementation of their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement, and adopt or pilot time to home among their indicators of progress. Where relocation is necessary, measure whether people have freely made informed decisions and can access safe housing, essential services and work.2. Fund the transition to a safe home. Bring adaptation finance and funding for loss and damage together with recovery and development finance to bridge the gap between emergency shelter and long-term housing. Work with local governments and community organizations, including in cities receiving displaced people, so that shelter is a first step toward a secure home. Track how this funding improves people’s housing and safety.
3. Plan for safe homes before a crisis. Where climate risks are known, identify suitable land and agree with communities on access, tenure and services. Prepare cities to receive people who need to move, so that they have safe options and support before a crisis forces them to leave. Invest in upgrading informal settlements, affordable housing and resilient infrastructure to help people stay safely wherever possible. Throughout these efforts, protect people against forced eviction.
We will not ask of others what we are not prepared to do ourselves. IOM and UN-Habitat are ready to work together to put time to home into practice: drawing on IOM’s displacement tracking and shelter operations and UN-Habitat’s urban and land data, we will work to measure it, and what each month of waiting costs, in selected cities and settlements, and to share what we learn openly, including whether land and tenure, rather than construction, are the longest part of the wait. We invite every government, city and partner that wants to shorten the wait to join us in Antalya.
As climate risks grow, people will continue to adapt where they live, and some will need to move. Everyone should have the chance to build a safe future wherever they live. Climate adaptation has an address. Let us make sure that everyone has one.
Notes and sources
1.- UN-Habitat estimate for 2024: about 1.16 billion people, or 24.8% of the global urban population, live in slums and informal settlements. UN-Habitat, Transforming informal settlements: Data, standards and practice, session summary, 13th World Urban Forum, Baku, May 2026.2.- Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Global Report on Internal Displacement 2026: summary, May 2026. In 2025: 29.9 million disaster displacements, 13% above the decadal average; almost 13.6 million people displaced by disasters at year end, 37% more than at the end of 2024. The 13.6 million figure includes people displaced in earlier years who were still displaced at the end of 2025. The 29.9 million figure counts displacements (movements), which can include the same person more than once. Both figures cover all disasters, including geophysical hazards such as earthquakes, not only climate-related events. Full report: doi.org/10.55363/IDMC.ETWG8973.
3.- IDMC, Global Report on Internal Displacement 2026 (same source). In 2025, conflict and violence triggered a record 32.3 million displacements, more than the 29.9 million caused by disasters, the first time on record. IDMC counts displacements (movements), not distinct individuals.
Amy Pope is the Director General of the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Anacláudia Rossbach is the Executive Director of UN-Habitat.
IPS UN Bureau

Excerpt:
After a flood or other disaster, finding a safe home can take years. At COP31, we should commit to measuring – and shortening – that wait.ANTALYA, Türkiye, Nov 14 2026 (IPS) - The shift away from fossil fuels is made more difficult by the powerful, often overlooked role of national oil companies. These companies are deeply embedded in their countries’ economies and political systems.
During the COP31 climate summit in Antalya, Inter Press Service (IPS) spoke exclusively with Amir Shafaie, Legal and Economic Program Director at the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), about the role of state-owned oil companies in the energy transition, the financial risks of continued fossil fuel investments and the policies governments need to adopt to meet global climate goals.
Shafaie said national oil companies produced 54 percent of the world’s oil and half of its gas in 2025. Their share of global production could rise to around 62 percent by 2050 if current trends continue.
Excerpts from the interview:

Amir Shafaie, Legal and Economic Program Director at the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI). Photo: Supplied
IPS: National oil companies account for nearly half of global fossil fuel production. How significant is their role in the global transition away from fossil fuels, and why have they received less attention in climate negotiations?
Shafaie: National oil companies are even more significant than the question suggests. In 2025 they produced 54% of the world’s oil and half its gas, and their share is projected to reach around 62% by 2050. Last year (2025) NOC capital expenditure was around US$240 billion — more than three times what the oil majors spent. So, the pace of the transition away from fossil fuels will be significantly shaped by these state-owned companies.
NOCs are also politically sensitive. They often have a massive role in the national political economy and significant influence over government: they fund national budgets and public services and are often bound up with national identity.
Given their importance, it’s time to stop treating them as a footnote in transition conversations.
They deserve to be a headline.
IPS: What specific steps should national oil companies take to align their business strategies with the global goal of limiting temperature rise to 1.5°C?
Shafaie: There is no single model — NOCs differ widely in mandate and capability — but every NOC needs a deliberate strategy of transformation to navigate the energy transition, and government owners of NOCs need to ensure that is the case.
As a first step, NOCs must stop treating business as usual as a neutral option and start to seriously assess the risks – and opportunities – presented by the global energy transition. Every NOC should test its planned investments against various demand scenarios, including those in which countries meet their climate pledges and oil and gas demand falls — and publish the results. Many projects that NOCs view positively today may not pay back. In 2023, NRGI analysis found that NOCs plan about US$1.8 trillion of upstream spending over the 2023-2032 period and that roughly a quarter, about US$425 billion, of that public money would be lost if oil demand falls in line with governments’ climate pledges.
Moreover, in these assessments, NOCs shouldn’t assume a pivot to gas eliminates risk: demand destruction from the recent crisis, with countries switching to renewables that can be cheaper and less geopolitically volatile, works against that; and there is still a lot of gas and LNG coming on to the market in coming years, so projects will need to be competitive.
Governments and NOCs also need a credible plan for the new business areas NOCs pursue, identifying sectors and technologies in which the NOC holds genuine comparative advantages.
Finally, NOCs are not only commercial entities—in many producing regions they are anchor employers and service providers, and their transformation carries real consequences for workers and communities. Governments and NOCs must anticipate the just transition needs of different regions as NOCs transform.”
IPS: How can governments persuade state-owned oil companies to reduce fossil fuel production while balancing energy security, economic growth and employment concerns?
Shafaie: Balancing these various concerns is not easy, but governments need to weigh all the factors (energy security, economic growth, employment concerns and production plans), not focus on just one or some of them. Governments are also well placed to do this with NOCS.
They own these companies or hold large stakes in them, so this is less about persuading NOCs than about setting a clear policy, including around how much revenue can go back into new oil and gas and requiring investments to be tested against different demand scenarios.
And there is room to balance these factors. The recent energy crisis shows that energy security and energy transition are not opposites: oil dependence is itself a security and cost-of-living risk, and NOCs often end up absorbing the cost, as Pertamina has with subsidised fuel prices.
The challenge also looks different for NOCs in net-importing and net-exporting countries. In net importers such as Thailand, producing more at home offers little protection from world prices, so the energy security gains come from cutting demand and diversifying supply. In large net exporters such as the UAE or Norway, the main risk is volatile revenues, and today’s windfalls are an opportunity to diversify their economies. Many NOCs, including Pemex, Pertamina, NNPC and increasingly Ecopetrol in the case of gas, sit in between and face both challenges at once, so governments need mandates that address both.”
IPS: What risks do continued investments in new oil and gas fields pose to developing countries, particularly in terms of stranded assets, public finances and long-term energy security?
Shafaie: The risks are significant, and they fall on ordinary people in producing countries. Our 2023 analysis finds that if governments meet their existing climate pledges, around a quarter of NOCs’ planned upstream investments for 2023–2032 may never break even. For some — Uganda’s UNOC and Cameroon’s SNH — the figure exceeds 80%.
When a state company’s assets lose value, the hit lands on public balance sheets, leaving less for health, education and diversification. Current high oil prices can mask these vulnerabilities in the short term, but they don’t remove them. The longer-term dynamics from the energy transition are still there. It is particularly important for NOCs and the government to exercise fiscal discipline in the current context, where market signals may lead them to take greater risks. As UN Secretary General Guterres said at COP31 ‘taxpayers should not underwrite investments that lock in fossil fuel dependence’.
IPS: The COP30 roadmap seeks to accelerate the transition away from fossil fuels. What concrete policy measures, financial incentives and accountability mechanisms are needed to ensure national oil companies become part of this transition rather than obstacles to it?
Shafaie: The Brazil COP roadmap is a significant step forward in taking the “transition away from fossil fuels” from an abstract idea to a basis for national planning. What happens at the national level is what really matters now.
The roadmap rightly asks countries to start now and equitably recognises that what this means in each country will differ, depending on exposure and capacity. The approach looks different in each country and can range from starting the phase-out of licensing and production in rich Global North producers to starting serious transition risk – and opportunity – assessments and associated planning in low- and middle-income producer countries.
The COP30 Presidency Roadmap also rightly recognises the distinctive role of NOCs at the intersection of public revenues, energy security and industrial development. Accordingly, for countries with NOCs, discussions around the NOC’s future should be central from the start if transition plans are to be credible.
International cooperation can also play a vital role in supporting NOC transformations through peer learning around scenario-based planning, disciplined investment decisions, decarbonisation and methane emissions abatement and finance for credible diversification into renewable energy and other business areas.
IPS UN Bureau Report

ANTALYA, Türkiye & NAIROBI, Nov 13 2026 (IPS) - Plans to build waste incineration plants across Africa risk undermining efforts to curb methane emissions, zero-waste campaigners have warned, as world leaders and climate negotiators gather in Antalya, Türkiye, for the COP31 climate summit.
Waste management and methane reduction are among the issues under discussion at the summit, with campaigners saying that governments should prioritise waste separation, composting and recycling over investment in incineration infrastructure.
Weyinmi Okotie, executive director of the Green Knowledge Foundation, said only 55% of municipal solid waste was collected across Africa, with just 4% recycled.
Organic material accounts for as much as 70% of municipal waste in some African cities, Okotie said, much of which ends up in dumpsites and landfills.
As it decomposes in oxygen-poor conditions, the waste releases methane, a greenhouse gas with about 80 times the warming potential of carbon dioxide over a 20-year period.
Food waste accounts for up to 14% of global methane emissions, according to a 2026 report by the UN Environment Programme

Mary Nyambura Kanyui at her recycling aggregation yard on Juja Road in Nairobi’s
Eastleigh area, where she buys recyclable materials from waste pickers. Credit: Chemtai Kirui/IPS
and UN-Habitat. The report estimated that 1.05bn tonnes of food were wasted in 2022, even as 783mn people faced hunger.
A ministerial declaration issued at COP31 by countries participating in the Global Methane Pledge called on governments to prevent organic waste from being sent to landfill, expand resource recovery, and capture methane emissions where avoidance is not yet possible.
The declaration reaffirmed the Global Methane Pledge‘s goal of cutting global methane emissions by at least 30 per cent below 2020 levels by 2030. It was endorsed by seven countries: Belgium, Canada, Germany, Indonesia, Norway, the UK and the Federated States of Micronesia.
The declaration was issued as ministers and private-sector representatives met to assess progress towards the target.
Existing commitments are projected to deliver only 10–11 per cent of the emissions reductions needed by 2030, participants warned, and they called for stronger policies, improved emissions monitoring, and increased public and private investment.
They called for stronger policies, improved emissions monitoring and greater investment to accelerate methane reductions across the energy, agriculture and waste sectors.
Global municipal solid waste is projected to rise from 2.1bn tonnes in 2023 to 3.8bn tonnes by 2050, according to the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). The annual cost of managing waste, including the effects of pollution, ill health and climate change, could reach US$640.3bn by then if current trends persist.
A shift towards a circular economy, in which materials are reused rather than discarded, could instead generate net annual economic gains of US$108.5bn by 2050, UNEP estimates.
Türkiye’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, urged governments to embrace zero-waste initiatives, saying efforts to reduce rubbish and increase recycling could help cut emissions and tackle the climate crisis.
His call came as Türkiye’s COP31 presidency urged countries to halve the projected growth in global annual waste generation by 2035. The proposed target shifts the focus from waste collection and disposal towards preventing waste at source, extending the life of materials and reducing emissions from discarded organic matter.

Sherphine Apiyo Kochiyo, a monitoring and evaluation officer at Kenya’s Centre for Environment Justice and Development (CEJAD), attends the COP31 climate summit in Antalya, Türkiye. Credit: GAIA
Wednesday was designated Zero Waste Day at COP31, with discussions focusing on circularity and methane reduction.
But campaigners warned that the growing promotion of waste-to-energy incinerators in African countries risked locking cities into costly infrastructure and diverting investment from waste prevention, composting and recycling.
An average of USD 4.1bn a year in climate finance was tracked for methane reduction in the solid-waste sector in 2021–22, but 94 per cent of that funding — USD 3.86bn — went to projects involving undifferentiated waste incineration, according to the Climate Policy Initiative.
Just USD 223m went to targeted waste-management measures, such as landfill-gas capture and food-waste anaerobic digestion. A further USD 22m was directed to organic-waste management. Sub-Saharan Africa received 57 per cent of the funding for targeted projects, the analysis found.
A report by the Global Alliance for Incinerator Alternatives (GAIA), published in October, identified 15 waste-to-energy incineration projects and proposals across 10 African countries, with combined estimated capital costs exceeding US$4bn.
Public funding was the largest identified source of finance. Yet only one project — the Reppie plant in Ethiopia — was operational. Two others were under construction, while the remaining 12 were at various stages of approval, financing, planning or proposal.
Chythenyen Devika Kulasekaran, a researcher at India’s Centre for Financial Accountability, said companies were increasingly promoting incineration in Africa after pushing the technology in parts of Asia.

Waste workers with the Nipe Fagio waste collection service sift through compost to remove larger particles during the production of organic fertiliser in Bonyokwa, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 2023. Credit: Nipe Fagio
Kulasekaran cited a proposed plant in Casablanca, Morocco, which would be the largest incinerator in Africa if built. An agreement for the project was signed in August, he said, although details of its financing remained unavailable.
Desmond Alugnoa, programme manager for zero waste and climate at GAIA, said governments facing waste-management problems and electricity shortages were attracted by the prospect of generating power from rubbish.
But incinerators required large upfront investments and a constant supply of waste to operate, he said. Alugnoa cited Ethiopia’s Reppie plant, which he said had received substantial public investment but generated relatively little electricity for the national grid compared with its operating costs.
Such projects also risked diverting public money from efforts to reduce waste before it was discarded, Alugnoa said.
Across eastern, western and southern Africa, community-based waste workers are already recovering organic waste and recyclable materials that might otherwise end up in dumpsites and landfills.
In Ngong, located on the outskirts of Nairobi, Kenya, Michael Wangombe collects food waste from markets and nearby businesses and supplies it to a black soldier fly project, where larvae convert the organic material into fertiliser.
Collectors are paid about KSh80 (US$0.62) for each bucket of waste collected. The material is weighed before being fed to the larvae, while the remaining residue is processed into fertiliser for agricultural use.
Wangombe is a member of the Ngong Social Justice and Environmental Centre, whose members have received protective equipment and support in finding buyers through the Danish Refugee Council’s Fair Recycling project.
Maurice Onzere, project manager of the Danish Refugee Council’s Fair Recycling project, said the initiative was helping waste pickers move from informal collection into more structured recycling businesses.
Participants receive training in waste segregation, financial management and market access, and are linked to aggregation centres where they can sell recovered materials to recycling companies.
Further along the waste-recovery chain, Mary Nyambura Kanyui runs an aggregation yard on Juja Road in Nairobi’s Eastleigh area, buying recyclable materials from waste pickers and selling them to recycling companies.
Kanyui spent three years collecting waste before setting up the business nearly six years ago. She now employs five workers, each earning KSh600 ($4.57) a day.
The Danish Refugee Council has helped her establish links with buyers, including recycling companies.
Onzere said women accounted for 57% of the waste pickers engaged by the programme in December 2025, up from less than 12% in 2021. The project works with about 4,000 waste pickers, including refugees and members of host communities.
In Tanzania, the environmental organisation Nipe Fagio works with waste pickers in Dar es Salaam to turn organic waste into fertiliser using black soldier fly larvae. The organisation is also working with the city of Zanzibar on plans for a zero-waste island.
A similar model is being pursued in Ghana, where a project established with Alugnoa’s support converts food and other organic waste into compost for urban farmers. The initiative also works with farmers to demonstrate its use. Despite operating across several municipalities, it processes less than 70 per cent of the city’s organic waste, Alugnoa said.
Durban, South Africa offers another approach. At Warwick Market, a project diverts unsold food from traders for use as animal feed, with the remaining waste sent for composting.
These initiatives were among the approaches discussed at the COP31 Food and Agriculture Pavilion, where practitioners from Tanzania, Uganda and Indonesia shared experiences of using black soldier fly larvae, biogas and composting to manage organic waste and reduce methane emissions.
Piotr Barczak of Africa Circular presented the BUGS project, which supports the development of black soldier fly systems across Africa. Representatives of Tanzania’s Nipe Fagio, Uganda’s Collect Village and GAIA Asia Pacific in Indonesia also outlined how these approaches were being applied in their respective countries.
But expanding such initiatives and the wider systems that support waste recovery requires investment.
Kanyui said she could make a profit of KSh10,000–15,000 (US$77–116) on days when she sold plastic after paying her workers. But banks were reluctant to lend to her because they did not consider the materials and equipment at her yard sufficient collateral.
“Someone goes to the yard the first time and sees rubbish,” she said.
Kanyui said access to a loan would allow her to buy more recyclable materials and that she would be able to repay it quickly.
Kenya’s Sustainable Waste Management Act, passed in 2022, requires waste to be separated at source and makes producers responsible for the environmental impact of products they introduce to the market. Regulations gazetted in November 2024 established an extended producer responsibility (EPR) framework, requiring companies to finance the collection and recycling of waste from their products.
Companies can meet these obligations individually or through producer responsibility organisations (PROs), which collect contributions from members and arrange for the recovery and recycling of discarded materials.
Dorothy Adhiambo Otieno, a programme officer at Kenya’s Centre for Environment Justice and Development (CEJAD), said some PROs had initially subsidised recycling companies buying recovered materials before shifting their support to aggregators, who collect materials from waste pickers and supply them to recyclers.
Some PROs were now exploring direct payments to waste pickers, Otieno said. But workers operating informally faced documentation requirements, including obtaining personal identification numbers from the Kenya Revenue Authority, which could make it difficult for them to receive payments.
Figures published by the Kenya Extended Producer Responsibility Organisation (KEPRO) show that its subsidy framework for September–December 2026 allocates 30 per cent of funding to recyclers, 25 per cent to aggregators, 15 per cent to transporters and the remaining 30 per cent to waste collectors.
Individual waste pickers and community-based organisations can participate through contracted aggregators. Guidance issued by the National Environment Management Authority (Nema) also provides for direct payments to waste pickers at collection points and material recovery facilities.
Producers are required to publish the rates they pay for waste collection services, the guidance says.
Sherphine Apiyo Kochiyo, a monitoring and evaluation officer at CEJAD, said the framework was welcome, but its effectiveness would depend on whether funding reached the workers recovering the waste.
Speaking on the sidelines of COP31, Kochiyo called for greater investment in community-based waste management, including separate collection vehicles for organic and dry waste, support for compost standards and certification, and funding to help community organisations participate in developing waste-management policies.
Campaigners warned that expanding incineration capacity risked diverting investment from waste reduction, recycling and composting. Kulasekaran said the plants’ need for a steady supply of rubbish could also lock cities into long-term dependence on incineration, rather than encouraging efforts to reduce waste at the source.
UN secretary-general António Guterres urged governments to move beyond pledges and increase investment in waste collection, composting and circular infrastructure. Citing projects in Durban, Dhaka and Kampala that convert organic waste into compost, fertiliser and animal feed, he said such initiatives could create jobs and lower costs.
“The era of pledges is over. The world needs action,” Guterres said.
IPS UN Bureau Report

Nov 13 2026 (IPS) -
CIVICUS discusses the case for United Nations (UN) reform with Heba Aly, director of the Article 109 Coalition, an international civil society network that calls on states to review and update the UN Charter.

Heba Aly
Why does the UN Charter need reforming?
Our world faces multiple existential challenges. Violence and conflict are on the rise, as seen in Gaza, Iran and Ukraine, among other places, and the UN has been unable to respond meaningfully. The changing climate is devastating communities, with the recent flooding in Nepal just the latest example. AI is going off the rails, with AI agents acting rogue in the absence of regulation. And big powers are threatening nuclear war. Our current global governance systems are not equipped to deal with any of this.
At the same time, the UN is under attack. The USA, its historic architect, is now undermining it by questioning its effectiveness, cutting its funding and establishing competing bodies. Other states are retreating from multilateralism, some because they don’t want to play by the rules, others because they feel the UN doesn’t represent the interests of the majority.
That is in part because the UN’s architecture still reflects the world of 1945 rather than that of 2026 and still privileges five countries that won a war over 80 years ago. Its Charter was adopted before the internet, before the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, before the idea of planetary boundaries.
Triggering Article 109 of the UN Charter, which establishes the process for convening a General Conference of UN member states to review and update the Charter, offers the possibility of bringing the UN into the 21st century.
How can Article 109 be triggered, and why use it?
Triggering Article 109 requires a two-thirds majority vote in the UN General Assembly, where every state has a seat, plus the support of nine of the 15 members of the Security Council. This means the five permanent members of the Security Council cannot veto a conference being held. So triggering Article 109 is very much within reach.
Article 109 offers a pathway to a renewed UN architecture that is democratic, inclusive and fit for the 21st century, and legitimate because it is rooted in the Charter. It was a concession made in 1945 to the many countries that opposed giving the five permanent Security Council members veto power, with the promise that this would be revisited by the UN’s 10th year. The purpose of Article 109 was also to offer the means to adapt the organisation to changing world circumstances, based on learning from its first years of operation. Eighty-one years on, this built-in review mechanism has never been used. It’s an opportunity hiding in plain sight.
A General Conference would bring all states together to discuss openly what is and is not working in international governance, and where changes are needed for everyone’s benefit. Many states have grievances about the current system, and giving them a chance to share their vision of a future UN can help rebuild much-needed trust.
What about the risk of making things worse?
The threats the world faces today need urgent action. If we do nothing, the UN could collapse altogether.
Our recent analysis of voting patterns at the UN General Assembly shows that efforts to roll back norms on climate change, gender and human rights have failed to secure two-thirds majority support, which is the threshold required to change the Charter. The data simply does not support the suggestion that a majority of states would back an outcome that dilutes fundamental principles of the Charter. In fact, it suggests quite the opposite. An overwhelming majority of states have expressed support for human rights and multilateralism, as evidenced by initiatives such as the Friends of Human Rights and Multilateralism, the Hague Group and Partners for Multilateralism.
A new world order is going to emerge, whether we like it or not. It will be either built by the powers who are de facto changing realities on the ground or shaped through a structured and inclusive process where every state has a voice. That’s what a General Conference to review the UN Charter would offer.
What would reform mean for people in the global majority?
Most of the effects of today’s crises are felt in global majority countries. Take climate change. It is estimated that some 143 million people in global majority countries will be displaced by its effects by 2050. The disproportionate impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on global majority countries was another striking example.
Most of these crises stem from failures of global governance and inequitable decision-making at the global level. And that is in part because international institutions tend to exclude global majority voices. This means the countries suffering the most do not have enough of a voice in the fora set up to tackle these challenges.
The Security Council is an example of this. Although the majority of its work is dedicated to Africa, the continent does not have a permanent seat on the Council.
A review of the UN Charter is an opportunity to rebalance power and ensure equitable access to resources and equal protection from harm. It is an opportunity for the global majority to shape the next world order in a way they could not in 1945, when many countries, still under colonial rule, did not have a seat at the table.
What role should civil society play in reform?
There is strong public support for international cooperation and an effective UN. One recent poll found that 57 per cent of people across 34 countries want their country to work with others to take on common threats, even if it means compromising on some national interests. And in another, 73 per cent of people who had an opinion about the UN said it needed reform.
Civil society therefore has an essential role in channelling public demands for a UN that can deliver effective international cooperation. It can help push states to embrace a more ambitious vision of multilateralism and pressure them to meet the moment.
Civil society can also help think through the outcomes we want from a Charter review and from a future UN and, during negotiations, hold governments accountable for outcomes that benefit people. Those outcomes could include a much more formal role for civil society at the UN. Today civil society engagement at the UN is often a tick-box exercise, and many civil society organisations face restricted access. A renewed Charter could codify a role for civil society in international decision-making that goes beyond today’s voluntary consultative approach.
I encourage civil society organisations that are interested in rebuilding international cooperation to get in touch and join the hundred-plus organisations that are already part of our network.
There are reasons for hope. In recent months, many western leaders have echoed what leaders from the global majority have been saying for some time: that the current world order is not fair and that we need something more equitable. Now we have an opportunity to make that happen.
CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.
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