The Human Consciousness Now...Our World in the Midst of Becoming...to What? Observe, contemplate Now.
PORTLAND, USA, Sep 1 2026 (IPS) - The age structures of populations vary considerably across countries. Some countries have relatively young populations, with large proportions consisting of children and adolescents. Other countries have much older age structures, with a substantial proportion of people aged 65 years or older.
The world’s current population of approximately 8.3 billion has a median age of about 31 years. This is substantially higher than during much of the 20th century, when the global median age was generally below 25 years. The world’s median age was 22 years in 1950, declined to 20 years in 1970, and then increased to nearly 25 years by 1999.
Population ageing is expected to continue worldwide in the coming decades, The median age of the world’s population, currently about 31 years, is projected to increase to approximately 36 years by 2050.
Despite the overall trend toward older populations, substantial differences in age structures exist among countries.
In 2026, approximately 50 countries and territories have populations with median ages of 21 years or younger, reflecting highly youthful age structures. At the other end of the age spectrum, a similar number of countries and territories have median ages of 42 years or older, indicating comparatively old populations.
These wide differences in median age illustrate the striking demographic diversity among countries and the contrasting social and economic challenges associated with youthful and older populations.
Most countries with highly youthful populations are located in Africa. For example, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Niger, and Somalia have median ages of 16 years or younger.
In contrast, countries with comparatively older populations are concentrated primarily in Europe and East Asia. France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Spain, and Switzerland, for example, have median ages of 42 years or older. The highest median ages – about 50 years – are found in Italy and Japan (Table 1).
Source: United Nations.
In addition, the median age is expected to rise in virtually all countries, in both more developed and less developed regions. By 2050, for example, the median ages of several countries – including China, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Spain – are projected to reach 50 years or more.
The substantial variations in age structures of national populations are also evident in the proportions of people under age 18 and those aged 65 and older.
Once again, countries in which approximately half or more of their population is below age 18, while only a few percent are aged 65 years and older, are concentrated primarily in Africa.
In 2026, for example, 56% of the population in the Central African Republic is under age 18, while the corresponding proportions are approximately 53% in Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Niger, and Somalia. In each of these countries, only about 3% of the population is age 65 years and older.
In contrast, many developed countries – including Greece, Italy, Japan, Portugal, and the Republic of Korea – have much older population age structures. In some of these countries, such as Italy and Japan, approximately 14% of the population is under age 18, while nearly twice that proportion – between 25% and 30% – is aged 65 years and older (Figure 1).
Source: United Nations.
The ongoing changes in countries’ population age structures will have far-reaching implications, particularly for population growth, labor markets, employment, education, healthcare systems, retirement programs, and long-term care.
Many developing countries have relatively young populations and, because of their age structures and population momentum, generally experience relatively high rates of population growth. In contrast, countries with comparatively older populations tend to have slower rates of population growth, with many developed countries already experiencing population decline.
As many developed countries with ageing and declining populations face growing labor shortages, countries with youthful populations continue to have large numbers of young people entering the labor market, often in excess of available employment opportunities
By midcentury, several African countries with particularly young age structures are expected to experience particularly rapid population growth. For example, the populations of Chad, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Niger, and Somalia are projected to increase by more than 80%.
Such rapid population growth can pose major challenges to social and economic development, particularly in providing adequate education, employment, housing, healthcare, and other essential services. Governments will need to expand infrastructure and public services rapidly simply to keep pace with the growing number of people.
Countries with young and rapidly growing populations may also face greater difficulties in reducing hunger and inequality, advancing women’s rights, expanding access to healthcare, creating decent employment opportunities, preventing social unrest, and addressing internal conflicts.
These demographic pressures underscore the importance of government policies that strengthen human capital, create productive employment, expand social services, and improve infrastructure. Such measures will be essential for ensuring that rapidly growing populations can achieve sustainable improvements in their living standards.
The slow pace of socio-economic development, high rates of unemployment, and limited educational and employment opportunities for many young people are contributing to social unrest, discontent, and political upheaval.
As a result, increasing numbers of young men and women seek to emigrate to developed countries in search of employment, greater security, and better prospects for themselves and their families. While many use regular migration channels, others increasingly resort to irregular migration, including unauthorized entry, overstaying visas, or seeking asylum and refugee protection.
In several African countries, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone and Liberia, half or more of the population reportedly would like to emigrate to another country, typically in Europe and North America. These migration aspirations reflect not only economic motivations but also broader concerns about employment opportunities, personal security, governance, and prospects for the future.
Nigeria, Africa’s most populous nation, provides a particularly striking example. Approximately half of its population reportedly would like to leave the country and resettle abroad, preferably in an English-speaking country. Economic hardship, unemployment, limited opportunities, and insecurity have contributed to this strong desire to emigrate. Many Nigerians have already moved abroad through regular migration channels, while others have undertaken irregular journeys or sought asylum and refugee protection.
The persistence of such strong migration aspirations in many less developed countries highlights the close relationship between demographic pressures, socioeconomic conditions, and international migration. Where large youthful populations confront limited employment, educational, and economic opportunities, migration can become an increasingly attractive option for seeking a better future.
Unauthorized migration has consequently become a major political issue in many destination countries. Governments in numerous migrant-receiving countries have introduced or strengthened measures to deter unauthorized migration, including increased border enforcement, arrest and detention of unauthorized migrants, deportation, and the return of people who have entered without authorization or overstayed their visas.
At the same time, the demographic circumstances of migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries differ considerably. Many less developed countries have relatively young populations and high rates of demographic growth, whereas many developed countries have substantially older age structures and are expected to experience population decline over the coming decades. By 2050, for example, the populations of countries such as Italy, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, are projected to decline by approximately 13% (Figure 2).
Source: United Nations.
These contrasting demographic trends are likely to increase the economic and political importance of international migration. As many developed countries with ageing and declining populations face growing labor shortages, countries with youthful populations continue to have large numbers of young people entering the labor market, often in excess of available employment opportunities.
The consequences of population ageing are becoming increasingly significant for a growing number more developed countries and are also emerging as an important concern for some less developed countries as well. These demographic changes are prompting governments to reconsider existing economic and social policies, programs, and benefits in order to adapt to population realities.
Population ageing, combined with increasing longevity, is reducing the number of workers available to support each retiree while increasing the fiscal burden on the working-age populations that finances pensions, healthcare, and other age-related government programs.
Longer lifespans also mean that many older men and women may outlive their personal savings or retirement benefits. As longevity continues to increase, pension systems are paying benefits for substantially longer periods than anticipated when many of these systems were established during the 20thcentury.
Consequently, governments are facing growing pressure to reform retirement systems, healthcare services, and long-term care programs to ensure their financial sustainability while maintaining adequate support for ageing populations.
In addition to placing greater strains on government finances, the rising costs of medical treatment and care for growing numbers of older persons are placing increasing pressures on family budgets, capacities, and expectations.
Financing and providing long-term care for older persons is a major challenge for societies and families. In many countries, public provision for long-term care remains inadequate or largely unavailable to significant proportions of the population. At the same time, the growing number of older men and women is placing increasing stress on traditional safety nets, including families, friends, and local communities.
Powerful and largely irreversible demographic trends are driving population ageing, with growing numbers and proportions of people – especially women, who typically live longer than men – spending more years in old age. These trends will have profound implications for the organization and financing of societies.
The contrasting age structures of populations in developing and developed countries require significant social and economic adjustments. Countries with youthful populations need to expand education, employment, healthcare, and other services to meet the needs of growing numbers of young people. In contrast, countries with substantially older populations must prepare for rising demands on pension systems, healthcare, and long-term care.
In light of these demographic realities, governments need to revamp policies and programs affecting their populations. Unfortunately, many governments appear to be postponing these necessary adjustments. The longer governments delay adapting policies and programs to changing demographic conditions, the more difficult and costly the consequences are likely to become for their populations.
Joseph Chamie is a consulting demographer, a former director of the United Nations Population Division, and author of many publications on population issues.
JOHANNESBURG, Sep 1 2026 (IPS) - In 2024, Kurdish social worker Pakhshan Azizi was sentenced to death. She remains incarcerated in Evin Prison, Tehran, Iran. This is her story …
Please read her letter from prison here.
For more on Civicus’s Stand as My Witness Campaign.
Additional reporting and research: Cecilia Russell
Picture credits: Kurdistan Human Rights, BBC Persian, Clare Quirk, Wikipedia, CY Boechat (VOA)/Wikimedia Commons, UNICEF, Civicus, Amnesty International, ANF News, Vida Rabbani, Women’s Committee of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (WNCRI)
IPS UN Bureau Report
UNITED NATIONS, Sep 1 2026 (IPS) - On the morning of August 26, an unprecedented series of flash floods struck Nepal and the Tibet Autonomous Region of China, causing immense destruction, killing hundreds of civilians and leaving thousands missing. Entire neighborhoods have been buried underwater and beneath mud as the Nepalese government and humanitarian organizations rush to provide emergency assistance.
“My family members were swept away by the flood in front of my eyes,” Kalpana Malla from Nepal’s Nuwakot district told reporters. “They could not escape the flood; there was no chance at all. This flood took everything, but my son and I climbed the rooftop of a house and survived, but couldn’t explain how.”
Although the direct cause of the floods is currently unknown, figures from the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) indicate that the floods were caused by a significant glacial collapse, after previously reporting they were caused by a magnitude 4.4 earthquake. Marking a magnitude 5.2 seismic event, the subsequent debris flow and downstream collapse of seismic waves crashed over the Nepal-China border, destroying buildings and roads along the Trishuli River.
“Initial analysis of before-and-after satellite images now suggests that part of a glacier collapsed high in the mountains,” said Professor Liz Stephens, Professor in Climate Risks and Resilience at the Department of Meteorology at the University of Reading in the United Kingdom, noting that the stability of high-mountain environments is increasingly threatened by the global impacts of climate change. She adds that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has “high confidence” that similar “complex cascading events” could occur in the future if underlying climate factors are not addressed soon.
Entire regions in Nepal have been rendered inaccessible due to heavy flooding and mudslides, which destroyed at least 35 bridges, affected over 40 kilometers of roads, and disrupted telecommunications and electricity services in roughly 10 percent of the total affected areas. The hardest-hit regions are the Rasuwa district near Kathmandu in northern Nepal, the Nuwakot district in central-northern Nepal, and the towns of Timure, Rasuwagadhi, and Syabrubesi. According to figures from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), roughly 10,000 households are in dire need of emergency assistance, with many families stripped of basic services, such as shelter, food, water supply, and access to healthcare.
Last week on August 27, Lila Pieters Yahia, the United Nations (UN) Resident Coordinator in Nepal, informed reporters during a press briefing at the UN Headquarters that at least 359 people had been killed, while 73 additional civilians had been hospitalized, though some have since been released. Yahia also stated that approximately 910 civilians remain missing, though various media outlets report the figure exceeds 1,300. Since then, Nepal officials have confirmed 900 deaths and over 4247 missing.
These numbers are projected to fluctuate in the coming days as aid personnel increasingly access isolated areas. Of those unaccounted for, Yahia noted that roughly 517 are foreign nationals spanning over 30 countries—including hundreds from China and India, alongside approximately 90 from the United States.
“Everyone in a mountain valley faces the same hazards, but tourists are more vulnerable because they may not recognize the danger or understand local warnings,” said Dr. Fatima M. Pillosu, hydrometeorologist and flash floods researcher from the Department of Meteorology at the University of Reading. “Visitors from regions where such events are rare may not appreciate how fast a mountain river can rise, nor that these valleys also face avalanches, landslides and floods from melting glaciers, even in dry weather. Knowing in advance what can happen, and what to do if it does, is one of the most useful protections.”
Children in Nepal are among the hardest-hit populations, with the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimating that at least 17,000 children have been impacted. UNICEF has recorded the destruction of at least 18 schools and damage to 20. Roughly 10,000 school-age children are projected to require urgent support to continue their education, including new learning materials, access to temporary learning centers, and psychosocial support services for both children and teachers.
“Children across Rasuwa and Dhading saw their lives being literally washed away in front of their eyes in a very short span of time, with homes, classrooms, and medical facilities damaged,” said Alice Akunga, the UNICEF representative to Nepal. “Children who have survived the floods now face heightened risks of disease, malnutrition, violence and exploitation,” she said.
Yahia informed reporters that the UN and its partners are currently on the ground, providing direct support to vulnerable communities while simultaneously conducting assessments to determine the exact scale of needs. Currently, the World Food Programme (WFP) is positioned to provide equipment and emergency rations to communities on the frontlines of the crisis. Additionally, two staff members from the World Health Organization (WHO) are distributing tents, logistics support, and medical kits for about 10,000 people for roughly three months.
Although the UN has identified potential risk for additional flooding in areas of Nepal on August 27, it is working closely with the Nepalese government to scale up its life-saving operations across health, nutrition, water, sanitation, protection, and education.
In the wake of the disaster, both countries and UN entities have begun sending emergency supplies and funding for the relief efforts in Nepal. UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Tom Fletcher announced that USD 2 million would be allocated from the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF).
The U.S. State Department has pledged to send a disaster response advisor along with USD 500,000 in aid. Yahia also confirmed that Switzerland has sent more than USD 600,000 for aid, and other countries such as Japan, Australia and the United Kingdom have pledged to send aid funding and supplies in the days to come. Regional neighbors, such as India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, have begun sending emergency supplies.
IPS UN Bureau Report
TEHRAN, Sep 1 2026 (IPS) - Writing from the women’s ward of Evin Prison on 10 June 2026, Kurdish political prisoner Pakhshan Azizi, who remains under a death sentence, reflects on her legal case, political principles, humanitarian work, and the broader historical and political dynamics shaping the Middle East.
Azizi opens by stating that “politics and ethics are at the height of their historical degradation”.
She explains that she remained silent for a long time because, for someone imprisoned and condemned to death, every word carries the risk of further punishment or even losing one’s life. Yet she says she can no longer remain silent while others define her identity and speak on her behalf.
Azizi accuses individuals both inside and outside prison of exploiting her case for personal or organisational interests. She argues that people claiming to defend her have instead attempted to marginalise or erase her, turning her case into an object of political competition rather than genuine solidarity.
She describes spending three years in prison and two years under what she calls an unjust and oppressive death sentence. According to her, she is the only female political prisoner under a death sentence whose conviction has been upheld four times. She stresses that neither she nor her lawyer has received any official notification that her execution has been suspended, despite public reports suggesting otherwise. Even if such a suspension existed, she emphasises, it would not mean that her death sentence had been overturned.
She recounts the immense suffering experienced by her family, noting that several relatives have also been imprisoned simply because they are Kurdish. She criticises what she sees as unequal public attention, suggesting that recognition often depends on conforming to political narratives rather than on the reality of one’s work or persecution.
Throughout the letter, Azizi argues that her prosecution has been shaped not only by legal irregularities but also by political manoeuvring behind the scenes, involving actors both inside and outside prison. She says that her experiences of interrogation, ideological pressure, and imprisonment echo the long history of discrimination and marginalisation faced by Kurdish people.
She writes that, over time, she has come to rely only on herself, believing that history will ultimately demonstrate the sincerity of her principles and the consistency of her commitment.
Her political positions
Azizi then sets out her views in nine numbered points.
The Middle East conflict has deep historical rootsShe argues that today’s conflicts cannot be understood solely through the actions of contemporary governments. Instead, she traces the region’s instability back to the post–First World War division of the Middle East by colonial powers.
She describes the current wars as a continuation of that historical process, arguing that the region’s resources—including oil and minerals—have long been exploited by global powers while ordinary people bear the consequences through poverty, sanctions, displacement, and violence.
According to her, civilians are repeatedly sacrificed in conflicts they neither initiated nor control, while political elites continue pursuing geopolitical interests.
Opposition to warAzizi unequivocally condemns the war involving the United States and Israel and rejects military attacks on Iranian territory and the wider Middle East.
She specifically condemns attacks against schools, hospitals, emergency services, universities, and other civilian infrastructure, describing such attacks as war crimes under international law.
She emphasises that children deserve life, not death.
Rejection of allegations of organisational membershipAzizi firmly rejects accusations that she belongs to any political or armed organisation.
She explains that she worked as a social worker and acknowledges that, because of the environment in which she worked in northeastern Syria (Rojava), she inevitably cooperated with various local actors. However, she insists that cooperation in humanitarian work should not be interpreted as organisational membership.
Humanitarian work in SyriaShe describes spending years working in refugee camps in Syria under extremely difficult humanitarian conditions, particularly assisting people displaced by the war and affected by ISIS attacks.
She argues that using isolated photographs or superficial evidence to portray this humanitarian work as proof of political or military affiliation is fundamentally misleading.
Her position on Kurdish rightsAzizi explicitly rejects separatism.
She argues that demands for Kurdish rights should be understood within Iran, advocating federal arrangements and greater recognition of Kurdish communities while preserving the country’s territorial integrity.
Looking beyond Iran, she expresses a longer-term vision of a democratic confederation across the Middle East based on cooperation rather than division.
As a Kurdish woman, she says preserving Kurdish culture and history is both a historical and a human responsibility but insists that separatism has never been the solution.
Peace through dialogueShe argues that genuine peace can only be achieved through dialogue with ordinary people, especially those who have been marginalised and denied opportunities.
Skepticism toward international powersAzizi questions why global powers would suddenly claim to defend her or Kurdish history when those same powers have historically contributed to denying and suppressing Kurdish identity.
She suggests that powerful states often instrumentalise minority communities for their own geopolitical purposes.
Independence from governmentsShe emphasises that social work is independent of governments and political authorities.
Her work, she writes, has always been with people rather than with states.
Commitment to independent civil societyAzizi concludes by reaffirming that she has never belonged to any organisation.
She describes herself as an independent social worker committed to addressing the deep social wounds created by decades of war.
She argues that rebuilding society requires independent civic institutions capable of fostering dignity, culture, and life rather than perpetuating violence.
Azizi ends with a sentence in Kurdish followed by Persian:
“I am one who dies for life, not one who lives for death.”
She closes by expressing gratitude to everyone who has defended her despite political differences, including her family, her lawyer Mohammad Hossein Raisian, and her friends, thanking them for their sincere support.
Source: HRANA News Agency, the news outlet of the Human Rights Activists in Iran.
Translation: Courtesy of Civicus
IPS UN Bureau Report
NAIROBI, Kenya, Sep 1 2026 (IPS) - Open a can of something fizzy and the reason the sugar doesn’t separate immediately is gum arabic, tapped by hand from acacia trees across the Sahel. Spray on perfume and the reason the scent is still there at dinner is frankincense, a resin cut from Boswellia trees on the dry escarpments of the Horn of Africa. The fat that gives a chocolate bar its snap may well be shea, gathered and pressed by women in the parkland belt of West Africa. The cashmere jumper came from goats that can only be raised on cold, dry rangelands.
These are drylands. They cover 44 per cent of the planet’s land, hold 44 per cent of the world’s cropland and half its livestock, and two billion people live in them. We have spent decades describing them as empty or unproductive. For a long list of things most of us use without thinking, they are the only places on earth that produce them at all.
It is no secret that our world is becoming hotter and drier. Three quarters of the planet’s land experienced drier conditions in the last 30 years than the previous 30. This year’s El Niño is intensifying fast, compelling the world to look back at what dryland systems already know. Nearly every model now points to a record-strength event: the US Climate Prediction Center puts the odds of a “very strong” El Niño at over 90 per cent for this fall and winter, and a 69 per cent chance it exceeds anything on record since 1950.
Drylands have been living through exactly this kind of shock-and-recovery cycle for generations, and their playbook offers real lessons. Farmers in places that have always been able to count on rain are beginning to face a question that dryland farmers answered generations ago: what do you grow, and how, when the water is not guaranteed?
Dryland systems are the longest-running operating record anywhere of producing value under conditions of scarcity, volatility and shock. These landscapes are home to generations of knowledge on how to thrive with limited water and high variability. This includes practices such as spreading risk across several crops and animals rather than betting the season on one, understanding land closely enough to move livestock before the pressure is too much, and building income that arrives at different times of the year so a bad month is not a ruined one. These are powerful lessons needed now.
Now is the time to listen and learn from dryland communities, practices, and regenerative production models. When this wisdom, data, and experience serve as our foundation, we can transition to sustainable business models and unlock investments to power our future world using knowledge that already exists in the places we have been calling marginal.
Mongolia, the host of the recently concluded UN’s COP17 talks under the Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), is a case in point. Three quarters of Mongolia’s land is already classified as degraded or at risk. However, Mongolian herders supply 40 per cent of the world’s raw cashmere, increasingly innovating to shift away from an extractive model to practices that generate diverse value, from wool to grass-fed meat, examples of what a healthy landscape can offer.
In northern Ghana, the Ojoba Women’s Shea Cooperative processes shea butter by hand in the arid Upper East Region, using a skill passed down through generations. They now supply international buyers including L’Occitane and Lush.
In both instances, the land already had value, and the skills already existed within the communities. What was missing was a route to the market willing to pay for them. These initiatives demonstrate what is possible when investment is designed around the realities and value in drylands.
Investment can take many forms: from financing cooperatives through the shift to new practices; insurance that pays out on rainfall; water and energy infrastructure that keeps a harvest sellable in extreme heat. There is growth potential beyond raw commodities too; processing into oils, powders, waxes compounds the returns. And payments for ecosystem services, from stored carbon, biodiversity and watershed protection, sit alongside that.
Donors like the European Union have already recognised the value of drylands with the €20 million Thrivelands initiative, led by Landscape Alliance, to build the coalitions and action this work needs; including innovations needed to protect and restore land. These innovations range from the tools to monitor and restore soil health accurately to the Land Degradation Surveillance Framework and the Regreening Africa app, which brings this data into the hands of farmers.
But public funding alone cannot unlock the drylands opportunities. Adapting to a drier world means restoring a broken nature finance system and closing the $700 billion finance gap to apply proven expertise across a growing area.
Many companies already depend on drylands through what they source, without having assessed how much of their supply comes from them. For those in the agrifood, textiles, and cosmetics sectors, investing in restoring and protecting these landscapes is a way to stabilise their supply chains, manage growing levels of risk and meet climate goals.
There is also the question of what inaction costs. Investing in drylands agriculture could avert a 12 per cent reduction in global food production over the next 25 years and prevent the release of about 60 per cent of stored carbon.
COP17 is a reminder of how little time is left. The UNCCD finance framework closes in 2030, with 82 per cent of the cumulative need for finance unmet. Time is running out to leverage the lessons from drylands to protect future food security. The gap between what is needed and what is being invested remains enormous.
The landscapes on which our future depends may be getting drier, but they are not devoid of opportunity. With science and innovation that enhances traditional knowledge, they are saturated with opportunities to bolster food security and climate resilience.
Dr Éliane Ubalijoro, chief executive officer of Landscape Alliance
Salina Abraham, Head of Thrivelands, Landscape Alliance
IPS UN Bureau
JAKARTA, Indonesia, Sep 1 2026 (IPS) - The US dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency has been eroding gradually for decades. However, various US policies, including recent deliberately unexpected actions, have at times accelerated de-dollarisation.
Jomo Kwame Sundaram
Despite warnings from Keynes and others about its likely problems, Harry Dexter White, the head US delegate, imposed an indirect gold standard at the 1944 Bretton Woods conference.
By fixing the gold price in dollars, the US currency became the world’s reserve currency, with other currencies pegged to it at fixed exchange rates. With this indirect gold standard, the metal’s price was fixed in US dollars.
Other currencies were pegged to the dollar, strengthening its role as the dominant currency. Other arrangements that could have mitigated the problems and adverse consequences of the dollar system were effectively rejected by the US at Bretton Woods.
Ninety per cent of foreign exchange market transactions now still involve the dollar. Most central bank reserves are still denominated in dollars, while the US dollar is still used to invoice around two-fifths of international trade.
Just after World War II (WW2), the US economy accounted for a quarter of world output, measured in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), and even more in nominal terms. The US share of the world economy has fallen to under 15% since.
The US also accounted for a quarter of world exports at that time. Unlike most other nations, US industry was strengthened rather than destroyed during WW2.
The size, liquidity, and depth of US capital markets have also reinforced the dollar’s role. Its special status in the Bretton Woods dispensation conferred an ‘exorbitant privilege’, increasing international demand for dollar bonds.
This has enabled the US government and companies to borrow at lower interest rates than others. The resulting increase in demand for dollar-denominated assets has also strengthened the greenback.
Erosion of dollar dominance
Since then, the US economy has become much more financialised and de-industrialised, now accounting for less than a tenth of world goods exports.
However, although the US now accounts for under 15% of global income at PPP, its stock market still accounts for over three-fifths of the world’s total market capitalisation.
Leading international monetary economist Barry Eichengreen’s 2022 survey of central banks’ foreign exchange reserves showed the dollar share of foreign reserves falling from 70% in 2000 to under 60% in 2021; it has since declined to below 58% in early 2025.
Ben Norton suggests that the actual dollar share of foreign reserves is even lower and continues to decline. Some central banks hold other reserves off the books for fear of Western actions to freeze and seize their foreign reserves.
With the US economy more de-industrialised and financialised, the dollar system has become more important in attracting foreign investors and inducing capital market bubbles from time to time.
De-dollarisation accelerating
De-dollarisation goes back many decades, even when the dollar-gold peg was still in place. France famously demanded gold for dollars, then shipped bullion back under armed escort.
Many recent Trump policies have heightened international concerns about holding dollar-denominated assets. Greater Washington belligerence, including illegal tariffs, sanctions and bombings, has also accelerated de-dollarisation.
Trump’s attempts to influence the US Federal Reserve Bank and other public surveillance and regulatory institutions have also shaken public and international trust. Humiliating dismissals of allegedly recalcitrant officials have not helped.
In the first half-year of Trump’s second presidential term, the dollar experienced its biggest fall since the 1973 OPEC oil crisis, by over 10% against other major currencies, before fluctuating considerably.
After Trump threatened massive tariffs against all other countries on 2 April 2025, fears of “a simultaneous collapse in the prices of all US assets” quickly grew.
Instead of the usual ‘flight to safety’ in dollar assets when crises previously loomed, it seems “The market has lost faith in US assets”, selling them down in response to new threats and uncertainties.
Since then, uncertainties have worsened market and dollar volatility worldwide. Unsurprisingly, foreign governments and investors are looking for alternatives to the dollar.
Eichengreen had previously expected a gradual decline in dollar dominance and a slow transition to a more balanced multi-currency reserve system.
Although the US president is not the sole cause of the recent acceleration of de-dollarisation, Trump 2.0 policies have prompted monetary authorities worldwide to consider alternatives to the US dollar as the world’s reserve currency.
More recently, Eichengreen has warned of a likely acceleration in the dollar’s decline, expressing concern about its adverse effects. That would threaten financial institutions holding dollar-denominated assets, causing them to lose value in foreign-currency terms.
No alternative?
However, Eichengreen insists “no other currency … is positioned to fill the dollar’s shoes”. Neither the euro nor the renminbi has the capacity or ambition to replace the dollar.
With privately issued cryptocurrencies not functioning as currencies except for mainly illicit transactions, Eichengreen expects the dollar to remain “the cleanest dirty shirt in the pile”.
IPS UN Bureau
LONDON, Aug 31 2026 (IPS) - On 24 August, police sealed off access to Zambia’s courts, closed the day before the deadline for petitions to challenge the results of the 13 August presidential election. The judiciary’s top official cited security reasons, but the timing left little doubt that authorities meant to block the defeated candidate’s legal challenge.
Official results gave the incumbent, Hakainde Hichilema, 60.49 per cent of the vote, comfortably ahead of challenger Brian Mundubile’s 37.87 per cent. Some results from the concurrent National Assembly vote remain pending, but Hichilema’s United Party for National Development (UPND) has also won a commanding majority over Mundubile’s National Reconciliation Party for Unity and Prosperity, part of the opposition’s Tonse Alliance.
Mundubile rejected the presidential election result and vowed to contest it in court, but an election night police raid forced him into hiding. Officers killed former minister Mutotwe Kafwaya and arrested 11 other opposition figures, blaming an exchange of gunfire and accusing Mundubile’s party of possessing weapons and planning an insurgency.
Hichilema came to power in 2021 by comfortably defeating President Edgar Lungu, whose crackdown on civic freedoms led to a polarised and violent campaign. Hichilema promised democratic renewal, pledging to strengthen human rights and the rule of law. However, after some initial positive changes, he’s overseen a slide back to the kind of practices he once campaigned against.
Pre-election crackdown
Hichilema’s margin of victory suggests he’d likely have won anyway, but the ruling party stacked the odds further in its favour while penalising the opposition. European Union observers described an ‘uneven playing field’, with misuse of state resources in favour of the UPND, voter inducements including cash handouts, heavy pro-government bias in state media, self-censorship driven by restrictive laws and police restrictions on campaign events. They also flagged a heavy and intimidating military presence at counting locations, weak security in vote tabulation and counting and a six-hour suspension of counting on election night, after which local officials appeared to be taking instructions from Electoral Commission headquarters before announcing results.
Civil society had already raised concerns about the make-up of the Electoral Commission, believing some of its members were UPND supporters, and judicial independence, after Hichilema appointed numerous new judges from UPND stronghold regions.
In December, parliament approved a law changing the electoral system. It expanded the number of constituencies and introduced a more proportional system with reserved seats for women, young people and people with disabilities. Civil society’s objections centred on the lack of consultation and the speed of these major constitutional changes, which raised suspicions they were intended to benefit the UPND.
As the vote got closer, authorities blatantly targeted opposition politicians, including by using the draconian Public Order Act. Last October, police arrested 12 people, including an opposition member of parliament, when they took part in a meeting Mundubile was expected to attend at a private home, charging them with conduct likely to cause a breach of the peace and participation in an unlawful assembly. In February, police arrested 16 Tonse Alliance members on the same unlawful assembly charge.
Opposition politicians also faced arrest for what would once have counted as the normal cut and thrust of political debate. One of the weapons authorities used was the 2025 Cyber Security Act, which expanded their power to criminalise online commentary and criticism.
In January, police arrested opposition member of parliament Miles Sampa after he alleged by-election fraud. In February, they arrested National Democratic Congress leader Mambwe Zimba over a Facebook post depicting Hichilema in a coffin. In March, they arrested Socialist Party leader Fred M’membe over radio comments about Hichilema and the political controversy over funeral plans for Lungu, who died in 2025. All three spent time in detention before being released on bail.
The crackdown even reached an event that should have showcased Zambia for the right reasons. In April, just days before RightsCon, the world’s largest gathering on digital rights, was due to open in the capital, Lusaka, the government effectively cancelled it. They postponed it at too short notice for rescheduling. Over 2,600 people had planned to attend and some were already on their way. Authorities cited unspecified concerns about some speakers’ clearances and demanded more information on discussion topics. The government evidently didn’t want debate about issues it deemed controversial, including its human rights record. Zambian officials were also reportedly pressured by China, a key investor, over the planned participation of Taiwanese civil society representatives.
Time to restore freedoms
Zambians remain proud of their democracy, which has seen three peaceful handovers since multiparty elections returned in 1991. Hichilema should get democracy back on track by restoring all the freedoms that have been compromised. That starts with reversing regressive laws typically rushed through parliament with little consultation, including the Cyber Crimes Act and others that restrict online speech. The government must also commit to respecting media freedoms and letting the political opposition play its proper democratic role.
The government should replace the colonial-era Public Order Act. Hichilema vetoed its proposed replacement, the Public Gatherings Bill, passed by parliament in May. Civil society had raised concerns about the bill’s broad granting of discretionary powers to law enforcement officers and imposition of criminal sanctions. Zambia needs a law that allows peaceful protests and doesn’t criminalise organisers and participants. Civil society has also raised concerns about an NGO Bill that would grant the government extensive powers to regulate, suspend and dissolve civil society organisations. This bill must advance no further.
Three decades of peaceful transitions made Zambia a regional democratic beacon. Keeping it one requires a government that respects dissent, and a civil society free enough to make sure it does.
Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.
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