The Human Consciousness Now...Our World in the Midst of Becoming...to What? Observe, contemplate Now.
WASHINGTON DC, Jul 8 2025 (IPS) - The World Bank’s private sector arm has raised the bar — and others may follow. On April 15, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) became the first development finance institution to adopt a formal remedy policy, publishing its Remedial Action Framework (RAF) to address environmental and social harm caused by IFC-supported investment projects.
The move sets a precedent and ramps up pressure on other development banks — including the Inter-American Development Bank — which are expected to release their own remedy frameworks.
Development institutions such as IFC finance projects meant to improve lives worldwide. Yet too often, these projects have caused environmental harm, displaced communities, and led to reprisals. This new framework is a milestone — both a leap forward for IFC and a sign of hope for communities harmed by development projects.
The International Finance Corporation (IFC), on April 15, 2025, adopted a Remedial Action Framework (RAF), an explicit policy on remedy, formalizing a commitment to address environmental and social harms caused by IFC-supported investment projects.
The IFC/Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) RAF is a cornerstone at a time when the World Bank Group is reviewing accountability systems on both its public and private sides. This framework sets a precedent, signaling a profound institution-wide commitment to avoid harm. It acknowledges that remedy is not only possible but essential and that it must be part of a broader cultural shift across the entire institution.
Credit: CIEL
The remedy framework is the result of years of advocacy by stakeholders both outside and inside the institution, and strenuous efforts from civil society organizations and project-affected people worldwide. Their contributions — grounded in firsthand experience of harm and technical recommendations — have centered remedy on the rights and the needs of those harmed.
Carla Garcia Zendejas of CIEL moderates a panel after a screening of the film “The Fisherman and the Banker” April 2024 in Washington, D.C. The film, produced by Sheena Sumaria over ten years, follows the fishing community of Gujarat, India as they sue the IFC, the lending arm of the World Bank, for funding a power plant which has harmed the ecology of the community.
Credit: CIEL
Cases like Alto Maipo, Titan Cement, and Tata Tea revealed how inadequate existing complaint systems were in responding to and remedying environmental and social harm to communities. The momentum needed was created with the Tata Mundra case and the landmark Jam v. IFC litigation by Indian fisherfolk, when IFC again dismissed findings reported by its own accountability mechanism.
With the RAF, IFC now acknowledges a core tenet of international law: institutions should avoid infringing on human rights and should address adverse human rights impacts when they have contributed to harm.
The framework introduces a structured approach to address environmental and social harms based on three pillars: Prevention and Preparedness, Access to Remedy, and Contribution to Remedial Action. While it still distinguishes between the roles of IFC/MIGA and their clients, it no longer denies responsibility.
Prevention remains key. IFC has reiterated the value of its existing sustainability policies to identify and manage environmental and social risks early — something civil society has long demanded, avoiding harm rather than managing its aftermath.
Still, given the numerous and disturbing failed past projects under existing policies, real change will depend on applying an environmental and social lens across all operations. A human rights-based approach must guide this shift.
The RAF also acknowledges the central role of grievance mechanisms. Effective, reliable, and independent grievance mechanisms and systems are essential for project-affected people to raise complaints and seek remedy when things go wrong. Considering IFC’s history with its own accountability mechanism —the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman— this is a significant step.
IFC/MIGA has restated its commitment to using its influence to push its clients to take remedial action and will also provide support for enabling activities, such as fact-finding, technical assistance, and community development activities. But the effectiveness of these contributions will depend on how meaningfully they engage with communities seeking remedy.
Importantly, the RAF applies to all IFC-supported investment projects and to all investment projects covered by MIGA political risk insurance guarantees, an encouraging decision.
Under IFC’s Sustainability Framework, clients have long been responsible for managing environmental and social risks. Now, they are also expected to fund and implement remedy. This is not as straightforward as it would seem: Development finance institutions’ operations are at the center of an often nebulous division of roles.
If IFC fails to properly supervise and monitor its clients, performs weak due diligence, or neglects to notice a low-capacity client, the risk of harm increases — and so does the institution’s responsibility. One of the thorniest issues during the creation of the framework was the cost of providing remedy.
Remarkably, private sector clients did not oppose remedy in principle — they questioned how to deliver it and how costs would be shared. They accepted responsibility for harms caused by construction or operations but they needed clarity on implementation.
Notably, the RAF instructs IFC to use its own financial resources — whether from project funds, donor trust funds, internal budgets, or operational risk capital — to support remedy. That is a major shift, one that could influence other development finance institutions and open a door to systemic change. Already, discussions on remedy are well underway at institutions such as the Inter-American Development Bank.
The RAF was approved on an interim basis, with a three-year piloting phase. The challenge ahead is turning policy into practice. Harm is harm — regardless of how it is funded or who caused it. As environmental and climate crises grow globally, and financial institutions multiply funds in search of solutions, we can point to the first remedial action framework as a standard to follow and as a way forward.
Now there is a way to address harms and provide remedy, the commitment to do so has been set, and many are ready to make this happen, as challenging as it will undoubtedly be. Remedy must be more than a principle. It must be a reality.
Carla García Zendejas is People, Land, and Resources Program Director at the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL)
IPS UN Bureau
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 8 2025 (IPS) - A coalition of UN staff unions, led by the 60,000-strong Coordinating Committee of International Staff Unions and Associations (CCISUA), has written to UN member states criticizing the UN80 reform process as “incoherent and lacking strategy”.
The union, one of the largest single coalitions in the world body, is asking the 193 member states to take over the UN reform process which is currently in the hands of a Task Force.
https://www.ccisua.org/about-us/
Among several issues raised by the (CCISUA), UN80 is dismissed as “chaotic and rushed.” In a critical analysis, the staff union points out that the proposed restructuring:
• Doesn’t address the roots of the problem• Forces managers to cut positions without an analysis of how the UN can be more relevant
• May need to be fixed by the next Secretary-General
• Will impact frontline services (either through UN 80 or prevailing funding shortages)
• Will result in a loss of capacity especially at the national level
• Shows a poor understanding of how the UN system is currently structured
• Is led by a task force that is arbitrarily composed, which in turn biases the outcomes
• Will be costly to implement
• Is being carried out without consultation.
The letter calls on UN member states to take greater control of the process.
Separately, the Secretariat staff unions wrote to the President of the General Assembly requesting to address member states on UN80.
“Closer to Geneva, a good example of issues with the coherence of UN80 is OHCHR downsizing offices in the field while expanding offices in Vienna under the justification of getting closer to those we serve”.
As a reminder, Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has appointed his special adviser, Guy Ryder, to lead UN 80. “We will be following up with further actions to contain the damage being caused by Mr. Ryder’s initiative,” the letter said.
Guy Candusso, a former First Vice-President of the UN Staff Union in New York, told IPS the reform process is usually in the hands of those who want to protect their own interests
“The UN, since Under-Secretary-General Joseph Connor left, has become top heavy with a proliferation of D2s and above. Reforms put forward are already driven by politics.”
Putting it in the hands of member states, he cautioned, is not going to help since it comes down to money. “If the funds are not forthcoming then I can’t see a good outlook for staff,” he said.
Meanwhile, Laura Johnson, Executive Secretary and Ian Richards, President of the UN Staff Union in Geneva, have provided an update on the latest developments regarding the UN 80 initiative.
The Staff-Management Committee (SMC), the global body for consultations between management and staff unions, met at the headquarters of the UN Mission in Kosovo last week.
First, despite its repeated assertions to the General Assembly and staff, management at the SMC did not present detailed UN80 proposals (including the 20 per cent budget cuts, which apply to regular budget (RB) and peacekeeping posts) to the unions and would not consult on UN80.
The only exception to this was a circular and incomplete discussion on potential mitigating measures to assist staff affected by cuts or relocations, once a final decision is made by the General Assembly on the 2026 budget at the end of this year. We asked management to correct its miscommunications on union consultation, but it has so far refused.
Given this, staff unions have had to engage informally with member states directly (see further down). On the mitigating measures, these remain subject to final approval, but are broadly the following:
• In July/August, agreed termination packages will be offered to staff who will be over 55 by the end of the year.• No staff need to relocate before 30 June 2026 and there may be remote onboarding and up to 3 months of telecommuting from the original duty stations if possible.
• If the approved 2026 budget has more staff than posts for a particular entity, this entity would need to activate the downsizing policy and set up Staff-Management Groups to carry out a comparative review to determine an order of retention of staff. This would take place January to February 2026. There will also be measures to ensure that RB fixed-term contracts expiring before then are renewed.
• Staff who are separated may have the option of being put on special leave without pay (SLWOP) for a period to be determined.
• There will also be flagging in Inspira to prioritise selection of staff in retention group 1 of the comparative review if new positions later become available. Subject to agreement by the Secretary-General, this flagging period will be extended beyond what is set out in the downsizing policy as an exceptional measure.
• If posts are moved, including to a common administrative platform, staff would normally move with their post. If staff don’t want to move, other suitable staff may be able to volunteer.
“The lack of finality on these measures and the lack of consideration of proposals presented by unions has been frustrating and will create more anxiety, as we made clear to management”, the letter said.
In addition to the cuts to RB and peacekeeping posts (20%), the initial phase of UN80 will establish common administrative platforms (CAPs), first in Geneva and New York and then in other locations.
Unions repeatedly asked for clarification on the CAPs as it is likely that administrative posts across the UN Secretariat will be reduced and appointments terminated, necessitating the activation of the downsizing policy.
In particular, “we asked for further explanation on how the order of retention for administrative posts across duty stations, entities and funding streams will be managed, but were unable to get clarity.”
It is clear that the General Assembly’s decision on the 2026 budget will be key. Therefore, staff unions have been informally engaging with member states.
The letter sent by CISUA highlighted the serious consequences of the UN 80 initiative on delivery, its lack of vision and the feeling that task force members were using the process to their own ends.
It also questioned how UN 80 will resolve the liquidity situation that triggered the initiative.
Many of these concerns were mentioned by member states during an informal briefing to the General Assembly last week. One member state has also circulated a draft resolution for member states to have greater oversight of the process.
Additionally, said the letter, Guy Ryder has retreated from his previous position of UN 80%. He said that the budget proposals with 20 per cent cuts were for entity heads to reflect on how they could cut costs. The Secretary-General will not necessarily make all these cuts and the final budget will reflect his priorities.
When asked what those priorities were, Ryder said he wasn’t able to reply.
“Our engagement with member states has not been without consequences. Management said at SMC that the unions had breached the staff rules and scolded unions for fulfilling their advocacy role. As an example, UNHCR management has tried to intimidate its staff representative. We called out this action and clearly set out how the staff rules, standards of conduct and General Assembly resolution 67/255 in fact explicitly allow for this important engagement”.
“We will continue to keep you updated and fight to roll back this harmful and pointless reform. The Secretary-General should be saving the UN. We believe Guy Ryder is doing the opposite”.
IPS UN Bureau Report
NAIROBI, Jul 7 2025 (IPS) - When Jean Baremba arrived in Kenya in 2018, he looked forward to rebuilding a life shattered by war in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.
The 42-year-old father of four says he escaped DR Congo to save his children after the death of their mother in a 2017 dawn attack by rebel fighters on their village.
“The rebels were forcibly recruiting men to fight for their army. Those resisting were killed and their property torched. I managed to escape; unfortunately, my wife lost her life,” Baremba told IPS.
A skilled carpenter, Baremba and his four children found their way into the Kakuma refugee camp, 497 miles northwest of Kenya’s Capital, Nairobi.
“Despite all the challenges, Kakuma gave me a second life and renewed hope.”
A Growing Challenge
Kenya hosts approximately 836,907 refugees and asylum seekers, with 51 percent of this population residing in Dadaab Refugee Camp, 36 percent in Kakuma Refugee Camp, and 13 percent in urban areas. The numbers comprise 73 percent refugees and 27 percent asylum-seekers.
Over the years, the ever-rising number of people seeking refuge in Kenya, especially from the Great Lakes region, has continued to exert pressure on the East African nation amid reduced global donor and humanitarian aid and support.
Kenya’s Department of Refugee Services has 220,000 pending refugee and asylum seeker applications.
Initially, the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) was in charge of refugee seekers’ management, but the Kenyan government took over in 2021 following the passage of the Refugee Act.
To solve the refugee crisis, the Kenyan government launched a plan to transform all refugees and asylum seekers into the Kenyan community by transitioning the Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps into integrated settlements.
The five-year transition plan, dubbed the Shirika Plan, aims to transform the refugee camps into integrated settlements for both refugees and host communities to make refugees economically self-reliant.
Shirika is a Swahili word for “coming together” or “partnering.”
The plan will allow refugees to access education, health, government identity cards, business permits, and banking services.
Additionally, refugees will be issued government tax numbers to enable them to open bank accounts and register and operate businesses.
At the same time, the plan will allow refugees to travel and live in any part of Kenya without a special movement permit.
The plan will see refugee students receive government education scholarships to enable them to pursue college and university education.
To enhance access to health services for refugees, the plan allows them to be listed on the Social Health Insurance Fund (SHIF), a government-managed public health fund.
Self-Reliance
For people like Baremba, being allowed to live like other Kenyans will grant refugees the much-needed economic independence.
“Integration will allow me to put my carpentry skills to work, and the Kenyan community will form part of my market,” Baremba said.
He added, “With a source of income, I will no longer rely on support from UNHCR.”
Mary Ajok, a South Sudanese refugee, hopes that the implementation of the Shirika plan will provide a permanent solution to crowded shelters, limited food rations and lack of proper healthcare services plaguing refugees in the camps.
“Raising children in a refugee camp can be challenging. Integration provides a peaceful and friendly environment for children,” Ajok told IPS.
Ajok hopes to establish a catering business to serve both refugees and the host community of Kakuma.
“Majority of refugees have various skills that can be put to use and contribute to the growth of Kenya’s economy,” she said.
Funding
During the official launch of the Shirika Plan at State House, Nairobi, President William Ruto said, “The plan will upgrade refugee management, shifting from humanitarian dependency to a more inclusive and progressive development model centered on human rights.”
US Embassy Chargé d’Affaires Marc Dillard, who also doubles as the chair of the Refugee Donor Group, describes the Shirika plan as a milestone for advancing socio-economic conditions and human rights for refugees in Kenya.
The United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) will work with the Kenyan government to implement the Shirika Plan.
The plan’s implementation budget is estimated to be USD 943 million. Kenya’s Minister for National Administration, Kipchumba Murkomen, has been meeting refugee donor groups appealing for funding to implement the plan.
The World Bank, UNHCR, International Finance Corporation and the Kenya Commercial Bank Group have pledged to fund the plan’s implementation.
Global and Regional Goals
The Shirika Plan contributes to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGS) and the AU Agenda 2063 and aligns with global commitments such as the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) of 2018, the 1969 OAU convention, the 1951 UN convention, and the 1967 UN convention
Inclusivity and non-discrimination based on race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, gender, or any other grounds are key guiding principles for the plan.
For refugees not keen on being integrated, the plan provides pathways for voluntary repatriation to stable home countries and third-country resettlement for deserving, vulnerable refugees.
Opposing Voices
The refugee integration plan is, however, facing resistance from a section of political leaders from Northern Kenya, citing inadequate consultations.
Farah Maalim and Daniel Epuyo, Members of Parliament representing Dadaab and Turkana West constituencies, have accused the government of Kenya and UNHCR of hurriedly rolling out the plan.
The two legislators are instead pushing for the repatriation of refugees back to their home countries.
“We cannot talk of integrating refugees when locals have pressing needs that are yet to be met,” Epuyo said.
Maalim said, “The Hosting Communities of Refugees are not ready for integration. Most refugees would opt for voluntary repatriation with generous assistance to enable them to reintegrate back in Somalia.”
IPS UN Bureau Report
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Jul 7 2025 (IPS) - When Bangladesh’s streets erupted in protest in mid-2024, few could have predicted how swiftly Sheikh Hasina’s regime would crumble. The ousting of the prime minister last August, after years of mounting authoritarianism and growing discontent, was heralded as a historic opportunity for democratic renewal. Almost a year on, the question remains whether Bangladesh is genuinely evolving towards democracy, or if one form of repression is replacing another.
The interim government, led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, confronts enormous challenges in delivering meaningful change. While it has taken significant steps – releasing political prisoners, initiating constitutional reforms, signing international human rights treaties and pursuing accountability for past violations – persistent abuses, political exclusion and economic instability continue to cast long shadows over the transition. The coming months will prove decisive in determining whether Bangladesh can truly break from its authoritarian past.
From electoral fraud to revolution
The roots of Bangladesh’s current upheaval trace back to the deeply flawed general election of 7 January 2024. The vote, which saw Hasina’s Awami League (AL) secure a fourth consecutive term, was widely dismissed as a foregone conclusion. The main opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party boycotted the election in protest at the government’s refusal to reinstate a neutral caretaker system.
The government unleashed an intense crackdown ahead of the vote. It imprisoned thousands of opposition activists and weaponised the criminal justice system to silence dissent, leading to deaths in police custody and enforced disappearances. This repression extended to civil society, with human rights activists and journalists facing harassment, arbitrary detention and violence. The government sponsored fake opposition candidates to create an illusion of competition, resulting in plummeting voter turnout and a crisis of legitimacy.
When opposition rallies occurred, they were met with overwhelming force. On 28 October 2023, police responded to a major opposition protest in Dhaka with rubber bullets, teargas and stun grenades, resulting in at least 16 deaths, with thousands injured and detained.
The situation deteriorated further after the election. In June 2024, the reinstatement of a controversial quota system for public sector jobs triggered mass student-led protests that would ultimately topple Hasina’s government. These protests rapidly evolved into a broader revolt against entrenched corruption, economic inequality and political impunity.
The government’s response was systematically brutal. According to a United Nations fact-finding report, between July and August security forces killed as many as 1,400 people, including many children, often shooting protesters at point-blank range. They denied the injured medical care and intimidated hospital staff. The scale of violence eventually led the military to refuse further involvement, forcing Hasina to resign and flee Bangladesh.
Reform efforts amid political discord
The interim government identified three core priorities: institutional reforms, trials of perpetrators of political violence and elections. Its initial months brought significant progress. The government released detained protesters and human rights defenders, signed the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances and established a commission of inquiry into enforced disappearances.
This commission documented around 1,700 complaints and found evidence of systematic use of enforced disappearances to target political opponents and activists, with direct complicity by Hasina and senior officials. In October, the Bangladesh International Crimes Tribunal issued arrest warrants for Hasina and 44 others for massacres during the 2024 protests, although the tribunal has a troubled history and retains the death penalty, contrary to international norms.
The Constitution Reform Commission has proposed expanding fundamental rights, with a bicameral parliament and term limits for top offices. However, the process has been undermined by the exclusion of major political players – most notably the AL – and minority groups.
Political tensions escalated as the interim government faced mounting pressure to set a general election date. Opposition parties accused it of deliberate stalling. The army chief publicly demanded elections by the end of 2025, while student groups sought postponement until reforms and justice were secured. After initial uncertainty, the government announced the election would occur in April 2026.
The most dramatic escalation came in May, when the interim government banned all AL activities under the Anti-Terrorism Act following renewed protests. The Election Commission subsequently suspended the AL’s registration, effectively barring it from future elections and fundamentally altering Bangladesh’s political landscape.
Economic challenges compound these political difficulties. Bangladesh remains fragile after devastating floods in 2024, while the banking sector faces stress from surging non-performing loans. Inflation continues outpacing wage growth and economic austerity measures agreed with the International Monetary Fund have sparked fresh protests.
Authoritarian patterns persist
Despite promises of change, old patterns of repression prove stubborn. Human rights groups document ongoing security forces abuses, including arbitrary arrests of opposition supporters and journalists, denial of due process and continued lack of accountability for past crimes. In the first two months of 2025 alone, over 1,000 police cases were filed against tens of thousands of people, mainly AL members or perceived supporters. A February crackdown on Hasina’s supporters led to over 1,300 arrests.
Press freedom remains severely threatened. In November, the interim government revoked the accreditation of 167 journalists. Around 140 journalists viewed as aligned with the previous regime have faced charges, with 25 accused of crimes against humanity, forcing many into hiding. Attacks on media outlets continue, including vandalism of newspaper offices.
The draft Cyber Protection Ordinance, intended to replace the repressive Cyber Security Act, has drawn criticism for retaining vague provisions criminalising defamation and ‘hurting religious sentiments’ while granting authorities sweeping powers for warrantless searches. Rights groups warn this law could stifle dissent in the run-up to elections.
Uncertain path forward
Bangladesh’s journey demonstrates that democratic transitions are inherently difficult, nonlinear and deeply contested processes. Democracy isn’t a guaranteed outcome, but the chances improve when political leaders are genuinely committed to reform and inclusive dialogue, and political players, civil society and the public practise sustained vigilance.
While the interim government has achieved steps unthinkable under the previous regime, the persistence of arbitrary arrests, attacks on journalists and the exclusion of key political players suggests authoritarianism’s shadow still looms large.
The upcoming general election will provide a crucial test of whether Bangladesh can finally turn the page on authoritarianism. The answer lies in whether Bangladeshis across government, civil society and beyond are able to build something genuinely new. The stakes are high in a country where many have already sacrificed much for the promise of democratic freedom.
Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Senior Research Specialist, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.
For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org
NEW YORK, Jul 7 2025 (IPS) - In Gabú, Guinea-Bissau, a grandmother named N’beta hesitated. Her six-month-old grandson, Seco, was healthy, so why give him medicine? But community health workers Jamilia and Amadu gently explained that the medicine wasn’t for illness, but for protection. It was part of a seasonal malaria chemoprevention campaign designed to protect children during the worst malaria transmission months — the rainy season.
“Now I understand it’s to keep him safe,” N’beta said, watching Seco become one of 250,000 children protected in 2024 with a simple but life-saving dose.
Malaria remains a deadly threat across Africa, especially for children under five. But with support from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and its partners are reaching the most vulnerable, particularly in hard-to-reach communities.
In Chad, 9.4 million mosquito nets were distributed using a fully digitalized system in 2023, protecting 3.5 million households. In Burundi, 1.3 million people were protected through indoor spraying in 2024. In Guinea-Bissau, malaria prevalence dropped by more than half in just three years from 2020-2023.
But malaria is only one of the threats.
In South Sudan, tuberculosis (TB) continues to claim lives, often undetected.
“Not everyone can read and interpret an X-ray report,” said Dr. Ofere Ohide, a Radiologist at Torit State Hospital. “But with new AI-assisted X-ray machines, even clinics without power or specialists can now detect TB early,” he says of the digital x-ray machines provided through the Global Fund support.
These innovations, combined with decentralized care and improved case notification, helped 92% of people with TB receive treatment in 2023, contributing to a 75% drop in TB-related deaths in South Sudan since 2015. Similarly, close to 20,000 people got cured of TB out of about 23,000 TB cases registered in 2023 representing 85% treatment success rate.
And then there’s HIV – a virus that once devastated entire generations.
In Zimbabwe, where AIDS once slashed life expectancy to 45 years, progress has been hard-won. One young woman, Princess, 17, a survivor of sexual abuse, found strength through a Global Fund-supported comprehensive sexuality education programme delivered by UNDP and partners.
“I reclaimed my voice and will use it to ensure justice for survivors of abuse,” she said, now dreaming of becoming a lawyer.
In Angola, 22-year-old Ana Alexandre became a peer educator after joining sessions on sexual and reproductive health. “I am no longer ashamed to talk about sexuality,” she shared. “My little sister can come to me and ask things… I answer normally and clearly.”
Since 2003, UNDP and the Global Fund have worked hand-in-hand with governments, civil society, and communities to end HIV, TB, and malaria, even in the most fragile settings. In Africa, countries supported by UNDP and the Global Fund include Angola, Burundi, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Guinea-Bissau, Zimbabwe, São Tomé and Príncipe, Mozambique, and South Sudan.
In 2023 alone:
1.5 million people received HIV treatment
44,000 people were treated for TB
13.1 million mosquito nets were distributed to prevent malaria
To all the partners of the Global Fund including the governments of Germany, France, Portugal, Japan, the UK, Canada, the EU, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands – thank you. Your support is not just saving lives. It is restoring dignity, hope, and the promise of a healthier, more prosperous, and secure future.
But the work is not done.
To protect every child like Seco, to empower every girl like Princess, and to reach every community still at risk, we must keep going. Continued investment, including in the Global Fund’s Eighth Replenishment, is essential to ensure health for all and end HIV, TB and malaria by 2030.
Praise Nutakor is Partnerships and Communications Specialist, UN Development Programme (UNDP)
IPS UN Bureau
NEW YORK, Jul 4 2025 (IPS) - UN Member States adopted the ‘Compromiso de Sevilla’ at the Fourth Financing for Development Forum (FfD4) which concluded July 3– the culmination of months of contentious negotiations that pitted wealthy nations against the developing world in competing visions for reform of the global economic architecture.
The wide-ranging outcome document will be met with both fanfare — from the host countries and UN officials keen to portray the process as a success — and criticism — from civil society groups lamenting the watering down of material commitments into so many toothless words. But buried in its 38 pages is a single paragraph that quietly plants the seed for a more transformative agenda:
We will establish a platform for borrower countries with support from existing institutions, and a UN entity serving as its secretariat. The platform may be used to discuss technical issues, share information and experiences in addressing debt challenges, increase access to technical assistance and capacity building in debt management, coordinate approaches, and strengthen borrower countries’ voices in the global debt architecture.
Uniting borrowing countries has long been a dream of those concerned with the imbalance of power in the global financial system. Creditors are organized into collectives like the Paris Club, they argue; so too should debtors work together to build collective negotiating power, underwritten by the threat of a coordinated default.
With two thirds of low-income and a quarter of middle-income countries in or near debt distress, a common negotiating front could not only obtain better terms of restructuring during times of crisis, but also bolster demands for lasting reforms of a failing system that keeps countries trapped in a vicious cycle of debt and underdevelopment.
This is easier said than done.
Developing countries, and the economic elites that typically govern them, are dependent on international finance, and reluctant to do anything that might spook financial markets. Simultaneously overcoming these fears in multiple countries, each with their own contexts and interests, is a tall order.
The FFD document thus conspicuously avoids the language of a “debtors’ club” or any threat of collective negotiation or default, leading instead with more neutral modes of cooperation like information-sharing and capacity-building. But even tentative steps toward cooperation can have a meaningful impact. Indeed, they have before.
In June 1984, eleven Latin American countries met in Cartagena, Colombia to coordinate their responses to the debt crisis that had by then roiled the region for two years. The resulting Cartagena Consensus was clear that it was not a “debtors’ club,” but a forum for collaboration. The group would meet five times in the years that would follow, developing common positions on the source of the crisis and the terms of its resolution.
The Cartagena Consensus is often held up as a cautionary tale for debtors considering coordination. The Group never became a fully realized “debtors’ club” capable of collective negotiation, and petered out before the crisis was resolved as creditors peeled away desperate debtors with sweetheart deals.
But even the tacit threat that a club could be in formation bore fruit. Principles developed collectively shaped early deals, the concessions from which bolstered the positions of subsequent negotiators, and less confrontational governments benefitted from gains won by the more radical.
As scholar Diana Tussie wrote at the time: “a significant improvement in the cost of the negotiated credit was achieved, spreads were reduced, rescheduling fees were drastically reduced, the cost of the loan was reduced, and the amortization period increased significantly.”
Rhetorically, the Consensus helped recast the crisis as a political one, rooted in global financial inequities and exogenous factors like rising interest rates in advanced economies, rather than a purely technocratic or moralistic question of responsible spending.
Today’s multilateral commitment to form a borrowers’ platform has advantages that Cartagena did not. While the developing world is facing a generalized debt crisis, it is not in the acute situation that beset the Cartagena Consensus, and so has an opportunity to gradually build its infrastructure under less desperate conditions.
The borrowers’ platform is to operate with UN support and a wider range of global participants. And the emergence of major new bilateral creditors, though not without its own challenges, may strengthen debtors’ negotiating hands.
Of course, the global debt challenge cannot be reduced to a zero-sum restructuring negotiation. Substantive reforms are needed to address the many faults in the debt system, from ongoing legislative efforts to combat creditor holdouts in Albany, to the establishment of a permanent multilateral sovereign debt workout mechanism — a top priority of debt relief advocates.
Yet these efforts have repeatedly been blocked by the intransigence of creditors. Movement toward reform will only be strengthened by the coordination of the countries that stand to benefit most.
A promise to establish a borrowers’ platform is far from a fully realized debtors’ club, and farther still from a panacea to the Global South’s ongoing debt crisis. But in a document short on transformative ambition, it is a concrete step toward the rebalancing of unequal power relations — and a sign that debtor countries will not submit themselves to creditor inaction forever.
Michael Galant is Senior Research and Outreach Associate at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (cepr.net) in Washington, DC.
IPS UN Bureau
LONDON, Jul 4 2025 (IPS) - Joshua Wong sits in a maximum-security prison cell, knowing the Hong Kong authorities are determined to silence him forever. On 6 June, police arrived at Stanley Prison bringing fresh charges that could see the high-profile democracy campaigner imprisoned for life. This is the reality of Hong Kong: even when behind bars, activists can be considered too dangerous ever to be freed.
An infamous anniversary is approaching. 30 June will mark five years since the passing of Hong Kong’s draconian national security law. Imposed on the supposedly autonomous territory by the Chinese government, the law made it a crime to call for democracy, leading to numerous jail sentences.
Last year, the Hong Kong authorities gave themselves still more powers to suppress dissent by passing another law, the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance. Already, police have used the new law to arrest over 300 people, including for such trivial offences as wearing T-shirts with protest slogans.
Democracy movement ruthlessly suppressed
The heady days of Hong Kong’s vibrant youth-led democracy movement, which erupted into large-scale protests in 2019, are a distant memory. It’s been so long now that some of those jailed have been freed from prison at the end of their sentences. But the authorities are determined to keep persecuting the most high-profile activists.
Wong’s case exemplifies the authorities’ determination to silence prominent voices. The young activist is the movement’s most famous faces. He’s been repeatedly jailed for protest-related offences going back to 2017, and has now spent over four years in prison either serving sentences or awaiting further trials. He’s now charged with conspiring to collude with foreign forces, for allegedly working with exiled democracy activists to urge international sanctions on China, a crime under the national security law.
Meanwhile, Jimmy Lai’s trial continues. The former media owner used his Apple Daily newspaper to support the democracy movement, until the authorities forced it to close in 2021. Like Wong, Lai has already received several sentences, but his current drawn-out trial is on the more serious charges of colluding with foreign forces and conspiring to publish seditious materials.
Lai, who also holds British citizenship, has been held in solitary confinement since December 2020. He’s 77 years old and in poor health, and his family are concerned that in such conditions he might not withstand the fierce heat of another summer. The authorities clearly intend for him to die in jail.
Tradition of dissent crushed
The Hong Kong of today is unrecognisable from the country once promised. When the UK handed the territory over to China in 1997, it was under a treaty in which the Chinese state committed to maintaining its separate political system for 50 years. This included guarantees to uphold civic freedoms. But China has unilaterally torn up that agreement and is determined to make Hong Kong indistinguishable from the totalitarian mainland.
On top of criminalising thousands of protesters, the authorities have thoroughly suppressed a once vibrant media. Hong Kong now stands at 140 out of 180 countries on Reporters Without Borders’ Press Freedom Index; in 2018, before the current intensive crackdown began, it was in 70th place. Recently, journalists have been subjected to a systematic campaign of anonymous harassment and intimidation. Authorities have started to target journalists and media companies for supposedly random tax audits.
In these conditions, many civil society groups, political parties and media houses have had no choice but to shut down, while international media have been forced to relocate. In April, it was the turn of Hong Kong’s oldest and biggest pro-democracy party, the Democratic Party, to close. Long a moderate voice that was careful not to speak out against China, it had nonetheless recently received warnings from Chinese state officials.
The timing reveals the authorities’ desire for absolute control. The next election for the Legislative Council, Hong Kong’s parliament, is due in December, and in democracies, parties gear up rather than close down ahead of elections. But most Legislative Council seats aren’t directly elected and only pro-China candidates are allowed to stand. With this latest party closure, the authorities are evidently intent on denying even the prospect of token opposition.
In the face of the crackdown, some democracy activists have managed to escape into exile, but there’s no safety there, since China is the world’s number one transnational repressor. In 2023 and 2024, the authorities placed a bounty on the heads of 19 exiled activists, offering rewards for their capture.
Hong Kong authorities have stripped exiles of passports, while police have targeted their families for questioning. May saw a further escalation, when police arrested the father and brother of US-based exile Anna Kwok, one of the 19 with a price on their heads.
Ever-growing control
The Chinese state’s reach now extends to the most trivial aspects of daily life. Pro-China informants report people who fall foul of laws, and there’s seemingly no act of rebellion too small to escape official notice. In June, Hong Kong police warned people not to download a mobile phone game developed in Taiwan on the grounds it was secessionist. Teachers – who must deliver a pro-China curriculum – have been instructed not to attend 4 July events organised by the US consulate, and to discourage students attending. Education minister Christine Choi Yuk-lin recently warned of the dangers of book fairs and other acts of ‘soft resistance’ in schools.
The Chinese state now holds all the cards in Hong Kong. But Hong Kong’s story isn’t just about a small territory’s loss of freedom: it’s a warning to the world about what happens when authoritarianism advances unchecked. As Wong faces the prospect of life imprisonment for the crime of calling for democracy and Lai withers in solitary confinement, the international community must review its commitment to democracy. The very least Hong Kong’s underground and exiled activists deserve is international solidarity and support to ensure their safety against attacks. As their struggle continues, the world shouldn’t look away.
Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.
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