The Human Consciousness Now...Our World in the Midst of Becoming...to What? Observe, contemplate Now.
APEX, North Carolina / SAN FRANCISCO, California, Jun 30 2026 (IPS) - With progress stalled on many issues, this year’s June talks in Bonn—which are supposed to smooth the way towards COP 31 in Antalya at year’s end—were widely judged a failure. What happened? And what does it mean for Antalya?
“Deliberately delaying us.”
“Spreading misinformation.”
“Denying the science.”
“Lacking integrity.”
“Blocking progress.”
“Costing countless lives.”
These were just some of the charges delegates leveled at each other during the UN Climate Meetings held in Bonn this June. As delegates took up multiple issues in small “contact groups” and “informal consultations”, negotiations quickly became tetchy and irritable before descending into levels of rancor and even rudeness rarely seen before. And it was not just one issue where tempers frayed.
What went wrong? One problem is the sheer number of topics on the Bonn agenda. Over the thirty-plus years since the UN climate talks began, countries have been keen to add issues they particularly care about to the agenda
From talks on climate change research and science to topics like mitigation and funding for adaptation, the mood was often combative and confrontational. By the meeting’s end, differences were so great that in many cases delegates could not even agree to continue working on the draft outcome documents from Bonn when they arrive at COP 31 in Antalya later this year.
This means they will need to start discussions from scratch. In other cases, they failed to finish their work, but at least managed to forward the current working texts. This is hardly a great outcome, however.
In fact, Bonn may have witnessed more arguments over “mandates” (whether a particular group should be discussing certain topics) and “points of order” (whether delegates were playing within the rules) than ever before in the climate change process.
Searching for positives, some participants pointed to one success. Delegates did choose the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) to host the Climate Technology Centre (CTC).
The CTC provides technological support to developing countries. It means the Centre’s work will continue beyond 2027 and possibly all the way through to 2041. But even the glow of this minor “win” dims when one recalls that UNEP was already the host.
This agreement simply means it can carry on its work. It doesn’t create something new. When continuing to do something that’s already happening counts as a victory, you know things haven’t gone well.
Too Many TopicsWhat went wrong? One problem is the sheer number of topics on the Bonn agenda. Over the thirty-plus years since the UN climate talks began, countries have been keen to add issues they particularly care about to the agenda.
For instance, vulnerable small island nations are eager to talk about keeping global warming under 1.5oC, the threshold at which scientists fear serious “tipping points” will be reached. They also want to talk about phasing out fossil fuels—the major cause of climate change—and about wealthy countries helping them to adapt.
Meanwhile, fossil fuel exporters like Saudi Arabia are keen to talk about what wealthy western nations’ actions, including carbon taxes or a shift to renewables, are doing to their oil-based economies. They believe these “response measures” could harm them—or already are. That said, these same oil and gas-rich nations certainly do not want to talk about getting rid of fossil fuels.
A third example are the western nations, particularly those in Europe, who are making efforts to shake off their dependence on oil and gas.
They are happy to talk about renewable energy and science, but are keen to shut down talk about funding or compensating countries affected by what the Europeans consider to be their virtuous efforts to change. Bailing out oil producers for any “harm” done to their export trade is the last thing on their minds.
As the various groups have added their topics to the negotiations over the years, these divergent views have collided with ever greater force. Although there are frequent calls to simplify the process, no country is going to give up their “pet” topic, especially since that would mean more time to talk about someone else’s favorite issue. Could everyone agree to simplify and give up their preferred agenda item? Maybe. But so far, no one has blinked.
The Rule Is, There Are No Rules!Making things more difficult still are the UN climate treaty’s “rules of procedure.” These were developed in the 1990s when countries first penned the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change—the bedrock agreement on which the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement were also built.
The rules of procedure offer a way out of difficult issues by allowing for countries to vote. In some cases, a two-thirds majority is required to “win” on an issue. Sometimes, the bar is even higher and a three-quarters majority is needed.
The trouble is, these rules were never formally adopted. Saudi Arabia and a number of other countries refused to agree to them. What this means is that consensus is required for everything. So, what happens when a treaty has 198 parties, all with differing views and priorities on what is possibly the most complex issue of our times? One could argue it’s a miracle anything has been agreed at all.
The COP 31 PileupWhat does this mess mean for COP 31, which is taking place in Antalya, Türkiye, in November? First, it means an agenda pileup. The annual June climate meeting in Bonn is supposed to help pave the way to the end-of-year COP. Bonn’s job is to resolve much of the low-hanging fruit—agenda items that require some sort of agreement or outcome document, but which can be taken care of relatively quickly. This then leaves the COP to finish up work on the big, meaty, difficult issues.
The problem is, Bonn resolved almost nothing. Even the low-hanging fruit seems to have soured. With so many documents unresolved and “rolled over” (or, in the jargon of the process, ‘Rule 16ed’), COP 31 will have a massive workload. It’s a logjam that seems unlikely to be cleared in Antalya.
Does this mean COP 31 will fail? Not necessarily. One silver lining that could be observed in Bonn was how well the two countries presiding over COP 31 seemed to be working together. In an unusual arrangement, the government of Türkiye is physically hosting and organizing the COP, while the government of Australia is joining as co-president tasked with handling the diplomatic negotiations.
Their collaborative spirit and air of quiet competence provided a ray of hope in Bonn. Also, there are two pre-COP events in October—one taking place in Fiji, the other in Tuvalu—that might help.
Still, the signs are not good overall.
Fixing the ProcessBonn did not occur in a vacuum. By common consent, the UN climate process has been getting steadily more complicated by the year, especially since the Paris Agreement was inked back in 2015. Bonn was just the latest example—and one of the more extreme—in how confusing and difficult it has become from an agenda perspective.
There is also a growing interest in these negotiations to reckon with. Some of the early COPs attracted only a few thousand participants, while today the numbers regularly top 50,000 and more.
The most extreme, COP 28, topped 83,000! Some argue this is making it more difficult, while others see this as a positive development, since it demonstrates to politicians that climate change remains a critical issue. Either way, this evolution adds to the organizational complexity of the process.
These recent travails and complications have led to a steady stream of think pieces, reports, and meetings aimed at streamlining, simplifying and improving the system. They contain many good ideas for shedding agenda items and other alterations.
Perhaps one day frustration will mount to a point where some of these good ideas actually happen. But with countries so divided on the substance of the talks, it is hard to imagine them agreeing on their organization, at least in the short term.
Does It Really Matter?In spite of the mess the process is in right now, we can see four reasons to remain positive and not to give up hope.
First, COP 31 is not a “make or break” COP. Sure, it needs to keep the momentum going. But there are no major outcomes needed in Antalya.
Instead, delegates and observers are looking more to COP 32 in 2027—which will review countries’ success in implementing their pledges under the Paris Agreement—and COP 33, which is tasked with completing a second “global stocktake” of progress. COP 33, in particular, will need to end with something noteworthy. Interestingly, COP 33 is also likely to take place hard-on-the-heels of the U.S. Presidential elections.
Looking further out, COP 35 in 2030 should mark another important moment in the process, with countries scheduled to submit their next set of pledges or “Nationally Determined Contributions”.
A second reason to stay positive—and no disrespect to the climate negotiations—is that we already have in place the major agreements we need to make progress.
The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement are the launch pads we need. A lot of the negotiations occurring these days in Bonn and at the COPs are relatively minor and procedural. Now, our work can and should be more about implementing what we’ve agreed.
To be clear: the COPs have an important role to play in reviewing progress and encouraging countries to do more. But the foundations are already in place, the promises made. Now, it is about doing what we have said we would.
Thirdly, the creation of “Coalitions of the Willing” in recent years show there is an appetite for promoting implementation even on issues where there is not yet consensus among all 198 member states.
Alliances designed to advance progress on critical matters such as energy, agriculture, water, oceans, and health can only help us move forward. While some, such as the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (GFANZ), have failed in their original goals, the potential is certainly there.
The recent alliance to transition away from fossil fuels, and another initiative on financing known as the “Vulnerability to Viability Compact”, are positive developments that could and should help us on the path to implementation.
Are we doing what is needed? Not yet. At least, not fast enough. But—and this is our fourth and final note of positivity—there is hope here. It’s worth noting that, since the Paris Agreement in 2015, the trajectory of global warming has changed. Back in 2015, the world was staring down the barrel of 4-6oC in warming by the end of this century. These numbers should cause any sensible person to quail. They are extinction-level predictions; apocalyptic in their scope, horrifying in their impact.
Today, the numbers have fallen to between about 2.1oC and 2.8oC, depending on your assumptions. These numbers are still very, very bad. They threaten breaching all sorts limits, passing many points of no return.
Even at 1.5oC warming, we are seeing unprecedented weather such as the heatwaves felt recently in Europe. Still, we have started to bend the curve. As a result of government policies, scientific breakthroughs, private sector initiatives and action from many, many stakeholders, things are slowly beginning to change.
Our friend Christiana Figueres, who played a major role in the Paris Agreement, talks often about “stubborn optimism”. We agree. This is the time to double down on climate action. With renewed energy and dogged persistence, we can keep bending the curve and change humanity’s future.
This, surely, is something participants at future COPs should be striving towards.
Prof. Felix Dodds and Chris Spence have participated in United Nations talks on climate change and other environmental negotiations since the 1990s. They co-edited Heroes of Environmental Diplomacy: Profiles in Courage (Routledge, 2022) and wrote Environmental Lobbying at the United Nations: A Guide to Protecting Our Planet (Routledge, 2025). Their next book, Political Heroes of the Environment: Profiles in Courage, is due for release in 2027.
ROME, Jun 30 2026 (IPS) - Farmers today are producing food under pressures that would have been unimaginable to previous generations. Input costs are rising and supply chains are unreliable. Water is scarcer. Weather is less predictable. And for a growing number of farmers — in Sudan, in Ukraine, in Myanmar, in Gaza — the challenge is producing food at all, in the middle of active conflict. These are not marginal conditions. They describe the reality facing hundreds of millions of people who grow the food the world depends on.
Smart farming — using data, digital tools, and precision technologies to make better decisions, use fewer inputs, and get more from every hectare — is not a luxury response to these pressures. It is increasingly a practical and necessary one. It helps farmers know when to plant, where fertilizer will generate the greatest return, how much water a crop actually needs, where pests are likely to emerge, and which risks are developing before they become crises.
Three agricultural revolutions got us here. The first gave humanity settled agriculture. The second transformed land use and productivity through new methods and early machinery. The third — the Green Revolution — combined improved seeds, fertilizers, and modern practice to feed a rapidly growing world. Each solved the defining challenge of its era … producing enough.
Smart farming — using data, digital tools, and precision technologies to make better decisions, use fewer inputs, and get more from every hectare — is not a luxury response to these pressures. It is increasingly a practical and necessary one
The fourth revolution faces a fundamentally different challenge. It is no longer simply about producing more food. It is about producing more with fewer and less reliable inputs, under greater uncertainty, on land under increasing stress, and while reducing agriculture’s environmental footprint.
The tools that drove the Green Revolution were extraordinary, but they are not infinitely scalable. Synthetic fertilizers depend on energy-intensive production and supply chains that have proven fragile. Aquifers in key agricultural regions are being drawn down faster than they recharge. The yield gains from conventional intensification are flattening. There is no endless supply of cheap water, cheap fertilizer, or cheap fuel to sustain food production the way we have for the past half-century.
Smart farming is how we meet this new challenge. It enables farmers to produce more with fewer resources, make better decisions under uncertainty, and reduce agriculture’s environmental footprint. It is not a vision for the future. It is already happening.
FAO’s own operational programmes demonstrate what is already possible. Our Desert Locust early warning system uses satellite imagery, weather data, and field intelligence to forecast outbreaks before they reach crops, giving governments time to act rather than simply respond. The SoilFER programme is turning faster, more affordable soil mapping into actionable fertilizer recommendations for farmers in Central America and sub-Saharan Africa. The Hand-in-Hand Initiative combines geospatial, market, and socioeconomic data so governments and investors can direct agricultural investment where it will have the greatest return. These are not pilots. They are operational programmes with measurable outcomes — and they include AI-driven tools that forecast pest and disease pressure, analyze crop stress, and help governments make better decisions faster than was previously possible.
My own family’s seven-generation grain farm in rural Indiana today uses GPS-guided equipment, variable-rate fertilizer applications based on soil sampling, yield mapping, and real-time weather tools to make planting and harvesting decisions. The technology works. The question is who has access to it.
That is the central challenge. The benefits of smart farming currently concentrate among producers who already have the resources, connectivity, and institutional support to adopt new tools. Smallholder farmers — who produce a third of the world’s food — are too often last in line. Women farmers and young producers face additional barriers to technology and financing, which means the whole system underperforms when they are excluded.
At FAO’s Global Conference on Smart Farming in Rome from 1 to 3 July, the commitments required are specific and clear. Governments need to modernize regulatory environments and invest in the digital infrastructure agriculture depends on. Development banks should finance data systems and precision agriculture as essential infrastructure rather than optional innovation. Private companies need business models that reach smallholders, not only large commercial farms. And organizations like FAO must ensure that technical knowledge becomes practical solutions farmers can actually us e.
The fourth agricultural revolution is already underway. What remains to be decided is whether its benefits reach the farmers who need them most — or whether the gap between what is possible and what is accessible becomes permanent.
Beth Bechdol is Deputy Director-General, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
JOHANNESBURG, South Africa, Jun 30 2026 (IPS) - Usually, the fiesta to celebrate St Antony at the church with the same name in Crown Mines, Johannesburg, is a lively affair. The church is usually packed with congregants from the Portuguese community, including recent migrants from Mozambique and Angola.
On Sunday, the mass was half empty, with mostly white congregants filling the few seats that were taken. The black Portuguese community – whether undocumented migrants or not – stayed away.
It was just two short days until an anti-migrant mass action planned for today (June 30) by an organisation called March and March, led by former radio personality and civic activist Jacinta Ngobese-Zuma. Who supports March and March financially is not known, but they seem to be highly resourced with immense power to mobilise. The ANC’s secretary general, Fikile Mbalula, has associated her organisation with the former President Jacob Zuma but the connections are indirect. Zuma’s uMkhonto weSizwe (MK), ActionSA and some smaller parties have endorsed the mass action – although Ngobese-Zuma’s organisation says it is an independent civic organisation.
Some parties, like the EFF, have stuck to their pan-Africanist stance.
Anti-migrant marchers make their way through Soweto during demonstrations, 29 June 2026, in Jabulani, Soweto. Credit: Alaister Russell/IPS
But foreign migrants are an easy target to blame for structural and economic issues in the country.
What is clear even in the days leading up to March and March’s campaign is that the impact of their ‘civic’ action, aimed at forcing the South African government to act against a massive diaspora of migrants from all over Africa, is one of misery and fear.
Already devastating photographs of families hurriedly preparing to leave the country have dominated the headlines.
South Africa has a long history of xenophobia, with probably the most infamous campaign ending as abruptly as it started in May 2008, when Mozambican citizen Ernesto Alfabeto Nhamuave was ‘necklaced’ in the Ramaphosa settlement on the East Rand in Gauteng.
Images of his burning body splashed across papers the following day, making the horror of the xenophobic attacks even more poignant.
At the time, I was the news editor at The Star, a major newspaper in South Africa. For about two weeks, our pages were filled with the stories about the impact of the attacks, which were often triggered by arbitrary identification – such as vaccination scars and issues of pronunciation – as well as fear, mass displacement, and the movement of thousands of foreign nationals leaving the country, all of which made for sad and distressing reading.
That year, according to Human Rights Watch, 62 people died, including 21 South Africans, 11 Mozambicans, five Zimbabweans and three Somalis, and thousands suffered injuries. About 40,000 foreign nationals left the country, and the authorities displaced a further 50,000 in camps until they closed them.
The authorities may have dismantled the camps, but they did little to bring the perpetrators to justice or to change people’s attitudes towards foreigners. In fact, if my memory serves me correctly, the official view of the 2008 xenophobic attacks was that they were due to a ‘crime’ problem, not a ‘hate’ problem.
Nhamuave’s murder case was closed, and with that, a festering sore of blame and misinformation fomented more attacks in the years to come.
And many more incidents and waves of violence followed.
Migrant myths. Credit: Collective Voices for Health Access
In 2019, I was living and working in Nigeria during another wave of xenophobia that primarily targeted the Nigerian community in South Africa. There was significant diplomatic fallout between Pretoria and Abuja, with South Africa temporarily closing its embassy after businesses like Shoprite and MTN were targeted in Nigeria.
And these are not the only two incidents.
While it is true that in South Africa 12.5 million South Africans are unemployed, most of whom are young people, and that something drastic needs to be done to stimulate the economy, bring people into the working space and improve it, a good start would be to create tolerance and understanding.
Indeed, myths like ‘they take our jobs’, ‘they contribute nothing to the economy’ and ‘they are the cause of all our crime’ continue to perpetuate.
Research shows otherwise.
Most foreign migrants are not employed in the formal sector. Administrative tax data suggests that foreigners hold less than 4% of formal jobs. In the informal economy, about 20% of the workforce consists of foreigners, creating greater competition.
Research at Wits University suggests that the unemployment rate would “fall by only six percentage points – from 43.6% to 37.6% – if all foreigners’ jobs were somehow handed to unemployed South Africans”.
This, they say, highlights that “foreigners do not dominate the labour market overall, even if some sectors and locations have higher concentrations of immigrant workers.”
Apart from that, if they swapped one-to-one, South Africans could lose jobs overall. A World Bank report found that one immigrant worker generates approximately two jobs for locals.
This xenophobic campaign, like its predecessors, will not solve the issues; instead, we will all be worse off.
Hate isn’t the solution. It deepens distrust and spreads fear.
Surely, logic and peace should prevail.
IPS UN Bureau Report
UNITED NATIONS, Jun 30 2026 (IPS) - As the United Nations held its first-ever Peacebuilding Week (June 22-26) UN officials and developmental partners gathered at Egypt’s Permanent Mission on June 23 to hold a dialogue on the main question which emerged from the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review (PBAR): “how can global commitments to peacebuilding translate into tangible results on the ground?”
This event, hosted by Egypt at the sidelines of Peacebuilding Week, titled “Strengthening National Peace Infrastructures in Africa: Lessons Learned and the Way Forward,” brought together representatives from African governments and regional organizations, as well as members of the UN system, to discuss how nationally-owned institutions can mitigate and prevent conflict, manage effects and sustain peace long after conflicts have ended.
To open the event, Egypt’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ihab Moustafa Awad Moustafa emphasized that the 2025 PBAR negotiations repeatedly asserted a fundamental concern of ensuring that policy discussions in New York produce measurable impact on the ground, whether in Africa or any other peacekeeping sites.
“One of the clearest answers that emerged during those discussions was the need to strengthen national capacities and institutions,” Moustafa said. “We are serious about peacebuilding, sustaining, peace, and primarily prevention, we must invest in national peace infrastructure.”
The PBAR, which was adopted in November of 2025, reaffirmed that nationally led and nationally owned endeavors remain at the core of sustainable peace. The PBAR actively calls on Member States, regional organizations, development partners, international financial institutions, and the UN system to strengthen the institutions capable of preventing conflict, fostering social cohesion, and managing risk.
Throughout the discussion, speakers agreed that contemporary conflicts are rooted in security threats, but also pointed to institutional fragility, governance deficits, and declining trust of public institutions between citizens as an additional threat.
Brian James Williams, Chief of the Peacebuilding Fund, at the Peacebuilding and Peace Support Office (PBPSO), explained that the review provides a clear mandate for the international community to follow nationally identified priorities.
“Prevention and sustaining peace needs stronger national capacities, stronger institutions and better alignment of international support behind those national priorities,” Williams said.
Williams detailed the UN Peacebuilding Fund’s increasingly important role in helping governments operationalize existing national mechanisms, rather than creating new parallel structures. Williams cited examples such as support for peace and reconciliation committees in Chad and local peacebuilding mechanisms in the Central African Republic.
“These committees bring together administrative authorities, traditional and religious leaders, women, young, and marginalized groups,” Williams said, relaying the efforts to connect national peace architectures with local institutions and provincial actors.
Participants of the dialogue repeatedly emphasized that national ownership must extend beyond central governments. Effective peace infrastructures require civil society organizations, participation of local authorities, women, youth, religious leaders, and representatives of the community capable of identifying tensions or risks before they can escalate into violence.
Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations, Ibrahim F. Jimoh, highlighted his country’s model to strengthen peacebuilding through institutions such as the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, and through reintegration, demobilization, disarmament, and reconciliation programs tailored to specific local conditions.
“Such infrastructures provide the framework through which countries can anticipate risks, address grievances, and support recovery,” Jimoh said. “Their effectiveness depends on inclusive participation, institutional resilience, and strong national ownership.”
Sierra Leone, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, and The Gambia, also shared examples where local mediation structures, national peace councils, reconciliation commissions, and traditional institutions of justice have contributed to conflict prevention and social cohesion.
Jacqueline Seck, Chief of Staff, Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), pointed to Ghana’s Peace Council as an example of nationally owned institutions providing trusted platforms to have dialogue, mediation, and electoral conflict prevention. Similarly, in The Gambia and Sierra Leone, it was discussed the role of dedicated peace institutions in helping support post-conflict reconciliation and manage political tensions.
Among the most major challenges, financing emerged as a recurring topic throughout the duration of the dialogue. While the catalytic role of the Peacebuilding Fund was praised by the speakers, many emphasized that sustained peace ultimately requires a long term political commitment to peace as well as continuous domestic investment.
Williams warned that developing institutions often takes a lot of time, and is a gradual process “Institutions take time to develop,” he said. “Results often require support at a certain scale, across the country, and across different parts of an institution to make meaningful impact.”
Throughout the discussion, participants pointed to a broader shift in peacebuilding strategy, from responding to crises after violence has already erupted, to investing in preventative institutions designed to address risks before conflict happens.
IPS UN Bureau Report
VICTORIA, Seychelles, Jun 29 2026 (IPS) - On the night of 29 June 1976, just before midnight, I stood among my fellow Seychellois at the heart of a moment that would change our history forever.
James Alix Michel
The air was heavy with expectation, pride, and a certain quiet anxiety: we were stepping into the unknown.
That night was emotional for me in a very personal way. After the new president had delivered his address, the president of my party – who would become Prime Minister at Independence – took the podium. At the end of his speech, he recited a poem I had written for our newspaper, entitled “Il est Minuit” – “It is midnight”. Hearing my own words spoken at that exact moment, when one era was ending and another beginning, was unforgettable. It felt as if the poem had become part of the birth certificate of our nation.
Fifty years later, as Seychelles celebrates its golden jubilee of Independence, I look back not only as a witness of that first midnight, but as someone who has walked alongside the country through many of its trials and transformations: from minister, to vice president, to president, and now as an advocate for the Blue Economy and for Small Island Developing States (SIDS) on the global stage.
From struggle to nationhood:
The struggle for Independence was our first great challenge. As a small colony in the Indian Ocean, it could have been easy to remain permanently on the periphery of history. Instead, the Seychellois chose to take responsibility for their own destiny. The transition from colonial rule to self government forged a strong sense of identity and duty. It taught us that freedom is not a one time event, but a continuous effort.
In the years after Independence, Seychelles experimented with different political paths, including one party rule and later a return to multi party democracy. These choices were often contentious, but they were part of our process of political maturation. As institutions evolved and multi party politics took root, we learned the value of dialogue, compromise and the rule of law. A young state was becoming a more confident republic.
2008: A turning point born of crisis:
One of the most defining moments in my own journey came in 2008. By then I was president, and Seychelles was facing a deep economic crisis. The global financial turmoil, combined with soaring oil and food prices, had almost exhausted our foreign reserves. The rupee was heavily overvalued, deficits were spiralling, and eventually the country missed a payment on its external debt.
In such moments, leadership is tested in very practical ways. On 31 October 2008, I took the decision to launch a comprehensive macroeconomic reform programme, supported by the International Monetary Fund. We floated the rupee, restructured the national debt, and imposed strict fiscal discipline. These were not popular measures; they required real sacrifice from the Seychellois people.
Yet that programme became a turning point. It stabilised our economy, restored credibility, and moved Seychelles towards a more modern, private sector led market system.
Looking back, I consider those reforms one of the most important achievements of my leadership. Without that foundation, many of the subsequent steps we took – in education, innovation and environmental policy – would have been far more difficult, if not impossible.
Pirates at sea, pressure on land:
Just as those economic reforms were taking root, a new and very different threat emerged. Somali pirates, heavily armed, began operating deep inside our Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), hijacking local vessels, taking Seychellois fishermen hostage and frightening away cruise ships and fishing fleets. Our two main economic pillars – tourism and tuna fishing – were suddenly at risk.
For a small island state with 1.3 million square kilometres of ocean, this was an existential security challenge. We knew we could not police such a vast space alone. We therefore mounted an intense diplomatic effort to convince regional and global partners that securing the Western Indian Ocean was in everyone’s interest. Seychelles became a hub for anti piracy operations; our Coast Guard cooperated closely with foreign navies; and we adapted our domestic laws to prosecute and imprison pirates.
These were difficult years, but they showed that a small nation, if it acts with courage and clarity, can punch above its weight. We helped to restore security to our waters and protect the livelihoods of our people.
Meanwhile, a quieter but more permanent threat was taking shape: climate change. Coral bleaching, coastal erosion and rising sea levels were affecting our islands directly. Seychelles was facing an environmental crisis it had done little to create, while international climate finance for SIDS was still limited and slow.
From vulnerability to vision: the Blue Economy:
It was in this context that the idea of the Blue Economy began to crystallise. For years, I had been convinced that our future would be decided not only on land, but in the ocean that surrounds us. Seychelles has a small landmass but a vast maritime zone. If we could rethink the ocean as a space for sustainable development – not just for exploitation – we could turn vulnerability into opportunity.
When I began advocating publicly for the Blue Economy, there was scepticism at home and abroad. Some considered it too abstract, others thought it was merely a new label for old ideas. But we persisted in giving the concept substance: through marine spatial planning, through the designation of large marine protected areas, and through innovative mechanisms such as the debt for nature swap we concluded in 2014 with the Paris Club and The Nature Conservancy.
That agreement restructured part of our national debt in exchange for robust commitments to ocean conservation. It helped to fund protection for 30% of our waters and became a model for other countries. Seychelles, once seen only as a vulnerable small island state, was now recognised as a pioneer of the Blue Economy and of nature based solutions.
Investing in people
Economic and environmental reforms are only part of the story. I have always believed that the most important investment a country can make is in its people. That is why I supported the creation of the University of Seychelles, at a time when some argued that our nation was too small to have its own university. The aim was simple: to give Seychellois youth the chance to pursue tertiary education at home and build their future on their own soil.
We complemented this with initiatives like the Young Leaders Programme, designed to prepare promising young Seychellois for positions of responsibility, including through postgraduate studies.
For me, these efforts are as central to our Independence story as any economic reform or diplomatic achievement. Independence is not only about sovereignty; it is about giving every generation the tools to shape its own destiny.
Looking ahead: Seychelles in 2076:
Today, as Seychelles celebrates 50 years of Independence, I am often asked what I see when I look ahead to the next half century. My vision is of a nation that has completed the journey from perceived vulnerability to respected ocean leadership: a country that manages its maritime space wisely, that uses its natural resources sustainably, and that shares its experience with other island and coastal states.
But my greatest pride is not in the policies we have already put in place. It lies in the potential I see in our people, especially our young people. They are better educated, more connected and more globally aware than my generation was in 1976. If they remain united, keep faith with our values and dare to innovate, I believe the Seychelles of tomorrow can be even more remarkable than the Seychelles of today.
At midnight on that first Independence Day, the poem “Il est Minuit” captured a sense of ending and beginning. Fifty years on, I feel we are once again at such a threshold. The first chapter of an independent Seychelles has been written. The next will be authored by a new generation.
My hope is that they will write it with courage, imagination and love for these islands and the ocean that surrounds them.
IPS UN Bureau
Jun 29 2026 (IPS) -
CIVICUS discusses Ghana’s anti-LGBTQI+ law with Leila Lariba, Executive Director of One Love Sisters Ghana, a community-driven organisation that advances human rights, social inclusion and wellbeing for Muslim LGBTQI+ people in Ghana.
On 29 May, Ghana’s parliament approved the Human Sexual Rights and Family Values Bill, which imposes prison terms of up to three years for people who identify as LGBTQI+ and three to five years for anyone deemed to promote, sponsor or support LGBTQI+ activities. With it, Ghana joins a growing group of West African states, including Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Senegal, that have recently passed anti-LGBTQI+ laws.
What does the new bill do, and how different is it from the version parliament approved in 2024?
Parliament approved the new anti-LGBTQI+ bill on 29 May and it now awaits President John Dramani Mahama’s signature. The bill criminalises LGBTQI+ people and anyone perceived to support, advocate for or provide services to them. It reaches far beyond identity and relationships into the freedoms of association, education, expression, healthcare and human rights advocacy. I have worked directly with LGBTQI+ communities across Ghana for years and I see this not as a legal document but as a tool that legitimises discrimination.
The version parliament approved in 2024, which former president Nana Akufo-Addo left office without signing, was already one of the continent’s most restrictive. The new text keeps most of its harmful provisions. It comes at a moment when LGBTQI+ people already face heightened fear, insecurity and stigma, and it makes simply existing, seeking support or speaking about human rights a potential crime.
Why is the bill being pushed now, and who’s behind it?
The bill is being pushed by anti-rights groups that have increasingly turned LGBTQI+ people into a political target. As many Ghanaians struggle with economic hardship, unemployment and governance concerns, public attention is being redirected towards a small and already excluded community.
Behind it stands a coalition of political figures, conservative religious groups and traditional leaders who frame LGBTQI+ rights as a threat to culture and family values. This narrative ignores Ghana’s long history of diversity and the fact that LGBTQI+ people belong to every family, community and faith group in the country and the world.
Do you expect President Dramani to sign the bill, and what would the consequences be?
It’s uncertain whether President Dramani will sign. But the damage is already done. The prolonged public debate has fuelled fear, encouraged discrimination and left many people feeling less safe. Even before it becomes law, the bill has emboldened hostility.
At One Love Sisters Ghana, we have documented rising reports of blackmail, evictions, family rejection, mental health crises, online harassment and workplace discrimination. People are now afraid to seek healthcare, legal help and psychosocial support in case they are exposed or targeted. When fear becomes institutionalised, people stop seeking help precisely when they need it most.
The law would threaten fundamental rights and deepen the stigma, isolation and vulnerability of people who already face daily barriers. As a queer Muslim activist, I know what it means to navigate many layers of exclusion. Many LGBTQI+ people are balancing identity, faith, family and safety. This law would make that even harder.
The impact would reach beyond individual people. Community organisations, healthcare providers, human rights defenders and support networks would also face risk, making it harder for vulnerable people to reach essential services and protection.
How are LGBTQI+ groups, including your organisation, responding?
Ghana’s LGBTQI+ communities are remarkably resilient. Across the country, people are supporting one another, sharing information, strengthening their safety and keeping community ties alive.
At One Love Sisters Ghana, we focus on community care, protection and wellbeing. We have tightened safety and security measures, expanded psychosocial support, documented rights violations and kept referring people in crisis to the help they need.
We work closely with activists, community leaders, health professionals, lawyers and regional partners to track developments and keep people informed and supported. Through our national support systems, we keep hearing from people worried about their safety, livelihoods and future.
We also hold on to hope. Our communities have survived hard times before, and we keep building solidarity, caring for one another and advocating for dignity and human rights.
What further restrictions could follow, and what support do you need to prevent them?
Our greatest fear is that this law lays the groundwork for broader restrictions on civil society, free expression and human rights work. Organisations could face tighter scrutiny, activists greater risk and excluded groups even harder access to services.
To prevent further harm, we need sustained support from national, regional and international allies for community safety initiatives, emergency response, legal assistance, mental health services and the protection of human rights defenders.
International solidarity should be led by local communities and grounded in human rights. Allies should amplify local voices, back grassroots organisations and keep advocating for fundamental freedoms.
This is bigger than LGBTQI+ rights. It’s about the kind of society we want to be. Respect for human rights can’t be selective. When the rights of one group are restricted, it creates a precedent that can affect everyone.
As a queer Muslim feminist and human rights defender, I believe that dignity, freedom and safety belong to all people. The conversations happening today will shape the future of our democracy. I hope Ghana chooses compassion over fear, inclusion over exclusion and human dignity over discrimination.
CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.
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Gender rights: rollback and resistance CIVICUS | State of Civil Society Report 2026
Senegal: ‘The new law criminalises not only LGBTQI+ people but also anyone offering support’ CIVICUS Lens | Anonymous interview 21.May.2026
Ghana: ‘The anti-LGBTQI+ law enshrines prejudice and discrimination and perpetuates inequalities’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Solomon Atsuvia | 01.May.2024
MEXICO CITY, Jun 29 2026 (IPS) - Ever since the Berlin Wall fell 37 years ago and the communist Eastern Bloc collapsed, Cuba has been debating economic reforms to its socialist system. Essentially, the discussion always revolves around the same issues: less state planning, more personal responsibility. In other words, a strong dose of capitalism as an antidote to inefficient and corrupt state bureaucracy.
Little has happened since then. Phases of liberalisation and opening up have been followed by phases of tightening and control. Time and again, hardliners within the party, the military and the bureaucracy have put the brakes on. The reason — the reforms fuelled inequality and resentment towards the newly wealthy privileged class. Underlying this was, above all, the fear of losing power and control, and of infiltration by the class enemy, or, in the Cuban interpretation, US imperialism.
Throwing money down a bottomless pit
Suddenly, things moved very quickly. Last week, the parliament – which had been convened in haste and with a rather incomplete quorum, as many MPs were unable to travel to Havana due to the petrol shortage – passed a 176-point reform programme which observers have described as ‘historic’ given its far-reaching implications. In the process, some of the ‘sacred cows’ of the socialist state economy are being brought down. For instance, there will be no more blanket subsidies in the future, instead, support will be targeted solely at the socially disadvantaged. This spells the end of the ‘Libreta’, the state food ration card that has granted the population access to virtually free food and hygiene products for over half a century, even though, in the face of the economic crisis, it had recently become little more than a piece of waste paper.
The second taboo to be broken is decentralisation. From now on, state-owned enterprises and provinces are to be less dependent on the central government in Havana and will be allowed to make their own decisions on staffing and wages. The absurd extremes to which this centralisation had led were captured by directors Juan Carlos Tabio and Tomás Gutiérrez Alea in their 1995 classic Guantanamera, in which a corpse had to be transported from Santiago de Cuba to Havana for burial – that is, all the way across the island, in a battle against bureaucracy.
Cuban exiles are permitted to invest directly on the island.
Private companies are finally to be permitted to operate in the agricultural sector; until now, only cooperatives had been authorised. Agriculture on the Caribbean island, once renowned for its sugar production, is now almost completely in ruins: millions of hectares of arable land lie fallow due to a lack of machinery, fertilisers, technology and labour. Cuba imports the majority of its food. Much of this comes from China, Turkey or Arab countries, but also from the neighbouring US – despite the embargoes. Private investment is now also permitted in the energy sector. The reforms will also allow individuals to own more than one private company in the future.
However, the liberalisation also targets trade, foreign investment and integration into the global economy. For example, private banks and financial institutions are to be authorised to operate in the microcredit sector. Numerous restrictions on foreign exchange transactions are being lifted. Consequently, businesses and private individuals may now open and operate foreign exchange accounts without prior authorisation. Foreign firms are permitted to select their own staff and are no longer required to go through state employment agencies. Furthermore, they are no longer obliged to enter into joint venture agreements with the state. Cuban exiles are permitted to invest directly on the island. This is intended to attract foreign investors and fresh capital.
Months ago, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio had already stated that political reforms and a change in the leadership were needed – but Havana categorically rejects this.
Almost all of these reforms have been under discussion for years. Even Vietnam and China have repeatedly urged the Cuban leadership to move in this direction, because, despite their historical ties, geopolitical interests and ideological affinities, they were tired of throwing money down a bottomless pit. Fifteen years ago, whilst the island was still receiving oil in abundance from its brother nation Venezuela and the then US President Barack Obama was reaching out to the island, the circumstances would have been ideal for such a transformation.
Now, beneath the sword of Damocles of the oil embargo and the threat of US intervention, it is actually already too late: the coffers are empty, legitimacy among the population has been squandered, and the reforms can only take effect if the US plays its part, lifts its sanctions against Cuba and supports the country’s integration into the global economy. However, that is out of the question at present. The US government holds the upper hand geopolitically and wants more. Months ago, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio had already stated that political reforms and a change in the leadership were needed – but Havana categorically rejects this.
The potential of democratization
The Speaker of the Cuban Parliament, José Luis Toledo, made it clear when the package was passed that ‘the reforms do not mean abandoning the state’s social role’. Washington’s reaction was correspondingly cool: the US State Department described the economic reforms as modest, too late and ‘superficial smoke signals’. This is a typical strategy to create the illusion of change, only to quickly reverse the reforms as soon as the regime’s control is threatened.
The strategies of either side are clear. Cuba is playing for time and hoping that Trump will lose the mid-term elections in the autumn, thereby losing his interest in Cuba and the backing for his stranglehold tactics. Washington will probably let Havana continue to squirm for the time being and wait to see whether words are followed by deeds – and how quickly. Meanwhile, political pressure is likely to continue to mount during the secret talks. Military intervention is not yet off the table either. This game of poker is ultimately about one thing: who dictates the terms for Cuba’s transformation.
The EU has, in fact, sidelined itself when it comes to Cuba.
So far, the Cuban people have had little say in the matter. Although protests against power cuts, water shortages and food shortages are a daily occurrence, they are swiftly and brutally suppressed. Unlike in Venezuela, there is no organised opposition on the island with charismatic leaders, a clearly defined political programme and broad support. This currently plays into the hands of the ruling elite. But this need not remain the case in the long term, especially if the reforms take hold and more and more people become independent of the state.
Transition processes in Eastern Europe have shown that civil society actors (and, unfortunately, organised crime too) know how to capitalise on the turmoil of such periods of upheaval. However, this could lead to all sorts of outcomes: permanent instability, a mafia-style oligarchic regime, or democratic structures. For the latter to emerge, however, the process – and above all the regime in Havana – would require discreet international support; at present, this seems conceivable only through countries such as Mexico and Brazil, with the backing of the UN or the Vatican.
Neither Latin America as a whole nor the EU currently has any relevant supranational structures with appropriate leaders. Quite the contrary. The EU has, in fact, sidelined itself when it comes to Cuba. Firstly, Trump’s sanctions forced most European companies to abandon their investments in and business dealings with Cuba, without Brussels doing anything to oppose this. And a few days ago, the European Parliament – with a majority of right-wing and conservative MEPs – called for sanctions against Cuba’s President Miguel Díaz-Canel and for an end to cooperation with Cuba – in other words, entirely in line with Trump’s thinking and spirit, without so much as a hint of independent ideas to defend European interests. Another small step towards geopolitical and geo-economic irrelevance.
Sandra Weiss is a political scientist and a former diplomat. A freelance journalist, Sandra writes articles about Latin America for several German newspapers, among others Die Zeit and Die Welt.
Source: International Politics and Society, published by the Global and European Policy Unit of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Hiroshimastrasse 28, D-10785 Berlin.
Excerpt:
This game of poker is ultimately about one thing — who dictates the terms for the country’s transformation.