The Human Consciousness Now...Our World in the Midst of Becoming...to What? Observe, contemplate Now.
PORTLAND, USA, Nov 17 2026 (IPS) - “Thou know’st ’tis common; all that lives must die, passing through nature to eternity.”(Hamlet)
Although birth and death are universal human experiences, their timing and circumstances vary considerably within and across countries, contributing to significant differences in population growth rates. These differences also reflect profound disparities between privileged and marginalized populations.
In 2026, an estimated 133 million people worldwide are expected to be born, while approximately 64 million are expected to die. These births and deaths, however, are distributed unevenly across countries and populations.
Approximately 63% of births are expected to occur in the less developed countries, excluding the least developed; 28% in the least developed countries; and 9% in the more developed countries.
Approximately 110 countries have fertility rates below the replacement level of 2.1 births per woman. These countries include Italy, Japan, and Spain, where fertility rates are about 1.2 births per woman. In contrast, some of the world’s highest fertility rates are found in less developed countries, including Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Somalia, where rates approach 6 births per woman (Figure 1).

Source: United Nations.
Like births, deaths are distributed unequally across countries. Premature deaths are concentrated in low-income regions, largely because of poverty, limited access to healthcare, and civil conflict. Consequently, some people in the world die at relatively young ages, while others live considerably longer.
Differences in mortality risks are evident from the first year of life. Finland, Iceland, and Japan, for example, have some of the world’s lowest infant mortality rates, with fewer than 2 deaths per 1,000 live births. In contrast, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia have some of the highest rates, exceeding 62 infant deaths per 1,000 live births. Infants in these countries therefore face mortality risks more than 30 times higher than those in countries with the lowest mortality rates (Figure 2).

Source: United Nations.
These disparities in infant mortality are also reflected in maternal mortality. In 2023, some of the highest maternal mortality rates were recorded in African countries, including Chad, Nigeria, and South Sudan, where rates exceeded 1,000 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births. By contrast, countries such as Iceland, Norway, and Poland recorded fewer than 3 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births.
Differences in mortality risks are evident from the first year of life. Finland, Iceland, and Japan, for example, have some of the world’s lowest infant mortality rates, with fewer than 2 deaths per 1,000 live births. In contrast, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia have some of the highest rates, exceeding 62 infant deaths per 1,000 live births
Life expectancy at birth likewise reveals substantial disparities in mortality across countries. In 2025, some of the lowest life expectancies at birth, at approximately 55 years, were reported in African countries, including Chad, Nigeria, and South Sudan. By contrast, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Switzerland had life expectancies at birth of approximately 85 years, about 30 years longer than those in countries with the lowest life expectancies.
Mortality disparities persist into older ages, as reflected in life expectancy at age 65. In 2025, for example, people aged 65 in Chad, Nigeria, and Togo could expect to live about 12 more years, compared with approximately 23 additional years in Australia, France, and Japan.
Life expectancy also varies considerably by income and education. Working-class individuals and those with less education generally have shorter life expectancies than their wealthier and more highly educated counterparts. Higher educational attainment is also associated with higher incomes, healthier lifestyles, better access to health care, and longer life spans.
Beyond deaths resulting from illness, disease, accidents, violence, and armed conflicts, voluntary medically assisted death is becoming an increasingly prominent global issue.
Medically assisted death, also known as death with dignity, voluntary assisted dying, or medical aid in dying (MAID), is the subject of growing debate in many countries. It can take two main forms: assisted suicide, in which individuals take prescribed life-ending medication themselves, and voluntary euthanasia, in which a medical professional administers the medication.
An important demographic consequence of disparities in birth and death across countries is the substantial variation in the levels of natural population change, defined as the difference between births minus deaths.
Many African countries, for example, have relatively high rates of natural increase. Rates exceed 30 per 1,000 population in the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Niger, and Somalia. In contrast, rates of natural change are negative in many countries, including China, Germany, the Russian Federation, Italy, and Japan (Figure 3).

Source: United Nations.
In sum, although birth and death are universal human experiences, their patterns reflect significant disparities within and across countries and between privileged and marginalized groups.
High fertility and premature mortality are concentrated largely in less developed countries, particularly the least developed, while longer life expectancy and low fertility are more common in more developed countries. Similarly, high rates of population growth prevail in many less developed countries, especially in Africa, while low or negative rates of population growth are occurring in a growing number of countries.
These demographic disparities in birth, death, and population growth are having significant economic, social, and political consequences worldwide.
Joseph Chamie is a consulting demographer, a former director of the United Nations Population Division, and author of many publications on population issues.
ANTALYA, Türkiye, Nov 17 2026 (IPS) - Indigenous communities risk paying a heavy price for the global shift to clean energy unless governments involve them in decision-making and protect their ancestral territories, an Indigenous leader from Brazil has warned.
Luene Karipuna, executive coordinator of the Articulation of Indigenous Peoples and Organisations of Amapá and Northern Pará (APOIANP), said the energy transition was increasingly being discussed without meaningful participation from Indigenous communities, even though their territories play a major role in protecting forests and limiting the effects of climate change.
Speaking exclusively to IPS on the sidelines of the ongoing COP31 climate conference in Antalya, Karipuna said Indigenous peoples were concerned that policies designed to reduce dependence on fossil fuels could create new threats to their lands through mining and other large-scale development projects.
“For Indigenous peoples in Brazil, the energy transition must come with concrete commitments, and one of them is guaranteeing that our voice is present in the spaces where government plans are built so that the transition respects our territories,” she said.
“We have noticed that the energy transition discourse has been a construction made behind closed doors, without popular participation and without even the participation of our organisations.”
Her concerns come amid growing debate over oil exploration near the mouth of the Amazon River, an ecologically sensitive region in northern Brazil. The prospect of expanding oil activity has raised questions about the country’s commitment to protecting the Amazon while pursuing its economic and energy interests.
For communities in the region, Karipuna said, the debate over energy cannot be separated from the immediate consequences of industrial activity, pressure on ancestral lands and the need to protect their livelihoods.

Indigenous communities have strong words for the negotiators at COP31. Credit: UN Climate Change/Kiara Worth
Mining for Clean Energy Raises New Concerns
Karipuna said the growing demand for critical minerals and rare earth elements, which are essential for renewable energy technologies and electrification, was creating another source of pressure on Indigenous territories.
As countries seek minerals to manufacture batteries, electric vehicles and other clean-energy technologies, Indigenous communities fear that their lands could become targets for new mining projects.
She said many of these resources were concentrated in territories that Indigenous peoples had protected for generations.
“As the discussions move forward, we have realised that these critical minerals and rare earths are concentrated in our territories, territories that we have protected for a very long time,” she said.
“This puts our territories once again into a sacrifice zone, in the name of an energy transition that does not consider our lives.”
Karipuna said Indigenous organisations wanted governments and companies to recognise their territories as exclusion zones for destructive industrial activities, rather than as areas available for exploitation in the name of development.
She said the global energy transition should not reproduce the same patterns of extraction and displacement that Indigenous communities have experienced in the past.
For Indigenous peoples, Karipuna said, the issue was whether governments would recognise their rights before approving projects that could affect their territories.
Consultation Must Come Before Projects
Karipuna identified free, prior and informed consent as a fundamental requirement for any development project affecting Indigenous communities.
She referred to International Labour Organization Convention 169, which establishes protections for Indigenous and tribal peoples, including consultation on measures that may directly affect them.
Brazil is a party to the convention.
“The main measure that the government and companies need to take is to respect our territories,” she said.
“Before any project, we must have the right to free, prior, and informed consultation, which is guaranteed by ILO Convention 169.”
She said consultations must take place before decisions are made, allowing Indigenous communities to understand proposed projects and express their concerns through their own organisations.
Karipuna argued that energy transition plans developed without their participation risk overlooking the social, economic and environmental consequences for communities living in the affected areas.
The same principle, she said, should apply to oil exploration, mining and other large-scale projects.
Indigenous communities should not be expected to accept environmental damage as the price of achieving global climate targets.
“Our territories must not be placed within the narrative that our lives need to be sacrificed so that the world can transition. And we know that this is not true,” she said.
Indigenous Territories Offer a Model for Forest Protection
Karipuna also challenged the idea that Indigenous communities need to adopt an entirely new development model to contribute to climate action.
She said their traditional knowledge, relationship with nature and systems of territorial protection already offered an example of how forests could be conserved.
Figures cited in the discussions around Indigenous forest protection show that Indigenous territories cover about 13% of Brazil’s land. Between 1985 and 2023, they lost less than 1% of their native vegetation, compared with 28 percent on privately owned lands.
For Karipuna, the difference demonstrates the importance of recognising Indigenous land rights in climate policies.
“It is important to consider our territories as primary zones for this transition and for their protection, because they are the ones that protect and are already recognised as the front line in curbing the climate crisis,” she said.
She said Indigenous communities had maintained their relationship with forests through generations, protecting the natural resources on which their lives depend.
Their contribution, she added, extends beyond preserving trees. It involves protecting entire territories and maintaining ways of life that depend on the health of local ecosystems.
“We are not here asking for a new model of transition. We, as Indigenous peoples, are showing the path to this transition,” Karipuna said.
“And the path is through our way of life, our science, and how we relate to our territory.”
She said governments should recognise Indigenous knowledge as an important part of climate policymaking rather than treating it as a secondary contribution.
Lula Urged to Accelerate Land Demarcation
Karipuna called on President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to accelerate the demarcation of Indigenous territories that are still awaiting official recognition.
Land demarcation is a central demand of Indigenous communities in Brazil because legal recognition provides an important basis for protecting ancestral lands against encroachment, land grabbing and large-scale development.
She said the government also needed to provide financial resources to Indigenous organisations so they could protect their territories after demarcation.
“Concrete actions we expect from President Lula are, above all, that he continue demarcating the territories that are waiting to be officially demarcated,” she said.
But she stressed that official recognition alone would not guarantee protection.
“It is not enough to simply demarcate Indigenous lands. We need financial contributions and government resources so that we can protect the territories.”
She said Indigenous territories continued to face invasions by large development projects and land grabbers, while Indigenous leaders had also been murdered.
The threats, she said, made it necessary for the government to strengthen protection mechanisms and provide resources for communities working to defend their lands.
Karipuna also urged Lula’s government to place Indigenous territories at the centre of its just energy transition policies.
She said climate commitments must recognise the role of Indigenous communities in protecting forests and ensure that their organisations participate directly in decisions about development and natural resources.
Forest Protection and Oil Exploration
The debate over Indigenous rights also comes as Brazil faces questions about how to balance its energy ambitions with its environmental commitments.
The Amazon is central to global climate efforts because of its role in storing carbon and supporting biodiversity. Its protection has become a major issue in international climate negotiations.
The prospect of oil exploration near the mouth of the Amazon has brought these competing priorities into sharper focus for Indigenous communities in northern Brazil.
For Karipuna and the organisations she represents, the central concern is that decisions about energy development should not ignore the people who live in and protect the region.
She said the government must ensure that the transition away from fossil fuels does not create new forms of environmental pressure through mining and other extractive industries.
Karipuna said Indigenous communities had already demonstrated their contribution to forest conservation. What they wanted now was recognition, participation and the resources needed to continue protecting their territories.
“Scientific data already show that this is the path. We only need to be heard, and we need to be present in the decision-making spaces,” she said.
“Indigenous peoples of Brazil must not be excluded from these spaces and should participate through our Indigenous organisations.”
Her message to governments attending COP31 was that climate action must respect Indigenous land rights and recognise the knowledge of communities that have protected forests for generations.
“Our territories cannot be used as sacrifice zones in the name of development,” she said.
IPS UN Bureau Report

BANGKOK, Thailand, Nov 17 2026 (IPS) - The energy transition is reshaping economic structures across Asia and the Pacific. Where it is managed well, it can unlock new economic growth opportunities. Where it is not, it can trigger inflation and political backlash that stalls reform. The difference lies in whether transition policies are designed with socioeconomic development at their core.
The Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2026 argues that the real policy challenge in pursuing energy transition is not a lack of available options, but how to identify and prioritize reforms that simultaneously support macroeconomic stability, sustain economic growth and improve people’s wellbeing. In other words, transition policy must become development policy.
Development and transition are inseparable
Fossil fuel-based energy is not just a source of emissions. It is a core economic variable. Its domestic price influences inflation. Its import costs affect trade balances and foreign exchange pressures. Its subsidies absorb fiscal space that could otherwise support investments in infrastructure, health or social protection. As a production input, energy access determines whether industries remain competitive globally.
When these linkages are overlooked, transition policies risk imposing concentrated costs on those least able to bear them. Measures that appear sound through a narrow energy lens may generate inflationary pressures, weaken fiscal positions, or disrupt employment and incomes. Across Asia and the Pacific, where economies differ widely in structure and vulnerability, these trade-offs matter greatly.
Indonesia showed what is possible when these dynamics are managed well. When oil prices declined in 2014, the government decreased gasoline subsidies. This reduced explicit energy subsidy spending from 3.2% to 1.0% of GDP in a single year, and redirected the savings into infrastructure and social protection.
Fossil fuels continue to dominate export revenues in several countries of the region, which makes them highly exposed to global price swings and the long-term decline in hydrocarbon demand.
This is why the Survey 2026 places socioeconomic development at the centre of energy transition strategy. It defines prosperity as: macroeconomic stability, sustained economic growth and people’s wellbeing. The question is not simply how to decarbonize, but how to do so in ways that reinforce all three.
Across Asia and the Pacific, that question demands different answers depending on whether a country is a fossil fuel exporter facing revenue risk, a net importer vulnerable to price shocks, or an economy where modern energy services are still out of reach for many households.
Looking at transition through a development lens
The Survey 2026 proposes a structured framework for identifying priority national energy transition policy goals. It recognizes that countries face different structural pressures within their energy systems. For some, the priority is reducing fossil fuel dependence. For others, it is expanding clean and renewable energy, improving energy efficiency or ensuring access to modern energy services. In practice, most countries will need to pursue more than one of these goals simultaneously, as their energy systems face overlapping structural challenges.
These goals are not purely technical or sectoral. Each carry considerable macroeconomic implications; from fiscal sustainability and trade balances to export competitiveness and household incomes. The challenge for policymakers is to assess transition goals keeping in view these considerations.
India’s solar manufacturing incentive scheme illustrates this point. By conditioning government payouts on domestic sales and local content, it catalyzed 48 gigawatts of manufacturing capacity and is projected to save around US$1.8 billion annually in foreign exchange.
This has turned an energy transition goal into a win for trade balances and industrial competitiveness. Nepal’s electrification drive shows the same logic applied to access. By expanding electricity coverage from 53% to 95% of total population between 2010 and 2024, the national utility moved from chronic deficit to profitability, while reliable power saved the economy an estimated 6-7% of GDP annually.
What appeared to be narrow infrastructure or industrial goals turned out to be powerful stability and growth dividends. That is precisely the kind of connection the Survey 2026 argues transition policy must be built around.

Source: Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2026
Making transition durable
A transition that does not deliver visible development gains will struggle to last. In contrast, policies are more likely to endure when they strengthen macroeconomic stability, support economic growth and improve people’s lives. That is not a secondary concern. It is what makes transition credible.
The examples from across the region share a common thread: the reforms that have continued were designed to produce tangible gains that people could see and feel, not just environmental targets that governments could merely report.
When energy transition generates jobs, lowers energy costs, reduces import dependence or frees up fiscal space for social spending, it builds the political constituency for further change. When it does not, it becomes a political liability. A companion piece will explore how countries can sequence and implement these transition priorities in practice.
In Asia and the Pacific, the energy transition will only work if development works too.
Shuvojit Banerjee is Economic Affairs Officer, ESCAP, and Weiwen Qi, is Former Intern, Macroeconomic Policy and Financing for Development, ESCAP
IPS UN Bureau

ANTALYA, Türkiye, Nov 16 2026 (IPS) - A coalition of African civil society organisations, representatives from the Africa Institute of Resilience Studies (an independent organisation working in research, policy, training and capacity development), and representatives from the Bank–Civil Society Coalition, which brings together seven major regional networks and civil society organisations working on climate and energy, have launched the African Non-State Actors Working Group on Critical Minerals on the sidelines of COP 31 in Antalya, Türkiye.
The launch comes amid growing concerns over environmental degradation and social suffering among communities living in energy-transition mineral-rich areas in Africa, where people bear the burden of forced displacement, loss of livelihoods and human rights abuses, with very limited or sometimes no benefits at all.
“Our shared purpose is to advance accountable, people-centred and nature-positive critical mineral development in Africa, with decent work at its core,” said Dr Augustine Njamnshi, the Executive Director at the African Coalition for Sustainable Energy and Access (ACSEA).
“Africa’s mineral wealth must create lasting value within Africa through local processing, refining, manufacturing and regional value chains that strengthen productive capabilities, support African ownership and improve community wellbeing,” he told delegates attending the UN climate summit in Antalya (COP31).
From cobalt, copper, coltan, lithium and other strategic minerals in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and parts of Zambia, to lithium projects in Zimbabwe and graphite in Mozambique, communities in mining areas continue to face poverty, environmental damage, unsafe working conditions, displacement, conflict and limited participation in decisions affecting their land and livelihoods.
“I believe the new working group will bring additional energy if it places affected communities, Indigenous Peoples, artisanal miners and African civil-society organisations at the centre,” said Appolinaire Zagabe, the Executive Director at the DRC Climate Change Network (Réseau sur le Changement Climatique RDC – RCCRDC).
The working group committed to building an all representative and action-orientated platform for collective engagement, bringing together organised labour, frontline communities, women and youth organisations, researchers, environmental movements and other African non-state actors.
“We will organise our work around four connected functions based on ideas and evidence, policy and advocacy, accountability, and voice and participation,” said Njamnshi. “Our goal is to advance freedom of association and collective bargaining, living wages, safe workplaces, social protection, skills development and the inclusion of artisanal and small-scale miners,” he told the delegates in Antalya.
According to Philip Kilonzo, the Head of Policy, Advocacy and Communication at the Pan African Climate Justice Alliance (PACJA), the working group will help bridge existing gaps in evidence and coordinated advocacy on critical minerals and a just energy transition.
“It will strengthen our collective efforts to promote accountable governance of Africa’s critical mineral resources, ensuring that their exploitation contributes meaningfully to the development and well-being of African people,” he told IPS.
To kick off, the working group will begin by developing shared evidence and priorities through an African Critical Minerals Issues Paper, wider consultations and a common African Non-State-Actor’s position.
“We will explore a Labour and Just Transition Brief and an accountability framework or scorecard examining decision-making, ownership, working conditions, the distribution of benefits and responsibility for risks,” said Njamnshi. “These products will be developed through consultation and are not presented as completed instruments at this launch.”
Interested organisations and constituencies, including African civil society organisations, trade unions, mining-affected communities, Indigenous Peoples and local communities, women’s and youth organisations, researchers and other non-state actors have also been invited to contribute their knowledge, experience and proposals through the ACSEA secretariat.
At the same time, RCCRDC, as a national civil-society platform in DRC and an accredited observer to the UNFCCC and UNEP, has raised community concerns in climate and energy-transition discussions at COP 31.
“We advocate for early community participation, transparent mineral governance, environmental protection, decent employment, local value addition and enforceable benefit-sharing,” said Zagabe. “We have also proposed a legally binding one percent contribution on final products linked to critical and energy transition minerals to go to community development,” he told IPS.
So far, the DRC Mining Code provides for community development agreements and an annual allocation of 0.3% of mining companies’ turnover for community development. However, according to Zagabe, implementation, transparency and community oversight have always been inconsistent.
“Our central message is clear, that the global energy transition must not reproduce exploitation, conflict and inequality in mineral-producing countries,” he said. “Communities must have decision-making power, legal protection and a fair share of the wealth generated from their resources.”
As the world transitions to clean energy while reducing dependence on fossils, demand for critical energy transition minerals is growing every day, and Africa holds a significant share of them.
However, the continent constantly exports raw materials and semi-finished products to the developed world, while receiving very little share of the massive wealth created from the sector. According to a UN report, countries and mining communities are often left with degraded landscapes, limited services, a few lasting economic opportunities and very little to show from the harnessing of their mineral resource wealth.
And now, at COP 31, African leaders and civil society representatives say that it is time for Africa to take charge. “As Africa, the way to go is to ensure that we don’t just release our critical resources to the developed world, who eventually leave us with problems,” said Dr Benjamin Mandewere, the Principal Climate Change Adaptation Officer in the Ministry of Environment, Climate and Wildlife in Zimbabwe.
“We also have to ensure that environmental and social impact assessments not only look at particular places but also take local communities on board to ensure that their voices are heard and they also benefit from these resources,” he told the delegates in Antalya.
IPS UN Bureau Report

MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Nov 16 2026 (IPS) - Zimbabwe’s President Emmerson Mnangagwa, who took over when a miliary coup ended Robert Mugabe’s 37 years in power, has made clear he has no intention of limiting himself to a decade at the top. In July, he signed a constitutional amendment that lengthened the terms of the sitting president and parliament from five to seven years and pushed the next general election back from 2028 to 2030.
Zimbabwe is not alone. In several African countries and beyond, presidents are using constitutional amendments, courts and parliaments to stay in power beyond the original limits. They are extending terms, abolishing term and age limits, writing rivals out of the race and, in the boldest cases, removing voters from the equation altogether, while repressing those who stand up for democracy. These moves can achieve much the same outcome as a coup, but their legal veneer spares those behind them the consequences. A military takeover can get a country suspended from the African Union (AU), while presidents who rewrite the rules have so far faced no penalties at all.
Limits erased
In Djibouti, President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh has ruled since 1999. In October 2025, parliament voted unanimously to scrap the presidential age limit of 75, which Guelleh had already exceeded. In April 2026, he claimed a sixth term on an implausible 97.8 per cent in an election most opposition parties boycotted.
In Chad, where Mahamat Idriss Déby took power in 2021 after his father’s death and won a disputed election in 2024, parliament abolished presidential term limits in October 2025 and lengthened terms from five to seven years. The Republic of the Congo shows where this road leads. A decade after a referendum removed term and age limits that would have stopped Denis Sassou Nguesso running again, the 82-year-old claimed a fifth term in March 2026, on an official 94.82 per cent.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) may be next. President Félix Tshisekedi is constitutionally barred from a third term, but he has floated a constitutional revision and a possible delay to the 2028 election. On 23 October, the National Assembly passed a law allowing a referendum to be triggered by a ‘major dysfunction’ of state institutions and sent it to the Senate. The constitution still forbids any change to term limits, but civil society and the opposition see this law as a step towards indefinite rule.
Africa has no monopoly on this tactic. In El Salvador, Nayib Bukele used his party’s supermajority to purge the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Chamber, whose new judges reinterpreted the constitutional ban on consecutive re-election to clear his way to a second term in 2024. In July 2025, the Legislative Assembly abolished presidential term limits altogether.
Rivals off the ballot
Once limits are out of the way, rivals are next. In Côte d’Ivoire, President Alassane Ouattara argued that the 2016 constitution had reset his term count to zero. The Constitutional Council agreed, clearing him for a fourth term at 83, and struck several challengers off the ballot seven weeks before the October 2025 vote. With no viable contenders left, he won with around 90 per cent.
In Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega jailed every viable challenger ahead of the 2021 election. In July, he declared that the country would hold no more elections, and now he’s writing political exclusion into the constitution. An amendment approved on first reading in September, pending a second vote in January 2027, would permanently bar anyone accused of being a ‘traitor to the homeland’ or of supporting foreign sanctions from standing for public office.
Voters written out
The ultimate way to entrench power is to deprive voters of their say. Once Zimbabwe’s amendment has kept the 84-year-old Mnangagwa in office until 2030, a parliament his party dominates could renew his mandate indefinitely, without voters having any say.
In Cameroon, President Paul Biya, 93 and in power since 1982, claimed an eighth term in October 2025. In April, parliament voted 200 to 18 to reintroduce the vice-presidency, a post the president appoints and dismisses, whose holder would serve out any unfinished term, even though the constitution requires a fresh election. The law effectively hands Biya the power to choose his own successor. Opposition leader Maurice Kamto called it a ‘constitutional coup’.
Ongoing repression
Legal manipulation relies on repression. In Zimbabwe, police shut down the inaugural meeting of the Constitutional Defenders Forum and Human Rights Watch documented seven attacks on student leaders campaigning against the amendment, some of whom were abducted, tortured and handed to police. Ruling-party loyalists trapped journalists covering parliamentary hearings and forced them to delete footage of violence against activists.
In Chad, opposition leader Succès Masra was sentenced to 20 years in prison two months before term limits were removed. In Côte d’Ivoire, authorities banned protests and public meetings other than campaign events. In the DRC, police fired teargas at people marching against the referendum law and arrested dozens, and clashes in Kinshasa left an opposition politician dead.
An outdated rulebook
When soldiers removed Gabon’s president in August 2023, the AU suspended the country the next day. None of the presidents rewriting the rules to stay in power have faced anything comparable. The AU has the tools. Its African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance provides for sanctions when governments amend constitutions or legal instruments to stay in power, just as it does for a coup.
Yet the AU has only ever suspended states after military takeovers or, as in Côte d’Ivoire in 2010, when a defeated incumbent refused to leave, and never for rewriting a constitution. It did not even suspend Chad in 2021, when the army installed the younger Déby in breach of succession rules, the first step in a process that ended with the abolition of term limits.
Each manoeuvre that goes unanswered lowers the cost of the next one. As long as rewriting the rules brings no consequences, presidents determined to stay will keep doing it, and those who resist will keep paying the price.
Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also a Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.
For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org.

ANTALYA, Türkiye, Nov 16 2026 (IPS) - Today (November 15) marks the second week of negotiations at the United Nations climate summit in the resort city of Antalya, Turkey.
This two-week Conference of the Parties, or COP31, comes as scientists have warned that the world is approaching the 1.5C warming limit set by the Paris Agreement in 2015.
Although scientists measure the target over decades, not individual years, they found that the planet crossed that threshold for the first time over a full year in 2024.
Scientists predict that sustained breach of 1.5°C is now unavoidable, and existing policies could drive warming to 2.8°C this century, increasing the risk of extreme heat, floods and droughts, according to the UN Environment Programme (UNEP).
For the temperatures to fall back below 1.5C, much bigger cuts in emissions and removing large amounts of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere are required.
The latest climate plans would cut global emissions by just 6 percent by 2035 compared with 2019 levels – far short of what is needed, according to the UN’s climate change body.
With negotiations in the Mediterranean country in the second week, Africa made some progress but also lost some critical issues it was pushing.
Africa’s Wins
On the first day of COP31, negotiators from Africa and other developing countries secured a formal place for the Climate Finance Work Programme (CFWP) on the official agenda.
The CFWP matters to African countries because it focuses on scrutinising developed nations’ legal obligations under Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement to provide public and concessional climate finance to developing countries.
Wealthy nations did not want to establish a dedicated space to discuss climate finance.
For African nations, the CFWP helps press for concrete financial accountability, particularly on pledges such as the $300bn annual climate finance by 2035 agreed at COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan.
During COP31, the Leaf Coalition, a public-private global initiative designed to halt tropical deforestation by mobilising large-scale financial support for forest-protecting jurisdictions, announced that Ghana would be the first country to access finance for a carbon credit project.
Ghana will get millions of dollars as buyers transact credits. The REDD+ program covers approximately 2.5 million hectares of forest across 10 regions in southern and central Ghana, where forests are under threat from agricultural expansion, illegal logging and mining.
Climate activists have criticised the initiative as a false climate solution and greenwashing, saying it delays actual decarbonisation while allowing high-emitting companies to keep polluting.
Major Setbacks
Africa’s bid to create a dedicated, standalone agenda item for tripling adaptation finance did not make it to this year’s COP agenda after wealthy nations opposed it. This was a tremendous blow to African countries. Parties agreed to triple adaptation finance at COP30 in Belém, with a target year of 2035.
However, the agreement did not settle the critical questions such as scope, baseline, delivery timelines, milestones and accountability arrangements. The African Group of Negotiators (AGN) wanted the issue to be at the centre of COP31. Without clarity on these elements, tripling risks becoming another political promise without a practical mechanism for implementation.
It is unclear what the baseline for the tripling is. If it is tripling from the US$40bn agreed at COP26 in Glasgow, developed countries will triple adaptation finance to US$120bn annually by 2035.
This issue is important because African countries lose an average of 2% to 5% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) every year because of climate extremes. Yet governments in Africa spend up to 9% of their annual budgets on unplanned disaster relief and climate response.
Now, Africa is pushing for adaptation finance to be discussed under the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA). Anchoring tripling of adaptation finance in the GGA discussions would ensure that finance is driving clear implementation, including addressing the growing adaptation needs of developing countries, strengthening climate resilience and improving access to finance.
Another setback for Africa is the Belém Action Mechanism (BAM) – a global climate mechanism established to guide, coordinate, and support a just transition for workers, unions, and vulnerable communities as the world shifts to a low-carbon economy. It was a big win for the continent at COP30 in Belém, Brazil.
Parties should agree on its operational details at COP31.
The latest draft negotiating text on BAM does not show that it can deliver practical support for just transitions. Wealthy nations want the already overstretched UN climate secretariat and external institutions, including development banks, to take responsibility. Africa does not want another bureaucratic process.
IPS UN Bureau Report

UNITED NATIONS, Nov 16 2026 (IPS) - Somewhere tonight, a family that lost its home to the water is asleep in a school gymnasium. The tent, the blankets and the first meal arrived within hours. But a secure home will take years. Every climate disaster ends with the same question, and few climate budgets have a line for it: where will we sleep tonight?

Amy Pope, Director General of IOM, at COP31 in Antalya, Turkiye. Credit: IOM
The scale is no longer in doubt. In 2025, disasters caused 29.9 million internal displacements – 13% above the ten-year average. Almost 13.6 million people were living in displacement caused by disasters at year’s end, 37% more than a year earlier.2 Climate is rarely the only force at work, and conflict and violence triggered more displacements than disasters last year.3 However, climate can deepen these pressures – and people displaced for any reason need somewhere safe to live. We track emissions and estimate disaster losses. But we need a clearer picture of how long families wait for a safe home.

Anacláudia Rossbach, Executive Director, UN-Habitat, speaking at a High level Dialogue in COP31 in Antalya, Turkiye. Credit: UN-Habitat
We propose to give that gap a name and a number: time to home. It is the time between the day a family is displaced and the day it is living in a safe, affordable home with secure tenure – meaning protection against forced eviction – whether it chooses to return, settle where it is, or live elsewhere. Building on existing work on durable solutions to internal displacement, this measure would track one essential part of recovery. The idea is simple to grasp: make the wait visible, understand what prolongs it, and work to shorten it. Measuring that wait would bring together the expertise of our two organizations. IOM knows where people go and what they face on the way and where they first find shelter, as the agency that tracks displacement and co-leads the global Shelter, Land and Site Coordination Cluster. UN-Habitat knows what the land, the law and the city allow when they arrive. Working with governments and communities, we can build a clearer picture of the gap and what would help shorten it.
Behind the number lies a conviction we share. A safe home is a foundation for adapting to a changing climate and living with dignity. Without stable housing, people can face greater barriers to enrolling children in school, finding work, opening a bank account, or accessing support. Helping people stay safely, move safely, and find a secure home requires connected policies and investment.
At COP31 in Antalya, we ask governments for three commitments:
1. Put housing into adaptation plans. Include housing and secure tenure for people who stay and those who move in national adaptation plans and in the implementation of their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement, and adopt or pilot time to home among their indicators of progress. Where relocation is necessary, measure whether people have freely made informed decisions and can access safe housing, essential services and work.2. Fund the transition to a safe home. Bring adaptation finance and funding for loss and damage together with recovery and development finance to bridge the gap between emergency shelter and long-term housing. Work with local governments and community organizations, including in cities receiving displaced people, so that shelter is a first step toward a secure home. Track how this funding improves people’s housing and safety.
3. Plan for safe homes before a crisis. Where climate risks are known, identify suitable land and agree with communities on access, tenure and services. Prepare cities to receive people who need to move, so that they have safe options and support before a crisis forces them to leave. Invest in upgrading informal settlements, affordable housing and resilient infrastructure to help people stay safely wherever possible. Throughout these efforts, protect people against forced eviction.
We will not ask of others what we are not prepared to do ourselves. IOM and UN-Habitat are ready to work together to put time to home into practice: drawing on IOM’s displacement tracking and shelter operations and UN-Habitat’s urban and land data, we will work to measure it, and what each month of waiting costs, in selected cities and settlements, and to share what we learn openly, including whether land and tenure, rather than construction, are the longest part of the wait. We invite every government, city and partner that wants to shorten the wait to join us in Antalya.
As climate risks grow, people will continue to adapt where they live, and some will need to move. Everyone should have the chance to build a safe future wherever they live. Climate adaptation has an address. Let us make sure that everyone has one.
Notes and sources
1.- UN-Habitat estimate for 2024: about 1.16 billion people, or 24.8% of the global urban population, live in slums and informal settlements. UN-Habitat, Transforming informal settlements: Data, standards and practice, session summary, 13th World Urban Forum, Baku, May 2026.2.- Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Global Report on Internal Displacement 2026: summary, May 2026. In 2025: 29.9 million disaster displacements, 13% above the decadal average; almost 13.6 million people displaced by disasters at year end, 37% more than at the end of 2024. The 13.6 million figure includes people displaced in earlier years who were still displaced at the end of 2025. The 29.9 million figure counts displacements (movements), which can include the same person more than once. Both figures cover all disasters, including geophysical hazards such as earthquakes, not only climate-related events. Full report: doi.org/10.55363/IDMC.ETWG8973.
3.- IDMC, Global Report on Internal Displacement 2026 (same source). In 2025, conflict and violence triggered a record 32.3 million displacements, more than the 29.9 million caused by disasters, the first time on record. IDMC counts displacements (movements), not distinct individuals.
Amy Pope is the Director General of the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Anacláudia Rossbach is the Executive Director of UN-Habitat.
IPS UN Bureau

Excerpt:
After a flood or other disaster, finding a safe home can take years. At COP31, we should commit to measuring – and shortening – that wait.





