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Jun 4 2026 (IPS) -
CIVICUS discusses the outlook ahead of Peru’s runoff presidential election with David Hidalgo, journalist and executive director of OjoPúblico, a Peruvian digital investigative journalism outlet.
David Hidalgo
What were the first round results?
The Peruvian electoral system requires a candidate to secure over 50 per cent of the vote to win. The first round, held on 12 April, produced no clear winner, as none of the parties took over 20 per cent. Consequently, on 7 June there will be a runoff between two candidates who did not secure strong support but have merely cleared the minimum threshold to reach the runoff.
The contest between Fujimori of Fuerza Popular and Sánchez of Juntos por el Perú promises a difficult and polarised election. Meanwhile, Rafael López Aliaga of Renovación Popular, who came third trailing by some 20,000 votes, has persisted with an intense campaign alleging fraud.
It was an unusual election, as over 30 presidential candidates stood and, for the first time in over 20 years, voters also elected a bicameral parliament. The recent constitutional changes that reintroduced the Senate granted it considerable power, including the final say on whether to vacate a president by removing them via a parliamentary mechanism. In a country that has had eight presidents in 10 years, the composition of the new Senate will be just as decisive as the result of the presidential runoff.
Who are the candidates?
Keiko Fujimori is the daughter of Alberto Fujimori, who came to power in Peru in the 1990s and, two years after taking office, staged a coup and ruled autocratically throughout the decade. Fujimori left a legacy of corruption and serious human rights violations, for which he was sentenced to prison. His daughter defends his government and has built her campaign on the promise of a return to order, a message that may resonate with an electorate affected by historic levels of public insecurity.
However, she carries political baggage. She was the subject of a judicial investigation into the alleged illegal financing of her 2021 campaign, a process that made significant progress but was ultimately quashed. She is surrounded by figures who uncritically defend and recycle a hardline rhetoric that includes the passing of laws to grant amnesty for past human rights violations.
Sánchez built his campaign around the figure of ex-president Pedro Castillo, a former schoolteacher who channelled popular frustration and won the 2021 election, but lacked political preparation and ended up attempting a coup. Castillo is now in prison. Sánchez, who served as minister of trade in his government, has indicated that should he come to power, he could use presidential powers to pardon him.
His candidacy also raises concerns due to his closeness to Antauro Humala, a former military officer who spent almost 18 years in prison for leading a revolt in which four police officers were killed, and who holds radical views on various issues.
López Aliaga, a business leader and former mayor of Lima, has an equally controversial profile. Following a contentious tenure as mayor, he ran on a far-right platform that polarised the presidential campaign. He called for an insurgency when the results went against him and suggested the murder of a critical journalist. He constantly invokes conspiracy theories about an alleged state takeover by a supposed left-wing mafia and dismisses anyone who doesn’t share his views, from human rights organisations to Keiko Fujimori.
Was the first round election free and fair?
Although it was a turbulent electoral process, with incidents relating to the distribution of electoral materials and the opening of polling stations, the election was conducted within parameters that have been validated by various observation missions. There’s no evidence of a concerted effort to commit electoral fraud.
The irregularities that occurred are under investigation. The problem is that these gave rise to allegations of fraud put forward by López Aliaga and his party. Distorted versions of events were circulated to give the impression of significant impacts. For example, in some polling stations in southern Lima, electoral materials didn’t arrive on time, which led to false claims that, for this reason, a million people had been unable to vote. False information also circulated that electoral tally sheets were allegedly tampered with. It’s true there were incidents and irregularities, but there’s no evidence of fraud. This was acknowledged by the European Union’s observation mission.
The narrative of fraud is not new. Since the 2021 election, Keiko Fujimori’s party has maintained that she lost due to fraud, and has repeated this in every election since. López Aliaga adopted the same strategy this time and called for the election to be annulled.
What role have civil society and independent media played?
Disinformation and polarisation have reached historic levels, and the media have had to contend with them in situations of hostility and inequality. The landscape has been marked by constant attacks on independent media from the usual political figures and also parts of the press aligned with powerful corporate structures and others within the ecosystem of content creation for social media, which has emerged as the new arena for public debate.
At the same time, an authoritarian political alliance currently controlling the government and the main public institutions has consolidated a sort of legal stranglehold on independent media, which operate as non-profit organisations. The law on the Peruvian Agency for International Cooperation extends state control over civil society organisations working with international funding and requires their projects to be registered in advance with the state and subjected to coercive oversight, with disproportionate and unconstitutional sanctions. This law undermines editorial independence for independent media and creates risks incompatible with international press freedom standards.
On top of this, there’s a practice where some political groups accuse those who denounce state abuses, corruption and anti-rights practices of terrorism. This was particularly brutal following the social unrest that erupted after Castillo’s downfall in December 2022, when state repression of protests left around 50 people dead in southern Peru. The attacks targeted organisations supporting victims.
To tackle disinformation, used as a political tool in the electoral context, OjoPúblico, with the support of CIVICUS and in partnership with 26 organisations, launched an election coverage initiative using verification methods, in partnership with digital media outlets, radio stations and organised groups from different regions of Peru. The aim was to give the public verified information and show how disinformation undermines democracy. In six months, we generated almost three million views and over 180,000 social media interactions.
What’s the cause of instability in recent years?
The current crisis began in 2016, when Keiko Fujimori rejected the election results and pursued a sustained strategy to weaken the elected government, which culminated in it being removed from office by Congress. Since then, polarisation has deepened and Congress has taken on an increasingly destabilising role.
In this context, an unusual dynamic took hold, when parties at opposite ends of the political spectrum began acting in unison to benefit one another, halt investigations against them and advance their control over key state institutions such as the Constitutional Court, the Ombudsman’s Office and the Public Prosecutor’s Office. By appointing like-minded officials, they weakened the mechanisms of democratic control.
Added to this is the infiltration of illegal economies into politics. One example is that, according to revelations by independent journalists, 28 parties included people linked to illegal mining on their lists. This is an activity with an economic weight comparable to that of drug trafficking in past decades.
The combination of polarisation, institutional capture and the infiltration of criminal interests has sustained a system that reproduces itself election after election. Forces change and adapt, but they don’t disappear and instability persists.
What’s at stake in the runoff?
What’s at stake is democratic stability. This is regardless of who wins. Neither of the two candidates has provided sufficient guarantees that they will respect democratic principles and the rule of law. For 20 years, Peruvian voters have had to choose the lesser of two evils.
If Fujimori wins, she will seek to revive her father’s heavy-handed approach under the banner of law and order, one very much in line with the hard-right wave sweeping through Latin America. If Sánchez wins, his alliances with left-wing groups with a history of violence will open up an equally uncertain scenario.
Neither has presented a solid and convincing programme for the next five years. Their proposals rely more on slogans and spending pledges than on structural solutions to urgent problems such as record levels of insecurity, out-of-control illicit economies, and a fiscal situation undermined by disproportionate tax breaks.
But it’s also true that, given this complex scenario, this is not a choice between two equivalent risks. The dilemma facing Peruvian voters lies in understanding which candidate, if elected, will have greater power to pursue their authoritarian impulses without checks from the institutions that should restrain them.
In recent years, various international analyses have ceased to classify Peru as a democracy and now regard it as a hybrid regime. Depending on who wins, this trend will continue or intensify.
CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.
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SAMARKAND, Jun 4 2026 (IPS) - In a significant policy shift symbolising rising environmental ambition, Uzbekistan on Thursday announced that it will become a donor of international environmental funding to the Global Environment Facility (GEF), as the Eighth GEF Assembly opened in the historic city of Samarkand.
The announcement was delivered by H.E. Saida Mirziyoyeva, Head of the Presidential Administration, on behalf of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, marking a notable milestone for the Central Asian nation and for the GEF partnership.
“I have good news for you,” the presidential message said. “Uzbekistan has decided to become a donor country to the GEF.”
The message also declared that Samarkand, host of the Assembly, would be a future “hub of green economy, sustainable development and climate finance”, underscoring the country’s broader environmental ambitions.
The Eighth GEF Assembly, the institution’s highest governing body, brings together representatives from 186 member countries along with international organisations, civil society, and the private sector to shape global environmental priorities. Held every four years, the Assembly guides financing strategies and policy responses to urgent challenges such as climate change, biodiversity loss, pollution, and land degradation.
Uzbekistan’s decision comes at a time when countries are being urged to increase both funding and leadership in addressing what leaders describe as the “triple planetary crisis” of climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution.
Claude Gascon, Interim Chief Executive Officer and Chairperson of the Global Environment Facility (GEF), addresses the Eighth GEF Assembly. Credit: Stella Paul/IPS
A Shift Shaped by Experience
Welcoming the move, Claude Gascon, Interim CEO of the GEF, described it as a strong vote of confidence in the institution.
“This is a remarkable demonstration of confidence in the GEF partnership and in our mission,” Gascon said.
Until now, Uzbekistan had been a recipient of GEF funding, supporting projects on land restoration, water management, and climate resilience. Gascon said this experience positions the country uniquely as it takes on a donor role.
“As a GEF recipient country, you have direct experience of the programme,” he said. “Your decision to contribute as a donor is a testimony to how these investments work on the ground.”
Gascon reminded the delegates that the “Silk Road was an ancient network of interconnected trade routes that linked the world. And Samarkand is known as the “jewel of the Silk Road” because for centuries, it stood at the crossroads of civilisations, a place where people, ideas, knowledge, and commerce converged and flowed to solve the complex challenges of the time.”
The parallels are poetic, he continued.
“Today, we face environmental challenges that call for this same spirit. This gathering of the GEF Assembly represents a unique international convergence and interconnection of people, ideas, knowledge and finance, as we persevere on the road to 2030, and indeed the road to a healthier, more secure, and more hopeful future for all.”
Gascon also pointed to Uzbekistan’s growing environmental portfolio, including large-scale tree planting, reforestation, water-saving measures, and air quality improvements. “These efforts show what is possible when leadership is paired with action,” he added.
The announcement aligns with a broader push within the GEF to mobilise diversified financing, including blended finance, to scale up global environmental action.
Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme, Inger Andersen, told the Assembly that the GEF had, since its founding in 1991, delivered solution after solution.
“Solutions that reach communities, protect nature, tackle pollution and underwrite resilience – and in turn, help governments deliver on their global commitments through local, regional and national action.”
Andersen also endorsed the emphasis of the GEF-9 investment cycle on blended finance.
“And we fully endorse the criticality of blended finance. At UNEP, we see blended finance as a value chain. Capital stacking cannot occur or be effective unless we set up enabling policies, incentives and taxonomies as well as standards, regulations, laws and incentives that will incubate feasible, environmentally positive project pipelines – creating a predictable investment climate that turns environmental challenges into investment and development opportunities.”
Framing the Urgency
In the opening address, delivered a day ahead of World Environment Day, Mirziyoyeva outlined the scale of the environmental crisis facing both the region and the world.
“Humanity today faces a triple planetary crisis,” the message said, referring to climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution.
Central Asia remains particularly vulnerable. Around 37 million people in the region already face water scarcity, with projections suggesting this could rise to 75 million by 2050. Melting glaciers, desertification, and declining water availability were identified as major threats.
“Climate change demands practical and immediate solutions,” the statement emphasised.
GEF Assembly chair and Advisor to the President of Uzbekistan on the Environment, Aziz Abdukhakimov, pictured ahead of the opening of the Eighth GEF Assembly. Credit: Stella Paul/IPS
Earlier, Aziz Abdukhakimov, Advisor to the President of Uzbekistan on the Environment, also stressed the need for collective action. “The world is facing accelerating climate change, biodiversity loss, land degradation, pollution, and growing pressure on natural resources. These interconnected challenges require collective protection on an unprecedented scale. Uzbekistan believes in the power of all the literal cooperation for our shared future.”
Green Ambitions for Samarkand
The government used the Assembly’s global platform to outline an ambitious set of initiatives aimed at ecological transformation. Central to these plans is positioning Samarkand as a regional hub for sustainable development and green investment, described as the “green investment capital of Central Asia.”
The strategy includes developing pilot green zones that can be replicated nationwide, as well as strengthening scientific research and climate monitoring. Plans also include expanding hydrometeorological research, increasing reforestation efforts, tackling desertification, and establishing new botanical gardens to support biodiversity.
The government highlighted targets to reduce emissions and waste while promoting environmental education and a broader “green culture.”
Regional cooperation is expected to play a key role, including a proposed clean air consortium with Kazakhstan and collaborative approaches to desertification. The president’s message also called on participating countries to join these initiatives.
Uzbekistan is also positioning itself as a centre for regional knowledge exchange. According to Abdukhakimov, the country has been “inviting young professionals, researchers, and students from around the region to study, conduct research, and collaborate; it’s continuously contributing to the next generation of environmental leaders and innovators.”
A Broader Signal
Uzbekistan’s shift to donor status carries significance beyond its financial contribution, particularly as the GEF prepares for its next funding cycle under tighter global budgets. It reflects a wider trend of emerging economies taking a more active role in global environmental governance.
Historically, the GEF has relied on contributions from a relatively small group of donor countries to finance projects in developing regions. Currently, the number stands at 40. Uzbekistan’s move signals confidence in the impact of GEF programmes and a willingness to share responsibility for sustaining them.
As discussions continue in Samarkand through Thursday and Friday, the focus is expected to remain on scaling up finance and ensuring equitable access to funding, particularly through mechanisms that can leverage both public and private investment.
Note: The Eighth Global Environment Facility Assembly is underway until June 6, 2026, in Samarkand, Uzbekistan.
This feature is published with the support of the GEF. IPS is solely responsible for the editorial content, and it does not necessarily reflect the views of the GEF.
IPS UN Bureau Report
STOCKHOLM, Sweden, Jun 4 2026 (IPS) - The outcome of the current Iran war is still in doubt, but one consequence is already becoming clear: it has weakened America’s capacity to project power. Many are asking who won. The more important question may be what the war has cost.
The Gulf’s geo-economic position means that this war, short and small by historic standards, will have long-lasting global effects. One of the most important concerns the future US capacity to project power. A quick look at the balance sheet helps identify how that may play out.
Gains and losses
The losses, of course, include the impact on nature, on the people of Iran and on the Gulf states. The poor in other regions will suffer as food insecurity rises. On the sidelines, Putin’s Russia has benefitted by being able to sell more oil, but its support for Iran will cost it friends and investment capital from the Gulf. Meanwhile, Ukraine has also benefitted because several Gulf states want its drones and technical support.
Of the main combatants, Israel gained some freedom of action in Gaza and Lebanon. But it is piling up problems for the future, just as it did when it escalated in Lebanon in the early 1980s. Iran has gained a kind of win by not losing while, conversely, the US loses by not winning. And this will have a serious impact on its capacity to project power in the coming years.
There are two aspects to this. One is material and concerns the ability to coerce; the other is non-material and concerns influence. The material aspect would be significant even if the war had been more successful.
The US struck over 13 000 targets in Iran in 39 days of fighting. It used up more than half its stealth cruise missiles. At current rates of production, replacing them will take five to six years. It used as many Tomahawk cruise missiles as it produced in 10 years and about two years’ worth of Patriot interceptor missiles.
The US still has huge capacity to use force, though it may have to use it differently.
Not surprisingly, some anxiety has been expressed that the US military capacity to respond to another crisis has been reduced. Equally unsurprisingly, top-level military leaders and civilian officials assure allies and adversaries alike that the US can still handle all contingencies and project its power at will.
The amount of weaponry used is emphasised by critics because they see that the US has gained nothing by it. But even if the victory the President has frequently proclaimed were real, the weapons would still have been used. If reduced weapon stockpiles cause a problem, it is a problem regardless of the war’s outcome.
Both the concern and the complacency are overstated. The US still has huge capacity to use force, though it may have to use it differently if the President sees a new need or opportunity for military action. It remains a military superpower, but one with thinner margins, more difficult trade-offs and less freedom to respond simultaneously to crises in different regions.
The non-material aspect is even more significant. Influence takes many forms — political, economic and cultural. One source of political influence is military superiority. States that are seen as overwhelmingly powerful often gain friends and persuade adversaries to give way. The Gulf war, however, has exposed the limits of that logic.
President Trump is not wrong when he praises US military prowess. But his boasts during the Iran War have only drawn attention to the tightly limited utility of all that force. Iran’s military capacity has been damaged, and the economy is in terrible condition, but the regime is still in power, with a harder line and tighter control. When the ceasefire started, it still had 70 per cent of its pre-war stock of missiles and has doubtless produced more by now.
The US is no closer than it was the day before the war to getting Iran’s enriched uranium out of the country. It can only do that with Iranian agreement, which will take time and require US concessions over sanctions. And whereas shipping moved freely through the Strait of Hormuz before the war, now it does not, and Iran has turned that into a bargaining chip.
Trapped again
The lesson is that superior force can knock things down and kill people, but does not necessarily give its holder the power to achieve objectives. The same lesson is unfolding in another theatre of operations: in the American campaign against drug traffickers, there have been over 60 attacks on small boats in the Caribbean and Pacific, killing more than 200 people. According to the latest studies, this has had no effect on the street price and availability of cocaine in US cities.
The problem in the Gulf is that Trump has taken his government into a hole from which it is hard to see a way out. We have encountered this before. It is a characteristic dilemma of a great power facing a resilient foe. Think not just Iran, but Ukraine. Think Vietnam.
In March 1968, at the height of the Vietnam War, as American opinion began turning decisively against it, Theodore Sorensen, President Kennedy’s former speechwriter, depicted the US predicament as being trapped in a six-sided box, which he described with three simple sentences: America’s military primacy could not produce victory, while its political primacy made withdrawal humiliating.
It could not impose its will on South Vietnam or break the will of North Vietnam. Escalation risked Chinese or Soviet intervention, while serious negotiation meant accepting the possibility of a Communist South Vietnam.
It is not hard to apply the underlying analysis to the US against Iran. Some translation is needed: the war is unwinnable but withdrawal is humiliating; no ally is giving meaningful help and the enemy is too stubborn; all-out escalation is unthinkable, while good-faith negotiation means acknowledging that the war was wrong from the outset.
Hedging against US unreliability will be part of Europe’s and other US allies’ long-term policies for years to come
The US never managed to break out of that box in Vietnam and will probably be unable to do so in the Gulf. This failure – there is no other word for it – is draining the US capacity for strategic leadership. Allies are faced with reckless behaviour, frequent disregard and contempt, demands to back actions on which they were not consulted and which they oppose, inconsistent and misleading statements, and a war without strategy, legality or ethics.
It is hard to see how the US will regain the moral capital and leadership capacity it has lost this year. More bluster will not do it. Nor will resuming the war or coming to an agreement that makes major concessions to Iran. And it is currently impossible to see why Iran would make concessions to the US.
The United States remains the most powerful military actor in the world. But even the world’s strongest military cannot automatically translate force into political success. The danger is that future leaders continue to believe otherwise.
A strategically astute president who does not casually abuse and threaten allies may emerge in the future. But if the US electorate can do it twice, it can do it a third time — if not with Trump, due to age and the constitution, then with Vance, Rubio, Hegseth or someone else.
Accordingly, hedging against US unreliability will be part of Europe’s and other US allies’ long-term policies for years to come, maybe forever. As they become less dependent on the US, they will also be less compliant. In a few years, the US can restore much of its material power. Its non-material power will grow back only slowly, if at all.
Therein lies the most serious risk: that Trump, or a future leader, continues to believe against all the evidence that force equates to power, and uses it destructively, desperately and pointlessly.
Dan Smith is a Senior Fellow at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and conducts research on issues relating to peace, security and international politics, with a focus on the Middle East and North-East Asia.
Source: International Politics and Society, Brussels
IPS UN Bureau
Jun 3 2026 (IPS) -
The joint declaration issued by Russia and China on 20 May, Joint Declaration of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the Establishment of a Multipolar World and a New Type of International Relations, has been read in sharply different ways. Some welcome its language of sovereign equality, multilateralism and a UN-centred international order. Others dismiss it as legal rhetoric deployed in bad faith. Both responses miss the more important point.
The declaration matters less for what it promises than for what it reveals. It shows how the language of the United Nations Charter has become a field of political struggle. Russia and China are challenging parts of the existing order in different ways. They are competing to shape the meaning of that order and to present themselves as its more authentic defenders.
That is why the declaration should be read closely. Its appeal to sovereign equality, indivisible security and the democratisation of international relations is not incidental. It is a claim to normative authority. The text seeks to occupy the language of legitimacy at a moment when the authority of the United Nations itself has weakened.
The gap between that language and the conduct of its authors is striking, though the two cases are not identical. Russia is waging a war in Ukraine in open violation of the principles it invokes. China presents a more complicated challenge. It should be criticised for internal repression, coercive pressure on Taiwan, its rejection of the 2016 arbitral ruling on the South China Sea, and its continuing support for Russia despite Moscow’s aggression. Yet China has also shown a degree of strategic restraint and continues to frame its global role in terms of sovereignty, non-interference and a state-based international order. That distinction does not absolve Beijing. It does suggest that any serious strategy for UN renewal should test China’s stated commitment to non-aggression and multilateral restraint against its actual conduct, especially in the South China Sea. None of this removes the hypocrisy. It makes the diplomacy more important.
Still, the erosion of the United Nations system cannot be laid only at the feet of Moscow and Beijing. Western governments have also weakened the authority of the rules they claim to defend. Broad unilateral sanctions on Venezuela were criticised by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on unilateral coercive measures for their severe humanitarian impact and for undermining the principles they purported to uphold. In February 2026, the Secretary-General condemned the use of force by the United States and Israel against Iran, and the subsequent retaliation by Iran across the region, as a military escalation that undermined international peace and security. When major powers treat Charter constraints as optional, they invite others to do the same.
This matters because hypocrisy alone does not explain the moment. Great powers have always said one thing about rules and done another in practice. The deeper problem is that the authority to define legitimate state conduct has weakened. The Charter remains the best available foundation for international order, but the institutional machinery built around it no longer commands the same confidence or compliance.
That is what gives the Sino-Russian message traction beyond its authors. Its critique of Western hegemony resonates across much of the Global South because it draws on real grievances. Many states remain underrepresented in global decision-making, face conditionality in external partnerships and see an international economic order that has not delivered equitable development. Moscow and Beijing are exploiting those frustrations, though not always in the same way and not with identical records under the Charter.
At the same time, many governments are watching carefully what Sino-Russian partnership actually offers in practice. Some Belt and Road projects have generated concerns about debt sustainability and strategic dependency, with Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port frequently cited, even if interpretations of that case differ. In parts of Africa, Russia’s growing security footprint through Wagner’s legacy structures and successor arrangements has reinforced authoritarian partners while securing access to strategic resources. The language of emancipation can easily mask new forms of dependency.
For the United Nations, this is not just a messaging problem. It is a structural one. The Security Council veto produces paralysis in the crises where collective action is most needed. Financing depends on obligations that major powers treat as politically negotiable. The relationship between the United Nations and regional organisations remains uneven and vulnerable to manipulation. A system designed in 1945 for 51 member states has not adapted adequately to a far more plural and contested world.
That is why the next Secretary-General will need more than administrative skill. The task is not simply to defend the Charter against selective or cynical misuse. It is to rebuild political confidence that the institution can apply its principles with greater consistency, broader legitimacy and stronger operational capacity. That will require coalition-building across regions, especially with states that want reform, without abandoning multilateral restraint.
The Sino-Russian declaration therefore sets a test that extends well beyond Russia and China. The question is not whether its authors believe in the Charter in the same way or violate it in identical forms. They do not. The real question is whether the United Nations still has the political authority and institutional capacity to make the Charter matter.
Related articles from this author:
Governing the Ungovernable
The Secretary-General This Moment Demands
From Reform to Reinvention: Reimagining the United Nations for the 21st Century
The UN’s Withering Vine: A US Retreat from Global Governance
Jordan Ryan is a member of the Toda International Research Advisory Council (TIRAC) at the Toda Peace Institute, a Senior Consultant at the Folke Bernadotte Academy and former UN Assistant Secretary-General with extensive experience in international peacebuilding, human rights, and development policy. His work focuses on strengthening democratic institutions and international cooperation for peace and security. Ryan has led numerous initiatives to support civil society organisations and promote sustainable development across Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. He regularly advises international organisations and governments on crisis prevention and democratic governance.
This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from the original with their permission.
IPS UN Bureau
BRUSSELS, Belgium, Jun 3 2026 (IPS) - Governments are falling 90 percent short of adaptation finance targets and leaving people in climate-vulnerable communities drastically under-equipped to cope with the devastating impacts of climate change, Oxfam warns ahead of Bonn climate talks (8-18 June).
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), as of 2024, governments mobilized $31 billion in adaptation finance – around 90 percent short of the $310 billion to $365 billion projected needs for developing countries by 2035. To bridge this gap, rich countries would have to increase their adaptation financing tenfold.
The total climate finance of $137 billion reached in 2024 is also just a fraction of what countries need to transition away from fossil fuels. This shortfall highlights a stark global inequality, that those who have done the least to cause the climate crisis are being hit by the heaviest damage and short-changed from the funding promised to help them deal with it.
People living across the Global South, women, girls and Indigenous groups are overwhelmingly bearing the costs of environmental devastation.
Meanwhile, super-rich corporations and individuals — largely based in the Global North — have seen their wealth skyrocket. The profits of the six biggest fossil fuel corporations are projected to hit $94 billion in 2026, continuing to attract mega-investors. Almost 60 percent of billionaire investments are classified as being in high climate impact sectors, such as mining or oil and gas corporations.
“For too long, governments have coddled a super-rich elite whose huge emissions and dirty investments in polluting industries are throttling climate action. At Bonn, leaders must tackle this unequal concentration of wealth and power. It’s time to make rich polluters pay, and channel that wealth into accessible, participatory climate finance in a way that reaches the communities who need it most,” said Mariana Paoli, Oxfam International’s Climate Lead.
Recent polling commissioned by Oxfam across seven countries found that approximately two-thirds (68 percent) of the public support increasing taxes on the profits of large oil and gas corporations to help fund a fair transition to renewable energy.
Oxfam urges governments to:
• Slash the emissions of the super-rich and make the richest polluters pay, through taxation on extreme wealth, excess profits taxes on fossil fuel corporations, and a carbon capital levy on investments in polluting sectors.
• Remove the financial barriers blocking a Just Transition by cancelling debt, phasing out fossil fuel subsidies and overhauling a financial architecture systemically skewed against Global South countries.
• Substantially increase climate finance to support communities on the frontlines of the climate crisis. This means fulfilling the $300 billion annual target agreed at COP29, including tripling funding flows specifically for adaptation, and substantially increasing resources to address loss and damage.
Footnote
According to the OECD, in 2024, wealthy countries mobilized $137 billion in total climate finance to support climate action in low- and middle-income countries. Of this, $102 billion came in the form of public finance, mostly as loans. Public finance for adaptation amounted to $32 billion.
The UNEP Adaptation Gap Report 2025 calculates that the cost of adaptation finance needed in low- and middle-income countries is $310 billion per year in 2035, when based on modelled costs. When based on extrapolated needs expressed in Nationally Determined Contributions and National Adaptation Plans, this figure rises to $365 billion a year.
Oxfam research finds that six of the biggest fossil fuel companies (Chevron, Shell, BP, ConocoPhillips, Exxon and TotalEnergies) are projected to earn $2,967 a second in profits in 2026. Download the methodology note.
“Climate Plunder: How a powerful few are locking the world into disaster”, the executive summary and the methodology note. The report is also available in Spanish, French and Portuguese.
The global poll, conducted by market research company Norstat in April 2026, gathered responses from people in seven countries (UK, France, Brazil, Turkey, Australia, the Netherlands and Colombia).
The polling also showed that support for taxing oil and gas corporations to fund the renewable energy transition crossed party lines. In six of the countries, there were more far-right respondents who supported such a tax, than those who opposed it.
IPS UN Bureau
SAMARKAND, Uzbekistan, Jun 3 2026 (IPS) - As the Global Environment Facility (GEF) steps into the starting blocks of its next financial cycle, the Interim CEO Claude Gascon reflects on what he termed a “moment of transition and delivery”.
He was speaking at a press briefing on the eve of the Eighth GEF Assembly, which is scheduled to begin tomorrow (June 4).
“We are looking towards the past successes of GEF-8 with very strong results as well as looking forward to the next four years launching GEF-9 with a “sharper focus on impact, speed and scale.”
The GEF-9 replenishment, which was approved in Council, will be presented in the Assembly tomorrow and sends a strong signal: “Multilateral collaboration still matters in the world,” Gascon said as the 71st Council of the GEF concluded in Samarkand, Uzbekistan.
Donor countries pledged an initial USD 3.9 billion to help developing countries accelerate their progress towards 2030 environmental goals.
“The USD 3.9 billion represents the initial set of pledges,” he said, adding that despite fiscal pressures globally, “In this climate, it is a very, very strong signal.”
Gascon emphasised that discussions with donor countries are still ongoing.
“We are confident that over the next six to 12 months, we will get significantly higher pledges,” he said, noting that these could be integrated into the GEF‑9 financial framework as they materialise.
Chizuru Aoki, Manager of the Multilateral Environmental Agreements and Funds Division, pointed to upcoming global environment meetings as likely venues for new commitments.
“We are expecting to hold pledging sessions on the occasion of CBD COP17 (the biodiversity COP), as well as other COPs (climate change and desertification),” she said. “The COPs tend to be a very good occasion for a new announcement to be made.”
With public finance under pressure, the GEF is placing greater emphasis on blended finance and other innovative mechanisms to stretch limited resources.
Fred Boltz, head of the Programming Division, said such instruments are “very much in demand” and increasingly central to GEF operations, though not a substitute for core funding.
Gascon clarified how blended finance is structured within GEF operations.
“The blended finance that the GEF puts in is, in fact, grants that we give to countries to develop blended finance projects,” he said. “The GEF portion… is not expected to be paid back by the country.”
He added that even if projects fail, “the GEF money basically is lost”, underscoring the institution’s role in absorbing risk.
This ability to take on risk is designed to attract private capital.
“GEF money can come in and decrease the interest rate or allow the technology to be adopted,” Gascon said, explaining that such support helps make projects commercially viable and encourages private sector participation.
Examples of innovative financing include biodiversity-linked instruments such as species bonds. These allow private investors to fund conservation efforts, with returns tied to measurable outcomes such as increases in wildlife populations. Such models avoid adding to public debt while expanding conservation funding.
The GEF-9 replenishment package introduces structural reforms to make the GEF faster, simpler, and more accountable, ensuring resources reach countries more efficiently, with key strategic priorities including:
Integrated Programs targeting systemic transformations across nature, food, urban, energy, and health systems to integrate the value of nature in production and consumption systems. Blended finance at scale, with an aspirational target of programming 25 percent of resources to mobilize private capital. Whole-of-government and whole-of-society engagement, deepening participation of civil society, youth, women, and the private sector. Strengthened support for vulnerable countries, with 35 percent of resources directed to support LDCs and SIDS, and 20 percent to support Indigenous Peoples and local communities.GEF-9 will also allocate USD 100 million to an Indigenous Peoples and local communities Conservation Initiative, four times more than in the previous GEF investment cycle. The initiative provides dedicated and direct funding to Indigenous-led organisations and contributes to their strengthening to enable their participation in GEF projects as executing agencies and funding intermediaries to enhance access.
Aoki highlighted that diversified funding approaches will complement, not replace, traditional sources. At the same time, she reiterated the importance of continued donor engagement.
“Please be on the lookout,” she said, referring to potential pledge announcements linked to upcoming COPs.
The stage is all set for the Eighth Assembly of the Global Environment Facility, which is scheduled to begin on June 4 at the Congress Center in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. Credit: Stella Paul/IPS
Eighth Assembly – a ‘Forward-Looking’ Forum
The financing discussion comes as the GEF prepares for its Assembly, which Gascon described as a “forward-looking” forum distinct from the Council’s administrative role.
“The assembly is much more to look forward – trying to bring new ideas and new thoughts,” he said.
Gascon stressed that the Assembly’s main task will be to consolidate emerging ideas into practical directions. “We want to distil those messages into a few key messages that the assembly can adopt,” he said, adding that these will guide implementation during the GEF‑9 cycle.
He also reiterated the GEF’s mandate within the broader global environmental governance system. “We are not here to decide what the COPs should do,” Gascon said. “We are here to implement the guidance that they give us.”
He added that COPs also review GEF performance and provide further direction.
Country Funding
Whatever funding was available, Gascon stressed that the GEF model ensures that recipient countries have 100 percent of the decision-making power in the use of their resources.
“And so, if you go to a restaurant, you have the choice of choosing different dishes on the menu. The same applies to countries; they have GEF programming directions, which serve as a menu for how they can spend their dollars,” said Gascon.
On country eligibility, Aoki confirmed that countries graduating from Least Developed Country (LDC) status will continue to receive support during a transition period.
They will have two more rounds of funding,” she said, describing the approach as a “soft landing”.
These countries include Vanuatu, which graduated from LDC to Developing Countries during the GEF-7 and Bhutan, which just graduated. She added that countries like Bangladesh that chose not to graduate despite being qualified remain unchanged in status.
“If they have not graduated, they have not graduated… nothing changes.”
Addressing suggestions raised informally during Council discussions, which included removing China from the list of GEF’s funding recipients and moving the Cali Fund from the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD) to the GEF , Gascon made clear that the GEF does not independently consider proposals outside established governance processes.
“Our guidance comes from the COPs,” he said.
Looking ahead, Gascon identified adoption of the GEF‑9 package as the primary benchmark for Assembly success. “The most important [outcome] is for the Assembly to adopt the GEF‑9 package,” he said, calling it a key signal to the institution’s 186 member countries.
The overall message from GEF leadership is a recalibration rather than a shift: continued reliance on public pledges, expected to grow over the coming months, combined with a stronger push to use grant capital to unlock private and philanthropic investment.
“We are looking towards the past successes of GEF-8 with very strong results as well as looking forward to the next four years, launching the GEF-9 with a sharper focus on impact, speed and scale,” Gascon said.
IPS UN Bureau Report
Note: The Eighth Global Environment Facility Assembly is underway until June 6, 2026, in Samarkand, Uzbekistan.
This feature is published with the support of the GEF. IPS is solely responsible for the editorial content, and it does not necessarily reflect the views of the GEF.
PORTLAND, USA, Jun 3 2026 (IPS) - In 2026, the population of the United States is significantly larger, older, and more diverse than it was 250 years ago when the country declared its independence from the Kingdom of Great Britain on July 4, 1776.
The population of the thirteen British colonies in North America in 1776 is estimated to have been approximately 2.5 million people, or 0.7% of the current size of the United States.
The 1776 estimate included both free inhabitants and enslaved individuals, with around 20% of the population – about half a million people – being enslaved. However, these estimates did not include the indigenous population.
Before the 1770s, the indigenous populations residing in the thirteen colonies of Great Britain had already suffered significant population declines over previous centuries. These declines were the result of diseases brought by Europeans, massacres, displacement from their lands, and continuing conflicts with the colonists over land, water, and natural resources.
Since no census enumerated the indigenous peoples, no official population figures exist for them in 1776. However, modern historical estimates suggest that more than a quarter million indigenous people lived east of the Mississippi River, organized into more than 80 distinct nations and speaking dozens of languages.
Among these indigenous nations were the Wampanoag, Narragansett, Lenni Lenape, Powhatan, Pequot, Mohegan, Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, Seneca, Tuscarora, Susquehannock, Abenaki, Cherokee, Catawba, Muscogee, Yamasee, Lenni, and Chickasaw.
The first population census of the expanded United States, mandated by the Constitution and conducted in 1790, counted nearly 4 million residents, of whom close to 18% were enslaved.
Indigenous people living in the United States were not included in the 1790 census. Historical estimates, however, indicate that the indigenous population within the newly established nation was approximately 600,000.
By 1861, at the start of the country’s civil war, the U.S. population had grown to approximately 31.4 million, of which 13% were enslaved, according to the eighth decennial census, which included 33 states and 10 organized territories.
In 1890, the country’s census attempted to enumerate indigenous people living in the United States. Their population was reported to number around 250,000, which is believed to be a significant undercount of the actual size of the indigenous population. The current estimate for the indigenous population in the United States is between 6.8 million and 9.1 million people, making up approximately 2% to 3% of the total U.S. population.
In 1976, two hundred years after the signing of the Declaration of Independence, the population of the United States had grown to approximately 218 million. Looking ahead to 2026, the mid-year estimate for the U.S. population, according to the Census Bureau, is nearly 343 million, which is about 135 times larger than the population in 1776.
According to the Census Bureau’s main series population projections, the U.S. population is expected to reach a peak of nearly 370 million in 2080 before gradually declining to 366 million by 2100 (Figure 1).
Source: U.S. Census Bureau.
International migration played a significant role in the growth of the U.S. population. Without international migration since 1776, the estimated hypothetical population of the United States in 2026 would be approximately 153 million. This figure is roughly 190 million fewer than the actual U.S. population, highlighting the enormous impact migration has had on the country’s demographic development.
While the population of the U.S. is expected to continue growing, it is expected to do so at a slower rate than in recent years. The nation’s growth rate has decreased over the past two decades, going from about 10% growth between 2000 and 2010 to 7.4% between 2010 and 2020 and is predicted to further decline to around 5.5% between 2020 and 2030.
Due to immigration, the U.S. population is expected to continue growing, reaching nearly 370 million by 2080, then slightly declining to 366 million by the end of the century. Without future immigration, the U.S. population is estimated to be 117 million smaller, at 226 million by the end of the 21st century
In the coming decades of the 21st century, the U.S. population will continue to undergo changes due to the three main demographic drivers: births, deaths and migration.
Currently births outnumber deaths, resulting in a positive natural population increase. However, the U.S. fertility rate, which reached lows of 1.63 births per woman in 2024 and 1.57 births per woman in 2025, has been generally below the replacement level of 2.1 births per woman since 1971 and consistently below the replacement level since 2007.
Due to the country’s low fertility rates, deaths in the U.S. are expected to outnumber births by 2040 and are projected to continue doing so throughout the rest of the 21st century. By 2080, the Census Bureau expects that the number of deaths will exceed the number of births by approximately one million.
Immigration to the U.S. is still occurring, but at a slower pace compared to recent years, resulting in a decreased rate of population growth.
The Census Bureau’s main series population projection assumes that net international migration will remain close to one million per year for the rest of the 21st century.
Due to immigration, the U.S. population is expected to continue growing, reaching nearly 370 million by 2080, then slightly declining to 366 million by the end of the century. Without future immigration, the U.S. population is estimated to be 117 million smaller, at 226 million by the end of the 21st century.
Another significant change in the U.S. population is demographic ageing.
In 1776, a notable demographic characteristic of the 13 colonies was their young age structure. For example, the median age of this population was estimated to be approximately 16 years.
In the early years of the United States, individuals over 70 years old were relatively uncommon. In the New England colonies, almost one-third of the population was under 21. Life expectancy at birth was low, approximately 35 to 40 years, mainly due to high rates of infant and child mortality. More than two hundred years later, life expectancy at birth in the U.S. is estimated to be approximately 79 years.
In the first U.S. census in 1790, the median age had changed little, remaining at approximately 16 years.
By 1820, the median age had increased to about 16.7 years. By 1860, the estimated median age of the U.S. population had increased to approximately 19 years, reflecting relatively high fertility levels and short life expectancies.
At the start of the 20th century, the median age of the U.S. population had increased slightly to approximately 23 years and reached 35 years at the end of the 20th century. By 2026, the median age is estimated to have reached about 39 years and it is projected to increase to 41 years by 2050 (Figure 2).
Source: U.S. Census Bureau.
In addition to population growth and demographic ageing, the ethnic composition of the U.S. population has also undergone significant changes. As the country’s composition changes, the major ethnic categories of the U.S. population compiled by the government have also changed.
Since the Declaration of Independence in 1776, the population of the United States has significantly increased from several million to 343 million, largely due to immigration.
The proportion of foreign-born individuals in the U.S. has varied considerably over the past several centuries. During the second half of the 19th century, the proportion hit a high of 14.8% in 1890. Throughout the 20th century, the proportion declined to a low of 4.7% in 1970. More recently, the foreign-born proportion reached a historic high in 2024 at 15.6% (Figure 3).
Source: U.S. Census Bureau.
Approximately half of all U.S. immigrants (52%, or 26.7 million people) were born in Latin America, while around a quarter (27%, or 14 million) were born in Asia.
By 2023, the estimated numbers of immigrants from the top five countries, which make up nearly half of the entire foreign-born population, are: Mexico (11.4 million), India (3.2 million), China (3.0 million), the Philippines (2.1 million), and Cuba (1.7 million).
Additionally, the indigenous population in the United States is estimated to be between 7 and 9 million people, including those who identify as American Indian or Alaska Native, either alone or in combination with other races. This accounts for approximately 2% to 3% of the total U.S. population.
In summary, since declaring its independence from Great Britain 250 years ago, the population of the United States has grown significantly larger, older, and more diverse.
Much of this population growth is credited to the country’s open door immigration policy, as symbolized by the famous lines at the base of the Statue of Liberty: “Give me your tired, your poor, Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me, I lift my lamp beside the golden door!”
With ongoing immigration to the United States, the current population of about 343 million is projected to continue growing and reach a peak of 370 million by 2080. However, without immigration, the U.S. population is expected to start declining in about twelve years and drop to 226 million by the end of the 21st century.
Joseph Chamie is a consulting demographer, a former director of the United Nations Population Division, and author of many publications on population issues.