ROME, Oct 2 2025 (IPS) - In the Global South, where people under the age of 18 comprise more than 50 percent of the population, youth activism is increasing rapidly. Youngsters are more agile and volatile than older people, less restrained by family, prestige and work. However, many suffer from marginalisation, lack of employment, and poverty. Furthermore, insecurity and limited life experience make young people an easy target for manipulating and unscrupulous politicians, criminal networks, and religious fanatics.
Students and young citizens come together by using social media to make their presence felt and mount protests in public spaces. The role of new media technologies as an organising tool has led besieged authorities to ban online platforms, though imposed restrictions have rather than contain protests accelerated them.
Rebellious youth generally belong to the Gen Z, which refers to “digital native”, the first generation fully immersed in a digital world, with constant access to internet and social media. An upbringing that has shaped their world view, making them independent, pragmatic and focused on social impact.
South Asia has recently experienced massive protest movements involving crowds of young people. In July 2022, after an economic collapse in Sri Lanka, a rebellion forced its president to flee the country. In July 2024, upheavals ended the long rule of Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh, and in September this year, violent protests in Nepal forced Prime Minister Khadga Oli’s government to resign.
Even though specific incidents triggered these upheavals, they were all due to long-term, shared grievances evolving from stark wealth gaps, rampant nepotism, and unlimited corruption. Above all, youngsters protested against members of powerful dynasties, favouring a wealthy and discredited political elite.
Sri Lankans were in 2022 faced with a galloping inflation, daily blackouts, as well as shortages of fuel, domestic gas, food, medicines, and essential imports. Amid massive desperation, huge crowds of mostly young people did on 25 March take to the streets under the slogan Aragalya, Struggle.
Political power had by then become embedded within the Rajapaksa dynasty. From 2005 to 2022, two brothers – Mahinda and Gotabaya Rajapaksa, had alternately shared the presidency and prime minister post, while another brother headed their political party; a fourth was speaker of the parliament, and other relatives occupied influential political positions.
While Gotabaya Rajapaksa served as defence minister, he was credited with ending the twenty-six-year-long civil war with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. After churches and luxury hotels in April 2019 had been targeted by ISIS-related suicide bombers, killing 270 people, Mahinda and Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who at the time were in opposition, accused the current government of leniency. When Gotabaya ran for the presidency the same year, he based his campaign on his record as a militant leader, embracing a Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalism inspired by his brother Mahinda’s ethno-nationalist rhetoric, favouring the Buddhist establishment. Gotabaya was elected with an overwhelming majority and six ministries were then headed by members of the Rajapaksa clan.
Most Aragalaya protesters considered their personal hardships to be a result of the mismanagement and corruption of the Rajapaksa-led government. They demanded that the president be deposed and a thorough “system change” brought about. After appointing an astute insider, Ranil Wickremesinghe, as acting president, Gotabaya Rajapaksa fled to Singapore. Wickremesinghe’s government refused to hold elections and persistently portrayed Aragalaya as a chaotic movement, captured by militants, fascists, and terrorists.
Several Aragalaya supporters were wary of being used by partisan or militant groups, particularly those with leftist ideologies which had a long history of organizing protests and strikes. One exception could have been the leftist National People’s Power (NPP), established in 2019. The 2024 elections, which Wickremesinghe had been forced to accept, was won by a NPP coalition lead by Anura Dissanayake.
So far, Dissanayake and his NPP coalition have not introduced any radical political or economic changes. They have largely continued the Wickremesinghe government’s economic and foreign policies, raising questions about the extent to which the NPP coalition is willing, or able, to depart from established governance patterns and deliver the systemic change that has been promised. Deep set divisions and ethnic-religious tensions continue to harass the nation and NPP is apparently trying to tread lightly to avoid stirring up any violent disaccord.
The same could be said about Bangladesh, where an interim government led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus seems to be cautious not to cause any antagonistic violence. Yunus’ group of personal supporters and experts presides over a nation with a chilling rise in mob violence and political discord; women are often being targeted, as well as there are reports of attacks on religious minorities.
The formerly dictatorial, but secular and highly corrupt political party, the Awami League, has been banned and democratic elections are promised by the interim government in February 2026. Some are optimistic about democratic elections, described by Yunus as becoming the most “beautiful elections ever”. However, others are unsure if elections will actually be held within a political scenario where violence is a common-day affair.
In Bangladesh, it was a quota system for jobs that forced youngsters into the streets. It was mainly students who led the protests. Student politics had for several years been ferocious, especially since religious and political fractions used them as a mobilising force. Violent feuds within educational institutes had killed many and seriously hampered the academic atmosphere.
Student anger became unified through a common resentment of reserved positions in the Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS), a cherished field of government service. The reserved positions were destined to “freedom fighters, i.e. veterans from the 1971 liberation war, as well as their children and grandchildren. Protests erupted in full force on 1 July after the Supreme Court in June 2024 had reinstated a 30 percent quota reserved for veteran descendants, generally interpreted as an intent by the governing party to favour its traditional supporters.
Bangladesh became a sovereign nation in December 1971, after a war against Pakistan, which was supported by India. Sheik Mujibur Rahman was until his assassination in 1975 president and prime minister. Following further turmoil with counter coups, General Ziaur Rahman eventually took over as president; he was in May 1981 assassinated in yet another coup. Ziaur Rahman’s widow, Begum Khaleda Zia, served from 1991 to 1996 as the second female prime minster in the Muslim world (after the Pakistani Benazir Bhutto) and again between 2001 and 2006, when Bangladesh, according to the Corruption Perceptions Index was listed as the most corrupt country in the world. Following the end of her government’s term, a military-backed caretaker government charged Khaleda Zia and her two sons with corruption and in 2018 she was sentenced to 17 years in prison.
Sheikh Hasinah, daughter of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was prime minister between 1996 and 2001, and again from 2009 to 2024, following several controversial elections. Her tenure as prime minister was marked by economic mismanagement, rampant corruption, leading to a rising foreign debt, increased inflation, youth unemployment, banking irregularities and an enormous wealth gap. The Financial Times reported that more than an estimated USD 200 billion was allegedly plundered from Bangladesh during Sheikh Hasinah’s time as prime minister, with a lot of these money ending up in countries such as the UK.
As the case had been in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, several members of the Nepalese political elite considered themselves as privileged and not accountable, while favouring family members and supporters to syphon wealth from overprized building endeavours.
Khadga Prassad Oli, a communist who began his political career as “spokesman for the oppressed”, seemed to be unaware of the anger accumulating around him within a nation where some two thousand men and women daily left to look for livelihoods in other countries (remittances from Nepalis working abroad constitute a third of the country’s GDP). Of those who stayed behind, more than 80 percent work in the informal sector, while youth unemployment in the formal sector is more than 20 percent.
On 4 September this year, the government ordered authorities to block 26 social media platforms, including Facebook, X, YouTube, LinkedIn, Instagram, Reddit, Signal and Snapchat, for not complying with a deadline to register with the country’s ministry of communication. The measure was explained as a means to tackle fake news, hate speech, and online fraud.
By then, youngsters had with increasing anger accessed platforms where politicians’ children posted photos of their opulent existence, awash with designer clothes, luxury holidays, and lavish parties. The close down of all media platforms, except the Chinese TikTok, further inflamed the resentment of Nepalese youth.
Soon Kathmandu was burning – Singha Durbar, i.e. Nepal’s administrative headquarters; the health ministry; the parliament building; the Supreme Court; the presidential palace; the prime minister’s residence, offices of the governing communist party, and the Kathmandu Hilton, were all set ablaze.
Nepal, the oldest sovereign, and until 2008 only Hindu state in South Asia, was for 250 years, under a strict caste system, ruled by the Shah dynasty. After internal power struggles and murders within the “Royal House of Gorkha” the monarchy was abolished and it was only in 1990 that it had ceded partial power to political parties. After that, a series of failing civilian governments gave in 1996 rise to a “Maoist” insurgency, which took sixteen thousand lives.
The leader of that rebellion, Pushpa Kamal Dahal, was in 2008 elected prime minister. However, he and his erstwhile revolutionaries proved incapable of improving Nepalese living standards and soon indulged themselves in corruption. After the September Gen Z-led upheaval a caretaker Prime Minister has been appointed. Sushila Karki, has a good record after being Nepal’s first female Chief Justice, between 2016 and 2017.
While new leaders seem to have emerged in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal, the general public is now asking itself if these recently arrived politicians will be more prudent, corruption free and restrained in controversial actions, than their predecessors.
Much of the outcome depends on the “big brother” in the area – The Republic of India, where millions of migrant workers from Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka reside and work. Indian democracy has, with all its shortcomings, been characterized by a collective political discourse in which concerns of a diversity of all Indians could find a space. However, under prime minister Modi we now witness the rise of Hindu nationalism, rooted in homogeneity and exclusion, questioning who really belongs in the Hindutva community, while marginalizing those who don’t, among them migrants, Muslims, and many others. A dangerous polarization that could worsen the situation in neighbouring countries, particularly considering the huge number of their emigrants being present in a country prone to discriminate against them, as well as forcing them back to a tumultuous situation in their countries of origin.
This is part 1 of an analysis of the connection between youth movements and political change, part 2 will analyse how youth-led revolutions have changed political scenarios globally.
IPS UN Bureau
