The Human Consciousness Now...Our World in the Midst of Becoming...to What? Observe, contemplate Now.
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Jun 15 2026 (IPS) - When Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán lost by a landslide to a unified opposition in April, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was watching. The lesson he drew was not that he should be more moderate; it was that he needed to crack down harder. He had already arrested Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP)’s leading presidential contender, in March 2025. After Orbán’s defeat, he has accelerated his campaign to fracture the opposition and rewrite the rules before the next election in 2028.
Electoral autocracy
Erdoğan has been in power since 2003. After surviving a coup attempt in July 2016, he used emergency powers to purge the state at scale. Over 150,000 people were detained, fired or suspended from their jobs. Emergency decrees expanded the government’s power to shut down organisations and remove elected officials. A 2017 constitutional referendum, narrowly approved in a campaign that independent observers found deeply flawed, replaced Turkey’s parliamentary system with a hyper-presidential one.
Independent media has been systematically dismantled. Turkey now ranks 163rd out of 180 countries on Reporters Without Borders’ 2026 World Press Freedom Index. Yet elections have continued, and the opposition has continued to win at the municipal level, most strikingly in Istanbul in 2019 and again by an even wider margin in 2024. That residual competitiveness is what Erdoğan is now moving to close.
İmamoğlu had beaten Erdoğan’s candidate in Istanbul twice, was formally nominated as the CHP’s 2028 presidential candidate and polled strongly against Erdoğan nationally. Authorities arrested him on charges of corruption and links with terrorism as his nomination was under way, triggering Turkey’s largest wave of protests in over a decade. A 4,000-page indictment filed in November 2025 sought to sentence him to over 2,000 years in prison. Espionage charges followed in February 2026. His trial began in March amid continuing protests. He remains in prison, and in the 14 months since his arrest, over 500 more people have been detained, including 16 CHP-affiliated mayors.
With İmamoğlu imprisoned, Erdoğan’s next move was to prevent the CHP from consolidating around anyone else. On 21 May, an appeals court annulled the outcomes of the CHP’s 2023 national congress, ejecting the party’s elected leader Özgür Özel, who had raised the CHP to rough parity with Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) in national polls, and reinstating his predecessor Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, a divisive figure who lost the last presidential election. Özel condemned the ruling as a judicial coup and refused to leave the party’s headquarters. Three days later, riot police stormed in, firing rubber bullets and teargas. The government denied any involvement, implausibly claiming the judiciary had acted independently. The operation was legal in form and political in substance.
Turkey’s constitution limits presidents to two five-year terms, and Erdoğan’s second expires in 2028. In May 2025, he appointed a legal team to draft a new constitution. It seems clear the goal is to extend his eligibility. The AKP and its nationalist allies fall short of the parliamentary threshold required to change the constitution or call a referendum on it. Some analysts believe the government’s recent initiative to end the decades-long conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party is at least partly designed to attract enough parliamentary votes to clear that threshold.
There is a structural reason the stakes are so high. Turkey’s hyper-presidential system means that, unlike Orbán, Erdoğan would have no safe path back from electoral defeat. For him, losing power could mean political extinction. His crackdown is a response to this threat.
Civil society resistance
Turkey’s civil society has, however, not submitted. Huge protests followed İmamoğlu’s arrest. A mass rally marked his 100th day in jail, and people marched again when the CHP headquarters were raided. Most recently, when Erdoğan ordered the closure of Bilgi University, one of Turkey’s oldest liberal academic institutions, students and staff immediately gathered outside to protest. Within two days the government reversed the closure. This illustrated both the extent of Erdoğan’s repressive urges and their limits when met with swift resistance.
The government has responded to protest with blanket bans on public gatherings, social media restrictions and mass arrests. Four days after İmamoğlu’s arrest, at least 1,879 people had been detained. Police repeatedly intervened forcefully, using teargas and detaining protesters and journalists.
Orbán’s downfall has frightened Erdoğan as much as it has inspired the Turkish opposition. He is moving to eliminate the conditions that made it possible. He has got rid of the most credible and unifying opposition candidate, neutralised the main opposition party and is in the process of dismantling what’s left of an electoral architecture that, however tilted, could still allow the opposition to win.
Turkey’s democracy now depends on whether enough people keep showing up, and on whether they can keep resisting Erdoğan’s campaign to dismantle democracy.
Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also a Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.
For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org
UNITED NATIONS, Jun 15 2026 (IPS) - On principle, the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is an issue that unites the international community. But for a select few states, these principles came with conditions and a refusal to compromise on their security strategy.
The Eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) concluded on May 22, 2026 without member states reaching consensus on a final outcome document. It was the culmination of four weeks of extensive debates starting on April 27, along with the special meetings, consultations and briefings that preceded the conference.
Compared to earlier editions shared before and during the conference, the final draft weakened much of the language surrounding the obligations of nuclear states, including those that related to disarmament efforts. Yet even with these concessions, for the third time in a row after 2015 and 2022, the NPT parties failed to adopt an outcome document.
At the closing session of the conference, Do Hung Viet, President of the NPT Conference and the UN Permanent Representative of Vietnam, remarked that the collective threat posed by nuclear weapons requires a collective response. He warned that in 2031, the NPT would pass 20 years without an outcome. It was the responsibility of state parties, he said, to uphold the NPT until Article VI, which calls for parties to pursue disarmament measures in good faith, could be implemented, and they needed to bolster the treaty as a tool to address modern threats.
Following the closing of the conference, Viet told reporters that the current state of the international environment requires “urgent action” in the face of recent tensions. Although the conference could not reach consensus, Viet attempted to find some positives in the proceedings, in that the engagement “highlights the value of the NPT and multilateralism as a whole”. Yet he expressed concern for the health of the treaty going forward as it related to state parties’ commitments.
Izumi Nakamitsu, UN Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, added that if parties to the NPT wanted to prevent a “further decrease of confidence” in the nuclear nonproliferation regime, then they “need to visibly make a commitment” through measurable steps.
She remarked that the international community at large needed to take lessons from the proceedings, starting with the acceleration of disarmament commitments under existing treaties. There were also increased calls for a “strengthening of the review process”, or enhancing accountability and transparency measures over the implementation of countries’ commitments to the NPT.
“Nonproliferation and disarmament are two sides of the same coin, and it is simply wrong for nuclear weapons states to assume that nonproliferation obligations will be just adhered to without nuclear weapons states’ commitment and implementation of disarmament commitments under Article 6,” said Nakamitsu.
Susi Synder (left), ICAN Director of Programmes, and Seth Sheldon (right), ICAN’s UN Liaison, at a press briefing held on the final day of the NPT 2026 Review Conference. Credit: Naureen Hossain/IPS
Parties to the NPT, including nuclear-armed states, repeatedly acknowledged the NPT as a “cornerstone” for multilateral diplomacy and the nuclear disarmament regime. However, when it came to other nuclear treaties, such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), such acknowledgements were scarce. The final outcome draft makes a limited few references to these treaties but does not elaborate on the disarmament requirements outlined in them.
The final outcome document draft was noteworthy for its references to the humanitarian and environmental impacts of nuclear testing for the first time in the context of the NPT Review Conference. Experts from the International Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) noted that this was possible thanks to the advocacy efforts of civil society and of the communities impacted by nuclear weapons use and testing.
In particular, the draft “recognise[s] the growing calls for assistance to the people and communities affected by nuclear weapons use and explosive nuclear testing and for environmental remediation following nuclear weapons use and explosive nuclear testing” and “welcome[s] efforts already undertaken in this regard”.
The draft also included a call for member states to “take concrete measures to raise awareness of the public, including through education, on all topics relating to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation” by sharing the experiences of peoples and communities affected by nuclear weapons use and testing.
Recognition of the NPT stood in contradiction to the actions and statements made by nuclear-armed states. These states, which include the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, all maintain positions that contradict the principles of the NPT and broader efforts toward disarmament. These states have openly made plans to expand their nuclear arsenals and weave in the salience of nuclear weapons into their security strategy by justifying it through concepts of ‘extended nuclear deterrence’ and nuclear sharing with other countries considering their own nuclear expansion. Two members of the Security Council are engaged in separate, active conflicts that have only exacerbated geopolitical tensions, while also dredging up anxieties around nuclear weapons as a security strategy. With seemingly no end in sight to these conflicts, those anxieties have only deepened, and has shaped global and regional security policies for years to come.
For a civil society group like ICAN, the lack of outcome for the NPT is emblematic of increasing risks of proliferation among nuclear-armed states and their allies.
“There is a reason why the countries that claim protection from nuclear weapons are afraid of discussion of what these weapons actually do to people and the environment. They simply don’t want people to know the true extent of the horror and cruelty nuclear weapons wreak, because acknowledging these harms will eliminate any credible legitimacy for retaining nuclear weapons,” said Susi Snyder, ICAN’s Director of Programmes.
What will it take, therefore, for these countries to reverse their positions? Synder told Inter Press Service that “increasing the stigmatisation” of nuclear weapons would be one such tactic. Reinforcing the nuclear taboo by raising awareness among the populations of these countries is critical for them to recognise the complete destruction that a nuclear weapon would bring about, and the impact this would have on targeted communities and on themselves. Synder noted the literal cost of proliferation, claiming that in 2024 nuclear-armed states spent over USD 3000 per second on their arsenals.
Finally, security doctrines built on the theory of nuclear deterrence need to be challenged. Seth Sheldon, the UN liaison for ICAN, noted that if nuclear weapons can be seen as useless from a military perspective and unsustainable from a policy perspective, nuclear-armed states would reevaluate their positions. “Nuclear weapons are irrational. Nuclear deterrence is a fable. And all technology is abandoned once it is seen as no longer useful,” Sheldon said.
Though the 2026 NPT Review Conference ended without consensus, member states still have other avenues to pursue the nuclear disarmament agenda, both within and outside the NPT process. There still remain specific nuclear weapon-free zone agreements among countries and treaties like the CTBT and the TPNW which also contain legally binding obligations for its signatories. Synder confirmed that the TPNW will host its first review conference at the end of this year. Meanwhile, the NPT remains in its current form and state parties recognise its obligations and safeguards on the nuclear regime.
In 2024, the UN General Assembly pushed to establish an independent scientific panel on the effects of a potential nuclear war, whose panellists will present their findings in 2027.
Galvanising the world public opinion on the nuclear regime is critical to restoring faith in the nuclear regime. Otherwise, Nakamitsu warned, the world is in “the trajectory of a very dangerous path.
“Let’s get back to a path that is more sustainable peace rather than creating arms race dynamics.”
Note: This article is brought to you by IPS Noram in collaboration with INPS Japan and Soka Gakkai International in consultative status with ECOSOC.
IPS UN Bureau Report
ALGIERS, Algeria, Jun 15 2026 (IPS) - The German government, along with a number of other countries, are currently organising flights to evacuate travellers and influencers stranded in the Gulf states. For many citizens of other nationalities, however, there is no such assistance. They remain stuck in precarious situations, marked by exploitation and insecurity.
Robin Frisch
A system based on exploitation
The fact that these migrant workers cannot be evacuated is due to structural reasons. In the Gulf monarchies, the kafala system binds migrant workers to a kafil, or sponsor. This modern form of servitude gives employers virtually unlimited control over their workforce. The Gulf model only functions because workers are permanently kept in temporary employment. They are imported, but not integrated. Their rights remain limited, social security is minimal and political participation not permitted. This arrangement is not a shortcoming but a prerequisite for maximum flexibility and low costs.
The fact that the Gulf states’ economic model is reaching its limits is also increasingly the subject of current debate. In a much-discussed New York Times essay, Richard Florida explains that the economic model in Dubai and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is actually exacerbating the crisis. His question – ‘Could this be the end of Dubai?’ – can certainly be answered in the affirmative, at least from a social perspective. The Gulf states have all failed to provide a social safety net for their millions of workers. The mere import of workers, and complete absence of integration or social security, signal the end of the Dubai model. For decades, the Gulf states have profited from permanently keeping their workers in temporary employment. This model may be economically efficient, but it is structurally vulnerable.
The current war is acting as a stress test for this system. And it has shown that there are no institutional mechanisms in place to protect migrant workers. While citizens are being evacuated, millions of migrant workers are left behind. While supply chains are being secured, there remains a lack of the most basic protection for those who keep those chains running. Nobody is taking responsibility — it is just being passed from pillar to post, between countries of origin, employers and governments.
An International Labour Organization (ILO) study showed that social security, if it exists at all, only ever applies to formal employment contracts. In almost all the Gulf states, these regulations place the burden on the employee. Health insurance is mandatory and must be purchased privately. Not one Gulf state has a functioning system of unemployment insurance. Saudi Arabia is the only state that provides social security coverage for workers from certain countries of origin. This model of temporary migration appears to be so successful that even the current crisis will not change it. It is not in the interests of the Gulf states to provide social security as they derive no benefit from it themselves.
Not a single Gulf country has ratified the landmark ILO Convention 189 on decent work for domestic workers, though Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have at least made slight improvements to their national legislation and acknowledge the problems. In Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman, union activity is not strictly prohibited, and trade unions are working to better integrate migrant workers. However, the crisis caused by the war is now so dire that the extent to which the situation has improved for domestic workers seems of secondary importance. Whether through trade unions, government measures or employer obligations, what matters is that the situation for migrant workers in the Gulf states is fundamentally improved. Reforms will achieve little. It is time for systemic change.
Developing a social safety net
The executive secretary of the Arab Trade Union Confederation, Hind Benammar, has criticised the kafala system, but at the same time advocates for channels of communication to be opened with Saudi Arabia. Such diplomatic efforts are important now as they can help initiate reforms and resolve conflicts between governments. But the fundamental problem remains: How can working conditions be improved in the long term, and what form might an effective social security net take?
The victims of Iranian attacks in Dubai and the UAE were almost all migrant workers. In Dubai, there were even alarming social media posts about labour migrants being imprisoned. The strict internet censorship in these countries complicates the situation, as members of migrant communities are often unable to openly discuss the conditions on the ground. The fact that in this situation, it is the migrant networks – not governments – that are picking up the slack is not a sign of resilience but systematic failure.
One of the few organisations that are actually helping migrant workers at the moment is the International Domestic Workers Federation (IDWF). The IDWF organises emergency accommodation and coordinates aid, thereby effectively replacing government safety nets. Social security only exists where it is improvised. The millions of jobs as cleaners, nannies and nurses are primarily carried out by women. Domestic workers are often not even allowed to leave their workplaces, let alone move freely in public spaces. The social isolation of these workers is reminiscent of the pandemic. Here, too, they had nobody to rely on except for their own communities.
When governments, employers and insurances fail to provide assistance, communities must step into the breach. The IDWF approaches the embassies of workers’ countries of origin, calls for repatriation flights to be organised and provides its members with individual-level safeguards. They make contact with domestic workers through community leaders. These individuals, who together play a role similar to that of a works council, provide information about the situation, offer support in emergencies and organise training sessions on issues such as mental health, which is becoming increasingly important in light of the severe social isolation. In some of the Gulf states, this work has been criminalised, and several community leaders have even been detained. For domestic workers, but also for those in the construction and transportation sectors, this is a matter of sheer survival. For the most part, however, the Gulf states have no established trade union tradition. In the Gulf monarchies, policy-making is controlled by a handful of powerful men.
Over the last few years, Qatar and Saudi Arabia have sought to make financial contributions to the ILO. But the Gulf states will not be able to simply buy themselves a clean slate. Ambet Yuson, general secretary of the six-million-member Building and Wood Workers’ International (BWI), has condemned the fact that Saudi Arabia’s reforms by no means signify an abolition of the kafala system, claiming they are in fact little more than rebranding. In Saudi Arabia, stadiums for the 2034 World Cup are currently being built, but the construction sector also lacks a basic social safety net. It would be disastrous if the mistakes made in Qatar were to be repeated here. There, too, the kafala system resulted in exploitation, as any worker who lost their job found it nigh on impossible to switch to a new sponsor. Recruitment practices and indebtedness in the home country further exacerbate this dependence.
Thus, the war has not only exposed a crisis — it has marked a boundary. A model that consistently shifts risks onto legally marginalised workers will only remain stable provided no shocks occur. As soon as they do, it becomes clear that there is no social security because uncertainty is an inherent part of the system. The Gulf crisis shows just how important it is to develop the social safety net that the trade unions are advocating for. The much-discussed question of reforms does not go far enough. The real problem is structural. Yet this does not automatically result in systemic change. On the contrary: reactions so far suggest that the cost of the crisis will, in fact, continue to be shifted onto migrant workers.
Change will therefore not come from the Gulf states alone. Here, external and transnational levers are crucial. Countries of origin must enforce stronger protection mechanisms and binding social security agreements; international organisations such as the ILO must strengthen minimum standards; and European countries must take responsibility, for instance by regulating recruitment practices, supply chains and labour standards.
Robin Frisch is the head of the regional trade union project in the MENA region and of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation’s office in Algeria.
Source: International Politics and Society, published by the Global and European Policy Unit of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Hiroshimastrasse 28, D-10785 Berlin.
IPS UN Bureau
BONN, Jun 12 2026 (IPS) - Africa contributes the least to global greenhouse gas emissions, yet it faces some of the world’s most severe climate-related health impacts. Several realities define the continent’s climate and health landscape – increased infectious diseases, air pollution, death, disruption and pressure on health systems through heatwaves, floods, droughts and storms.
Changing temperatures and, more significantly, rainfall patterns are expanding the geographical range and transmission dynamics of climate-sensitive diseases such as Malaria, Dengue fever, Cholera and other vector- and water-borne diseases.
Climate-induced droughts, floods, and changing rainfall patterns are reducing agricultural productivity and threatening food systems. This increases hunger, undernutrition, stunting among children, and vulnerability to disease. According to archive.uneca.org, malnutrition remains one of the largest climate-sensitive health risks across Africa.
Thus, as African climate negotiators intensify preparations for the 64th sessions of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies (SB64), a clear message is emerging from Bonn: climate action without health action is no longer an option.
Over two critical days of engagement, African negotiators, health experts, technical institutions, and young climate leaders came together to strengthen Africa’s negotiating positions and place health firmly at the centre of the continent’s climate agenda.
The Climate and Health Capacity Building Workshop supported by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), and the African Group of Negotiators (AGN) Lead Coordinators Meeting collectively noted the growing recognition that climate change is not only an environmental challenge but also one of Africa’s most pressing public health threats.
For AGN Chair, Nana Dr Antwi-Boasiako Amoah, the connection is clear, and the required measures are equally urgent.
“Health is the human face of the climate crisis,” he told negotiators and partners during the opening of the capacity building workshop in Bonn. “If climate negotiations are ultimately about protecting people, then health must remain at the centre of our efforts.”
Chair of AGN, Nana Dr Antwi-Boasiako Amoah, with Dr Lynn Wagner of IISD at the Climate and Health Capacity Building Workshop. Credit: Friday Phiri
Building a Stronger African Climate and Health Voice
Building on the launch of the first-ever African Negotiators Climate and Health Curriculum in 2025, by Amref Health Africa, the climate and health capacity-building workshop brought together representatives from WHO-AFRO, Africa CDC, Amref Health Africa, the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), technical experts, and young negotiators to deepen understanding of climate-health linkages and identify strategic entry points across negotiation tracks.
Participants examined ways to strengthen Africa’s position on adaptation indicators, climate-resilient health systems, early warning systems, health infrastructure, preparedness for climate-related emergencies, and financing mechanisms that can support health adaptation efforts.
“Following the adoption of the Belém Adaptation indicators and the ongoing discussions under the Baku Adaptation Roadmap, Africa has a unique opportunity to shape how adaptation is measured, financed and implemented globally,” said the AGN Chair. “We must ensure that health indicators under the global goal on adaptation are meaningful, context-specific, and responsive to Africa’s realities. We must also continue pushing for adaptation finance that enables African countries to build climate-resilient health systems, strengthen early warning systems, protect health infrastructure, and enhance preparedness for climate-related health emergencies.”
The emphasis on institutional coordination reflected a growing understanding that advancing Africa’s climate and health agenda will require sustained collaboration between negotiators, public health institutions, technical partners, and civil society.
And the WHO-Africa Regional Team Lead on Climate Change, Health and Environment pledged coordinated stakeholder support for the climate and health agenda.
“At the WHO-Regional office, we have developed Africa-specific policy and implementation frameworks in support of an Africa-wide coordinated climate and health agenda. Together with the Africa CDC and Amref Health Africa, we have offered and continue to provide technical support for the continent’s climate and health agenda. As we head to the African COP next year, we pledge continued support to the AGN, as Africa’s voice in climate negotiations, to ensure that climate and health are not left behind.”
Meanwhile, IISD Senior Director for Tracking Progress Programme, Lynn Wagner, noted the need for coordinated climate action, pointing out that “isolated action is no longer tenable as the global community faces multiple and interconnected environmental and sustainable development crises.”
IISD has been supporting the Friends of Climate and Health initiative aimed at fostering international collaboration on climate change and health.
Unity and Coordination Ahead of Critical Negotiations
While health featured prominently in discussions, the AGN Lead Coordinators’ Meeting reinforced a broader strategic priority; maintaining a unified African voice theme across all negotiating streams.
Convening lead coordinators for the various thematic streams, the meeting focused on aligning positions ahead of what is expected to be a pivotal negotiating session, ahead of COP31 in November and, ultimately, COP32 next year.
Drawing on priorities established during the AGN Strategy Meeting in Accra earlier in March this year, lead coordinators reviewed progress in implementing elements of the African Common Platform and assessed emerging issues across the negotiation tracks.
The AGN Chair called for discipline, commitment, and coordinated action.
“Our strength lies in our unity and our ability to speak with one voice,” he said, reminding negotiators that Africa’s influence in the negotiations depends on collective preparation and strategic coordination.
The discussions intensified the interconnected nature of many agenda items. Climate finance remains Africa’s foremost priority, but increasingly, negotiators are recognising how finance decisions affect the various thematic outcomes, particularly, adaptation, which has been Africa’s main agenda over the years.
Health, Finance and the Road to COP32
A recurring theme across both meetings was the need to translate recognition of climate-related health risks into tangible climate finance support for African countries.
Negotiators emphasised the importance of securing adaptation finance that enables countries to build climate-resilient health systems, strengthen disease surveillance and early warning systems, protect health infrastructure, and improve preparedness for climate-related emergencies, as espoused in the Belem Climate and Health Action Plan launched at COP30.
“Health is already recognised within the investment frameworks and result areas of major climate finance mechanisms, such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD),” said David Kaluba, a Climate Finance Lead Negotiator. “However, the challenge is not only the availability of financing windows, but the limited pipeline of country-driven health-focused proposals and investment demand. Most countries have yet to fully integrate health priorities into their national climate plans (NDCs), financing strategies, and project pipelines, resulting in significant underutilisation of available climate finance opportunities for health system resilience, adaptation, and loss and damage responses.”
Kaluba therefore notes the need to generate sufficient country-level demand through evidence generation, development of bankable climate and health investment pipelines, and strengthening of institutional capacity to access and absorb available financing.
A Defining Opportunity for Africa
For many participants, this work extends beyond SB64. It forms part of a broader trajectory towards COP31 and ultimately COP32, significantly viewed as more than a diplomatic milestone.
It represents an opportunity for the continent to shape the global climate agenda around African realities and priorities, including climate and health.
As negotiations intensify, African countries are seeking to ensure that climate action delivers meaningful benefits for people on the ground, and health offers a powerful lens through which to frame that ambition.
Therefore, as formal negotiations begin on 8th June, one message is clear: protecting the climate ultimately means protecting human health. And for Africa, this principle is becoming an increasingly powerful driver of its engagement in the global climate process.
The author is the Climate Change and Health Advocacy Lead at Amref Health Africa.
IPS UN Bureau Report
Jun 12 2026 (IPS) -
CIVICUS discusses Botswana’s decriminalisation of same-sex relations with Faith Gunda, a Botswana-based law student and human rights defender, a member of the CIVICUS Protest Lab and co-founder of Sisterhood Chain International, a solidarity initiative that supports grassroots groups and amplifies young women’s voices.
Faith Gunda
What does repeal mean for LGBTQI+ people?
The formal repeal is symbolic, but symbols matter because they tell people whether they belong. For years, criminal provisions sent a message to LGBTQI+ people in Botswana: you are criminals. Even after the courts ruled these provisions unconstitutional in 2019, they remained on the books, a constant reminder that the state saw their identities as a threat. Their removal aligns written law with constitutional values of dignity, equality, liberty and privacy. But more importantly, it says that LGBTQI+ people are not criminals.
This changes everything for young people. When the law no longer criminalises your identity, it has positive impacts on mental health, belonging and civic participation. It lets LGBTQI+ people report violence, seek healthcare and live openly without fear. People can breathe a little easier. They can imagine futures they couldn’t before.
This progress didn’t come from above. It came from years of relentless advocacy by LGBTQI+ activists, LGBTQI+ organisations such as Lesbians, Gays and Bisexuals of Botswana and everyday people willing to risk everything to challenge entrenched stigma. The formal repeal is not the end of a struggle. It’s a foundation for the next phase. The work continues.
Why did it take so long to remove provisions courts declared unconstitutional?
Legal victories and political change don’t move at the same pace. The courts were clear in 2019 that the law was unconstitutional. But court rulings cannot implement themselves. Colonial-era laws remain embedded in statute books because removing them takes political will and politicians fear backlash. For six years, LGBTQI+ people lived with a law the courts had already called unjust.
What finally made change happen was sustained pressure. Civil society organisations, human rights defenders and lawyers refused to let this go. The Court of Appeal upheld the judgment in 2021, and activists kept speaking up, organising and demanding implementation. In March, the law finally changed. So, this is the lesson: court rulings matter, but it’s sustained civic action that turns them into real protection.
What barriers remain, and what comes next?
Decriminalisation isn’t the same as equality, but it’s the foundation for it. Real equality means marriage rights, family recognition and anti-discrimination protections. The marriage equality case due to be heard in court in July will test whether constitutional protections reach beyond private intimacy into full citizenship and whether same-sex couples can access the dignity and legal recognition marriage provides.
But legal barriers are only a part of the story. Social barriers persist too, including stigma in families, healthcare systems, schools and workplaces. Legal reform creates protection, but it cannot instantly change rooted attitudes. Young people in Botswana increasingly believe everyone should be able to live authentically without fear. They are organising, speaking openly, refusing the silence previous generations endured. This generational shift is becoming the most powerful driver of change.
The journey is not linear, but the direction is undeniable. Meaningful reform takes continuous civic engagement. This means activists documenting and defending civic space, grassroots organisations amplifying youth leadership and people refusing to accept anything less than full humanity.
Is Botswana an example for Africa?
Botswana’s progress shouldn’t be romanticised. The country still faces social conservatism and discrimination, and its gains will be vulnerable unless they are continuously defended. But it offers a model to follow.
Botswana stands out on the continent because it succeeded through civic advocacy, constitutionalism and judicial independence. This matters all the more now, when several African governments are passing harsher anti-LGBTQI+ laws and dismissing these rights as ‘un-African’, even though the laws banning same-sex relations were colonial imports.
Botswana’s path challenges that narrative. It shows that African constitutional democracies can interpret dignity, equality and liberty inclusively, without abandoning local legal traditions. For human rights defenders across the region, Botswana is proof that civic engagement, sustained advocacy and strategic litigation can produce meaningful change even in difficult political climates.
CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.
GET IN TOUCH
Instagram
LinkedIn
TikTok
SEE ALSO
Botswana: criminalisation of same-sex relations off the books CIVICUS Lens 21.May.2026
Gender rights: rollback and resistance CIVICUS | State of Civil Society Report 2026
Namibia: LGBTQI+ rights victory amid regression CIVICUS Lens 05.Jul.2024
UNITED NATIONS, Jun 12 2026 (IPS) - The global ocean economy continues its expansion, with ocean-related trade reaching USD 2.5 trillion as of 2025. Ocean services now make up the majority of the ocean trade, accounting for 58.9 percent of the composition, up from 47.8 percent in 2020.
Ocean services alone are now valued at USD 1.44 trillion dollars, an increase of USD 1.2 trillion since 2020; a rate greater than the entire global ocean trade in 2020. While 2020 was a year filled with disruptions, economies contracting, and consumer smoothing, this number is an increase of USD 476 billion dollars since 2015, a 49.5 percent growth from 2015, where the ocean services trade generated USD 961 billion.
“The ocean economy is expanding rapidly across sectors such as aquaculture, tourism, and shipping. While this growth is vital for food security, employment, and economic development, it’s increasingly constrained by the declining health of the ocean,” said Rafael González Quiroz, co-director of the United Nations ‘Third World Ocean Assessment’ and director of Spain’s Oceanographic center of Gijón (IEO-CSIC), during a press briefing held on World Ocean Day (June 8).
The UN World Ocean Assessment is a global integrated assessment of the world’s ocean following environmental, economic and social aspects, with interdisciplinary inputs from more than 650 experts to provide scientific basis for the consideration of ocean issues by governments and policy makers, among other stakeholders involved in the regulation and protection of the ocean.
Quiroz’s assessment reflect the broader expansion and changes within the ocean economy, where services have an increasingly dominant role in the global ocean economy. The strongest example of such is the recovery of marine and coastal tourism, which has turned sharply since the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic.
Credit: IPS/Maximilian Malawista
Today, marine and coastal tourism now accounts for 32 percent of global ocean trade, up from 16 percent in 2020. 32 percent representing USD 785 billion, over half of all ocean services trade. Maritime freight transport remains the second highest, at roughly USD 487 billion or 20 percent of total ocean trade. Quiroz emphasized that a “sustainable ocean economy can only exist if it’s built upon a healthy and resilient ocean”.
One of the key challenges highlighted during the briefing was marine pollution, especially plastics. Within global plastics trade, only 10 percent of all plastics are recycled. 52 million tonnes of such plastic waste every year enters the ocean, which the United Nations states is affecting at least 4,000 marine species.
In response, the international community has spent the past six years working on negotiating a “global plastics treaty”, an agreement which would put a ceiling on plastic production, and limit the USD 1.1 trillion dollar industry, ensuring waste management standards, recycling requirements, and creating market space for sustainable alternatives.
Achieving this may require changes to global trade incentives. UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD) finds that “the key barrier is an uneven national and trade policy field.”
According to UNCTAD, tariffs on plastics have fallen from 34 percent to 7.2 percent over the past 3 decades, giving plastic producers a larger incentive to keep making more plastic. While plastic tariffs have decreased, alternatives to plastics like bamboo, natural fibers, paper, and seaweed have had tariffs double to the rate of 14.4 percent. As a result of such tariffs, conventional plastics remain the cheaper option for manufacturers.
However, recent volatility in the energy markets stemming from the current Strait of Hormuz crisis has increased the cost of plastic production. Reports from UNCTAD show that because plastics are approximately 98 percent derived from fossil fuels, the cost of plastic prices has risen 70-80 percent in the European markets. This market shock could open the door for sustainable alternatives, giving real reason for companies to develop products free of polyethylene resin and other plastics, further developing the sustainable alternatives industry.
IPS UN Bureau Report
UNITED NATIONS, Jun 12 2026 (IPS) - African leaders are sharpening their focus on digital sovereignty, warning that the continent’s economic future will depend not just on connectivity, but on who controls its data—and where it is stored.
At a high-level roundtable during the 58th session of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa Conference of Ministers, held in Tangiers, Morocco, in April 2026, policymakers and technology leaders signaled a decisive shift in Africa’s digital ambitions: from being consumers of technology to becoming architects of their own digital infrastructure and data ecosystems.
Central to this shift is the idea of “sovereign data”—ensuring that African data is stored, processed and governed within the continent.
Participants emphasized that digital independence is no longer optional; it is a prerequisite for economic security and national resilience.
“Digital public infrastructure is as vital today as electricity,” said Américo Muchanga, Mozambique’s Minister of Communications and Digital Transformation. But, he added, infrastructure alone is not enough. Governments must now decide how to classify and manage their data—what remains within national borders, and what can be shared—so that its value benefits African economies.
Beyond infrastructure: entering the “age of intelligence”
For years, Africa’s digital agenda has focused on expanding connectivity—laying fiber, increasing mobile access, and building platforms for public services. While that remains essential, leaders say the conversation must evolve.
Digital public infrastructure (DPI), often described as the “rails” of the digital economy, must now carry something more valuable: intelligence.
As artificial intelligence reshapes economies globally, Africa faces a critical question—will it simply adopt external systems, or build its own?
“Africa must prioritize local data processing and systems that reflect its realities,” said Ambassador Philip Thigo, Kenya’s Special Envoy on Technology. He warned that relying on imported models risks entrenching systems that do not capture African languages, contexts or economic needs.
The solution, participants argued, lies in investing in local talent and capabilities—from data science to AI model training—so that innovation is grounded in African realities.
Building the backbone: data centres and “AI factories”
A recurring theme was the urgent need for infrastructure that can support this transition. Data centres—described as the backbone of the digital economy—remain in short supply.
“Africa needs to increase its data centre capacity tenfold,” said Adil El Youssefi, CEO of Africa Data Centres at Cassava Technologies.
Currently, the continent generates less than 1% of global data despite accounting for nearly 20% of the world’s population.
To bridge this gap, participants called for the development of “AI factories”—facilities capable of storing and processing large volumes of data locally. These would not only support AI development but also ensure that the economic value derived from data remains within Africa.
However, such investments require reliable and affordable energy, as well as long-term financing—two persistent challenges across the continent.
A new model: data embassies and regional cooperation
Among the more innovative ideas discussed was the concept of “data embassies”—shared infrastructure that allows countries to store data securely across borders while maintaining sovereignty.
This model, participants said, could help smaller economies overcome the high costs of building standalone data infrastructure, while strengthening regional integration.
It also reflects a broader push toward collaboration.
Pius Chaya, Tanzania’s Deputy Minister for Planning and Investment, stressed the need for strong public-private partnerships, underpinned by robust cybersecurity and data protection frameworks.
Without trust, he noted, digital systems cannot scale.
From policy to execution
While Africa has made strides in developing digital strategies, leaders acknowledged a familiar challenge: implementation.
Ndaba Gaolathe, Vice President and Finance Minister of Botswana, pointed to a gap between policy ambition and real-world impact. Botswana, he said, is addressing this by using a universal service fund—financed through a levy on mobile operators—to expand connectivity to underserved communities.
“The time for planning alone is over,” he said. “We must now focus on execution.”
This call for “mega execution” reflects a growing urgency to translate strategies into tangible benefits—jobs, services, and economic growth.
Inclusion and measurement
Despite progress, nearly one billion Africans remain offline, even in areas with mobile coverage. Industry representatives, including the GSMA, urged governments to remove taxes on mobile devices to make digital access more affordable.
At the same time, measuring the economic impact of digital transformation remains a challenge.
“If we cannot measure the contribution of technology to GDP, we cannot monetize it,” said Claver Gatete, UNECA’s Executive Secretary. Strengthening national statistical systems, he added, is essential for evidence-based policymaking and accountability.
A defining moment
As Africa accelerates its digital transformation, the stakes are becoming clearer. Data is no longer just a byproduct of the digital economy—it is its most valuable asset.
The discussions in Tangier point to a continent at a crossroads: one that must decide whether to remain a consumer in the global digital order, or to assert control over its data, technologies and economic destiny.
The message from leaders was unmistakable—Africa’s digital future must be built in Africa, and for Africa.
Source: Africa Renewal, United Nations
IPS UN Bureau
Excerpt:
From data embassies to AI “factories,” policymakers say control over data will define the continent’s economic future.