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May 15 2026 (IPS) -
CIVICUS discusses the rising trend of social media bans for children with Marie-Ève Nadeau, Head of International Affairs of the 5Rights Foundation, an organisation that promotes children’s rights in the digital environment.
Marie-Ève Nadeau
Are social media bans an effective way of protecting children?
Today, one in three internet users is a child, and digital technologies increasingly mediate all aspects of their lives, from the classroom to the playground, from their first friendships to how they see themselves. As evidence of harms and risks mounts, lawmakers around the world are racing to impose age limits on children’s access to social media. The instinct to act is right, but the current direction risks missing the point.
The real issue is the conditions children face when online. Children are growing up in a digital environment designed without their distinct rights, needs and vulnerabilities in mind. This is a deliberate choice. Tech companies’ business models prioritise commercial gain over children’s safety and wellbeing, deliberately embedding persuasive design, relentless engagement loops and extractive data practices by default. Fixing this requires more than blocking children’s access.
Age restrictions are not new, yet their effectiveness remains inconclusive. Banning children from specific services while leaving the underlying system untouched lets tech companies off the hook for recommender systems that push harmful content, persuasive design that keeps children compulsively engaged and data practices that exploit their attention for profit. Used in isolation, bans create an illusion of protection while the same harmful design practices continue unchallenged. Children are pushed towards other unregulated environments, such as AI chatbots, gaming platforms and educational technology services, where they face equivalent risks with even less scrutiny.
What do these bans mean for children’s rights to expression and information?
Children’s rights are interdependent and indivisible, and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child General Comment No. 25 makes clear that all children’s rights apply fully in the digital environment. This includes the right to protection from harm, but also to the rights of access to information, expression and participation. In practice, tech companies have made these rights conditional on the commercial surveillance, exploitation and manipulation of children, eroding their privacy, safety, critical thinking and agency.
Age-based bans that restrict access without addressing underlying design practices create a false choice between freedom and safety. Children need both protection from harm and meaningful access to expression, information and participation. Restricting access without reforming the systems that embed risk fails to uphold the full range of children’s rights.
Who is most harmed by these bans, and what gaps do they create?
Children’s rights apply until the age of 18, yet proposed restrictions often only cover children under 16 and a narrow set of high-risk services. This creates gaps. Children above the age threshold, and those who circumvent poorly implemented restrictions, end up in unregulated spaces outside the scope of bans.
Bans can also entrench inequality. Children are not a homogeneous group, and those facing intersecting vulnerabilities linked to disability, gender, political opinion, race, religion or ethnic, national or social origin may heavily rely on digital spaces for expression, identity safety and support.
At the same time, engagement-based platform design often rewards and amplifies divisive and harmful content, for example on gender-based violence, heightening risks for excluded communities. Blanket bans do not create safer spaces, nor eliminate these harms. Instead, they displace them to less visible, less regulated and even less accountable spaces. Effective protection must ensure children can exercise their rights and have safe spaces of support and community.
How does age verification work, and what does it mean for children’s privacy?
Tech companies routinely invest heavily in targeting advertising and personalising content yet fail to apply the same rigour to protecting children. Age assurance, an umbrella term for both age estimation and age verification solutions, allows companies to recognise the presence of children and act accordingly. It must be lawful, rights-respecting and proportionate to risk. Data collection should be limited to what’s strictly necessary to establish age, and used only for that purpose.
Global privacy regulators found that 24 per cent of services lack any age assurance mechanism and 90 per cent of those relying on self-declaration are easily bypassed. Yet robust solutions exist. Australia’s age assurance technology trial demonstrates that privacy-preserving age verification can confirm age without exposing identity. Technical standards, such as the 2089.1-2024 Standard for Online Age Verification published by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, show that independently audited frameworks, like those used in product safety or pharmaceuticals, are both feasible and necessary to ensure age assurance systems are secure, proportionate and compliant.
For low-risk services appropriate for all users, there should be no requirement to establish age. Where services or functionalities present risk to children, companies should address or mitigate specific high-risk features rather than gatekeeping entire services.
What should governments demand from platforms to protect children?
Age restrictions have become part of a global playbook, notably in data protection regimes like the US Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), which sets 13 as the threshold for consent to data collection. Poor implementation and enforcement of COPPA and similar laws have allowed tech companies to hide behind obscure disclaimers while failing to meaningfully restrict access and profiting from embedding risk into children’s digital experiences.
There’s another way forward. The priority should be holding tech companies accountable, not banning children from the digital world. That means banning exploitative practices, regulating risky features such as addictive design, manipulative recommender systems and extractive data practices, and requiring privacy, safety and age-appropriate design as the baseline.
It also means shifting to systemic risk management: companies should be legally required to anticipate, assess and mitigate how their products expose children to risk. This baseline already exists in other high-risk sectors such as aviation, food safety and medicine, where products must demonstrate safety before reaching the market.
A growing global consensus points to a clear path forward: embedding age-appropriate design, requiring child rights impact assessments, mandating privacy and safety by design and default, establishing effective enforcement mechanisms and ensuring independent auditing. Over 55 leading organisations and experts from all continents have endorsed the 10 best-practice principles developed by the 5Rights Foundation.
CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.
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UTTAR PRADESH, India, May 15 2026 (IPS) - The latest shock to global food systems, triggered by conflict in the Middle East and disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz, has once again exposed a fragile truth: the world’s food systems remain highly vulnerable to external shocks.
For Asia, especially South Asia, where agriculture underpins millions of livelihoods, the consequences are immediate and severe. Rising fuel prices, supply chain disruptions, and limited access to fertilizers are pushing already fragile systems to the brink.
The Strait of Hormuz is not just a geopolitical chokepoint; it is a lifeline for fuel and agricultural inputs across Asia. A significant share of fertilizers and their raw materials, including natural gas, transit through or originate from this route.
For countries such as India, Bangladesh, and Nepal, where agriculture employs between 38 and over 60 percent of the workforce, this dependency creates systemic risk. When supply chains falter, the effects cascade quickly: input costs rise, planting cycles are disrupted, and farmer incomes shrink.
Solar panels installed in a farm in Bangladesh. Credit: Heifer International
Even if shipping routes reopen, recovery will be slow
Damage to energy infrastructure and continued geopolitical uncertainty mean price volatility and supply constraints can persist for months. For smallholder farmers, this creates a dual crisis. Exporting produce becomes difficult due to logistical bottlenecks, while fuel shortages hamper domestic distribution. At the same time, the next cropping cycle looms, with essential fertilizers either unavailable or unaffordable.
This is not an isolated disruption. From the COVID-19 pandemic to the war in Ukraine, global shocks are becoming more frequent and interconnected. Each crisis compounds the last, pushing smallholder farmers, the backbone of global food production, into deeper uncertainty. The question is no longer whether disruptions will occur, but how prepared our systems are to withstand them.
At the heart of the problem is overdependence on external, input-intensive systems, chemical fertilizers, fossil fuels, and long, fragile supply chains. Reducing this dependence is central to building resilience.
Regenerative Agriculture and Renewable Energy Offer a Compelling Pathway Forward.
At its core, regenerative agriculture restores soil health, enhances biodiversity, improves water retention, and reduces reliance on synthetic inputs. Practices such as crop diversification, organic soil enrichment, reduced tillage, and integrated pest management shift farming from an extractive to a restorative model.
By rebuilding natural soil fertility, these approaches reduce dependence on external inputs. Instead of relying heavily on urea in rice cultivation, regenerative systems promote nutrient cycling and biological nitrogen fixation through legumes, alongside the use of compost and manure to strengthen soil organic matter and ensure a steady, natural nutrient supply.
Integrating renewable energy further strengthens resilience. Solar-powered irrigation replaces fuel-based inputs with clean, reliable energy, lowering operational costs and improving water-use efficiency—especially critical during periods of disruption.
The evidence base for these approaches is both growing and compelling. In Bangladesh, multiple studies show that solar irrigation consistently outperforms diesel systems, delivering higher returns, improving food security, and reducing irrigation costs by 20–50 percent, while significantly boosting profitability (Rana, 2021; Buisson, 2024; Sunny, 2023; Sarker, 2025).
Research also shows that bio-based inputs like compost, biochar, and green manure can partially replace synthetic fertilizers, often without yield loss, while improving soil health (Naher, 2021; Ferdous, 2023; Behera, 2025).
Regenerative Agriculture is Not Just an Environmental Solution—It is an Economic One
By reducing dependence on volatile external inputs such as chemical fertilizers and fossil fuels, regenerative agriculture shields farmers from global price shocks while improving long-term productivity and profits.
Emerging evidence from Nepal and India reinforces this trend: while yields generally remain stable, reduced input costs significantly increase farm profitability (Magar, 2022; Dhakal, 2022; Berger, 2025).
A broader analysis by the Observer Research Foundation (2025) finds that although yields may dip slightly during transition, most cases report higher yields over time, alongside improved income stability driven by lower input dependence.
Similar trends are being observed globally, reinforcing that regenerative approaches can deliver both resilience and profitability across diverse farming systems (link).
Importantly, these outcomes are already visible on the ground in South Asia. Through programs led by Heifer International, smallholder farmers are adopting regenerative and climate-smart practices that reduce costs, improve yields, and strengthen resilience.
In Bangladesh’s Jashore district, for instance, women farmers organized into cooperatives have reduced irrigation costs, improved productivity, and strengthened market access through solar irrigation, organic soil management, and collective action.
As one farmer, Shirin Akter, shares: “Adopting climate-smart practices and pooling resources through my cooperative allowed me to grow diverse crops. When drought hit, I still had harvests to sell, and my cooperative helped me recover quickly.”
For farmers like Shirin, these shifts are transformative, turning vulnerability into resilience through diversified systems, lower input dependence, and stronger collective support. Similar models in Nepal show how regenerative, community-based approaches can reduce resource pressure while improving incomes.
Scaling this Transition Requires Action Beyond the Farm
To transition to a resilient and sustainable food system, a multi-stakeholder approach is essential. Policymakers should realign incentives to support sustainable practices and reduce dependence on imported inputs. Financial institutions and insurers should recognize the lower risk profiles of regenerative systems.
Businesses must embed sustainability into core decisions, prioritizing sourcing from farmers adopting regenerative practices and building longer-term, stable supply relationships. At the same time, marketing teams can shape consumer demand by communicating the value of sustainably produced food. Together, these shifts can align supply chains and markets in support of more resilient food systems.
The stakes are high. The World Food Programme warns that roughly 45 million more people could be pushed into hunger if current disruptions persist, adding to the 318 million people already food insecure.
We cannot continue rebuilding fragile food systems after every shock. We must redesign them. Regenerative agriculture offers a pathway to reduce dependence on volatile external inputs, restore ecological balance, and build resilience where it matters most—at the farm level.
To replenish what has been used up is not just an environmental necessity—it is the foundation of more secure, equitable, and resilient food systems across Asia.
Neena Joshi is the Senior Vice President for Asia Programs at Heifer International. With over 20 years of experience, she leads initiatives to build inclusive, sustainable agrifood systems and empower smallholder farmers, especially women and youth, across Asia.
IPS UN Bureau
MAFIA ISLAND, Tanzania , May 14 2026 (IPS) - Under the warm waters off Tanzania’s Mafia Island, marine scientist Asha Mgeni hovers above a coral reef she has studied for years. Small fish dart through the currents. To most divers, the reef appears pristine. But Mgeni notices something unusual.
Tucked between coral branches are invasive organisms disrupting the reef’s natural growth and species, which were not there before, she says.
“We know these reefs,” she tells IPS. “When something new appears, it stands out immediately.”
For communities along Tanzania’s coastline, coral reefs are ecological treasures. They cradle fish stocks, soften the blow of crashing waves and support coastal economies increasingly threatened by climate change and environmental degradation.
Scientists say one of the biggest hidden threats comes from biofouling — the accumulation of algae, barnacles and microorganisms on ships’ hulls that can transport invasive species across oceans. For decades, ballast water was considered shipping’s main pathway for spreading invasive aquatic species. But maritime experts now say biofouling can no longer be ignored.
“Ballast water has certainly, historically at least, been considered the primary vector for IAS introductions,” says Will Griffiths, Project Technical Analyst at the International Maritime Organization. “However, the role played by biofouling in this regard has become more recognised in recent years, with some studies suggesting that in some locations, such as parts of Hawaii and New Zealand, it may have been the primary vector.”
Fish vendors wait for the arrival of the day’s catch along the shoreline in coastal Tanzania, where fishing sustains thousands of livelihoods. Marine scientists say invasive aquatic species linked to international shipping could disrupt fisheries and threaten food security for vulnerable coastal communities. Credit: Kizito Makoye/IPS
As global shipping expands, marine experts warn that invasive species are spreading through trade routes, disrupting ecosystems and threatening biodiversity. Scientists and regulators say biofouling can transport marine organisms and pathogens across ecosystems, threatening fisheries and coastal economies.
“It is also worth noting that biofouling can represent a great species richness in terms of species transported by ships and also, therefore, potential pathogens,” Griffiths tells IPS.
Mwanahija Shalli, a professor of Marine and Coastal Resources Management at the University of Dar es Salaam, says marine biodiversity underpins livelihoods for millions of coastal residents through fisheries and tourism.
“Invasive aquatic species threaten ecosystems and fisheries by displacing native species,” she says. “If we fail to manage biofouling, we undermine important conservation efforts.”
A broad alliance led by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) is stepping up efforts to confront a major environmental threat from shipping: the spread of invasive aquatic species through biofouling.
Port and maritime officials inspect a vessel at the Port of Dar es Salaam as part of efforts to monitor the environmental risks posed by invasive marine species spread through global shipping routes. Experts say biofouling on ship hulls has become a growing threat to marine biodiversity and coastal economies. Credit: Kizito Makoye/IPS
Known as the GloFouling Partnerships Project, the initiative aims to help countries strengthen regulations, improve monitoring systems and build technical capacity to reduce the transfer of invasive species through international shipping. The project supports efforts to meet the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals — particularly the target to conserve and sustainably use oceans, seas and marine resources — while delivering climate benefits through improved vessel efficiency and lower emissions.
Scientists say organisms nestled on ship hulls increase drag, forcing vessels to burn more fuel and produce more emissions.
“Biofouling changes the affected ships’ hydrodynamics and increases drag, meaning there is increased fuel consumption and thus increased greenhouse gas emissions,” Griffiths says. “This can also be a major issue when fouling is on the ship’s propellers, which, due to shape, require specialist cleaning.”
He says biofouling can also interfere with vessel operations.
“There is also some anecdotal evidence to suggest fouling can cause blockages in seawater intakes, affect engine performance and even firefighting systems in extreme cases, which further increases fuel consumption,” he says.
Andrew Hume, Senior Environmental Specialist at the Global Environment Facility, says the initiative builds on earlier international efforts to control invasive species transported through ballast water.
“The GloFouling project builds on a long-standing partnership between the GEF UNDP and the IMO to address shipping impacts on the marine environment,” he says.
According to Hume, the project closes a major gap by targeting hull biofouling, another key pathway for invasive species transfer.
“Keeping ships’ hulls free from just a thin layer of slime could reduce a ship’s greenhouse gas emissions by up to 25 per cent,” Hume says.
A cargo ship enters the Port of Dar es Salaam, one of East Africa’s busiest maritime gateways. As shipping traffic increases, scientists and regulators are raising concerns about biofouling — the buildup of marine organisms on ship hulls that can transport invasive species across oceans. Credit: Kizito Makoye/IPS
Marine scientists warn that invasive aquatic species can dramatically alter ecosystems, outsmart native organisms and damage fisheries that support coastal livelihoods. The issue is raising international concern as governments struggle to balance burgeoning maritime trade with the protection of ocean ecosystems. Griffiths says the international community has made substantial progress regulating ballast water through the Ballast Water Management Convention, but biofouling controls still lag behind.
“An important aspect to consider is that there is a robust international legal framework for managing ballast water, whereas at the international level biofouling provisions are, for the moment, recommendatory and only a few countries have biofouling regulations,” he explains.
Across East Africa, rising cargo traffic has increased concern about shipping’s ecological footprint. Similar efforts are underway globally. Indonesia estimates improved biofouling management could generate up to USD 7 million annually through healthier reefs, lower fuel consumption and reduced port maintenance costs.
In Peru, authorities are building a national aquatic biodiversity database to help scientists detect invasive species before they spread along the coastline.
“Collaboration in the project enabled the authorities to develop a national aquatic biodiversity catalogue providing the baseline knowledge to detect invasive species early and undertake rapid response,” Griffiths says.
In Fiji, the results are impressive.
“Fiji reported that as a result of the GloFouling dry dock training, they had improved the technical capacity of local personnel and gained access to resources to upgrade local facilities,” Griffiths says, adding that the programme had strengthened confidence among local maritime operators and enhanced Fiji’s position in the regional maritime services market
Meanwhile, Mauritius is encouraging private-sector investment in technologies designed to protect fragile marine ecosystems. Over the past six years, countries participating in the GloFouling initiative have moved toward stricter regulation and greater regional cooperation.
Australia and New Zealand have already introduced fully enforceable national regimes requiring clean hulls, biofouling management plans, record books and inspections consistent with the IMO’s 2023 Biofouling Guidelines. Griffiths says Brazil has emerged as a leader among developing nations.
“Brazil is the newest and most explicit adopter, directly embedding the 2023 guidelines into mandatory port state law,” he says. “Unlike the IMO’s voluntary approach, however, Brazil sets an explicit enforceable standard: vessels must arrive with no more than microfouling.”
The project has also expanded into maritime training and private-sector cooperation. Through the Global Industry Alliance, companies are testing hull coatings and cleaning technologies to limit the spread of invasive species.
“One of the project’s most transformative impacts has been creating a collaborative platform where technology innovators, regulators and industry leaders jointly develop and implement solutions for biofouling,” Griffiths says.
The alliance, initially created to support the project, has since evolved into a permanent collaboration. Griffiths says the group is expanding research into hull inspection technologies and the environmental impacts of antifouling coatings.
“The continuation of the GIA and its ongoing studies offers exceptional value as a driving force for industry innovation, standard-setting and knowledge dissemination,” he says.
Hume says the initiative builds on earlier GEF-supported efforts that led to the International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments in 2004. He says the programme has since helped develop the IMO’s 2023 Biofouling Guidelines and supported pilot projects in 12 countries.
Hume says the GEF is preparing a second phase of investment aimed at helping more countries implement the IMO’s 2023 Biofouling Guidelines and strengthen international cooperation.
“The objective is to strengthen national and institutional capacity of developing countries to implement the guidelines in order to reduce invasive species and lower greenhouse gas emissions,” he says.
A second phase of investment expected before June aims to strengthen national capacity, expand implementation and advance discussions toward a legally binding global framework on biofouling management. Although the GloFouling project officially concluded in May 2025, Griffiths says efforts are continuing through training programmes, technical studies and industry partnerships designed to maintain momentum ahead of anticipated binding international regulations by 2030.
Experts say cleaner hulls not only reduce the spread of invasive species but also lower fuel consumption and carbon emissions. However, scientists caution that poorly managed hull-cleaning practices can release chemicals and microplastics into marine environments.
Back on Mafia Island, Mgeni says the changes beneath the water are often subtle before they become irreversible.
“Once invasive species establish themselves, it becomes much harder to restore the balance,” she says.
For communities that depend on reefs for food, tourism and protection from storms, the battle against biofouling is becoming a fight to protect the ecosystems and livelihoods that depend on the ocean.
Note: The Eighth Global Environment Facility Assembly will be held from May 30 to June 6, 2026, in Samarkand, Uzbekistan.
This feature is published with the support of the GEF. IPS is solely responsible for the editorial content, and it does not necessarily reflect the views of the GEF.
IPS UN Bureau Report
GENEVA, May 14 2026 (IPS) - Norway’s reported decision to review and place on hold aspects of its funding to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) should be understood as more than a budgetary matter. It is a political signal. It is also a warning that the global plastics treaty negotiations may now be approaching the point at which governments must decide whether the present UNEP process can still deliver the treaty they promised, or whether a different pathway is required.
There should be no misunderstanding. Norway has been one of the strongest supporters of an ambitious global plastics treaty. It co-leads, with Rwanda, the High Ambition Coalition. It has also been the largest listed contributor to the INC process, with UNEP’s donor table showing more than USD 7.2 million in contributions received from Norway as of 25 March 2026.
Its apparent decision to pause or review funding therefore cannot be dismissed as marginal. It comes from a country that has invested politically and financially in the process and that has consistently positioned itself on the side of ambition.
That is precisely why the signal matters.
If Norway is now forcing a moment of reflection, it may be doing the negotiations a service. A process that cannot conclude, cannot decide, and cannot distinguish between genuine compromise and procedural obstruction needs more than another round of careful facilitation. It needs political clarity.
The original mandate was not ambiguous. In March 2022, the United Nations Environment Assembly agreed to develop an international legally binding instrument on plastic pollution, including in the marine environment, addressing the full lifecycle of plastics, with the aim of completing the work by the end of 2024. That deadline has passed.
The fifth session in Busan did not produce a treaty. The resumed fifth session in Geneva did not produce a treaty. INC-5.3 in February 2026 was essentially an organizational session, including the election of a new Chair. We are now looking toward INC-5.4, possibly at the end of 2026 or in early 2027.
At some point, the numbering itself approaches the point of absurdity. INC-5.4 is not a normal negotiating milestone. It is the fourth attempt to complete the fifth session of a process that was supposed to conclude in 2024. This is not multilateral patience. It is clearly a form of procedural dysfunction.
None of this is intended as disrespect toward Ambassador Julio Cordano of Chile, the newly elected Chair of the INC. On the contrary, he has taken on one of the most difficult environmental negotiations in recent memory.
He inherited a fractured process, an absurdly complicated text, deeply polarized delegations, and an increasingly visible divide between countries seeking a full-lifecycle treaty and those seeking a narrower waste-management instrument. This is despite his stated and admirable determination to get the treaty “over the line.”
The difficulty, however, is that all indications suggest that the Chair is pursuing a highly neutral, process-oriented path. That is understandable. A Chair in this setting is expected to maintain confidence across the room, including among delegations whose positions are far apart. But neutrality is not the same as progress.
At a certain point, a too-neutral process can become a shield for those who prefer no outcome, or only the weakest possible outcome. And his treatment of observers, despite recent indications that he will take their views more fully into consideration, still leaves much to be desired in a UN system that contends to be as broadly inclusive as possible.
The gap between the Like-Minded countries and the High Ambition Coalition is not a drafting problem. It is a political problem. One group of countries wants an agreement that addresses the full lifecycle of plastics, including production, design, hazardous chemicals, products, trade, waste, finance and implementation.
Another group seeks to confine the treaty largely to downstream waste management, recycling and national discretion. These are not merely different textual preferences. They are different theories of the treaty. The mandate for the negotiations clearly states that the former, not the latter, is what should be pursued.
If the process continues to treat these positions as equally bridgeable, it will continue to reward delay. Consensus can be a tool for legitimacy. But in this process, it is increasingly at risk of becoming a veto mechanism for the least ambitious actors.
The result is predictable: more informal consultations, more revised texts, more late-night sessions, more statements of disappointment, and still no treaty.
This is why Norway’s move deserves, at minimum, a measure of credit. It has introduced a hard political question into a process that has become too comfortable with postponement. If countries are serious about concluding a meaningful treaty within UNEP, they should do so now. Not after another “informal” round. Not after another partial session. Not after INC-5.5 or INC-5.6. Now.
But if they are not prepared to do so, then high-ambition countries should begin preparing an alternative. The obvious precedent is the Ottawa Process on anti-personnel landmines. When the established disarmament machinery could not deliver a comprehensive ban, a coalition of like-minded governments, supported by civil society and international organizations, moved outside the blocked forum and negotiated a treaty among those prepared to act.
The Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature in Ottawa in December 1997 and was later (after agreement was reached) brought back into the broader UN treaty system.
That example is important because it shows that moving outside a blocked UN process is not necessarily anti-UN. It can be pro-multilateralism. The Ottawa Process did not reject international law; it created it. It did not wait for the least ambitious actors to become ready. It allowed the most ambitious actors to move first and then invited others to join.
A plastics “Ottawa Process” would not need to start from zero. The UNEP negotiations have already generated years of technical work, draft text, legal options, coalition positions, scientific input and stakeholder engagement. A like-minded process could take the strongest elements from that work and use them as the basis for an agreed treaty text.
Participation could be open to all states, but on the basis of a minimum level of ambition: full lifecycle coverage; legally binding obligations; controls on problematic products and chemicals of concern; a necessary focus on supply chains; credible implementation financing; and reporting and review mechanisms.
The next stage should therefore be framed as a final test. INC-5.4 should be treated as the last credible opportunity for the UNEP process to produce a treaty that reflects the mandate adopted in 2022.
If that session produces only another procedural continuation, or a weak agreement stripped of lifecycle measures, production-related provisions, and meaningful controls on chemicals and products, then high-ambition countries should move immediately toward an Ottawa-style diplomatic track.
The plastics crisis is not waiting for the INC process to resolve its internal contradictions. Plastic production continues to grow, in accordance with targets set by like-minded countries. Waste continues to leak into rivers, oceans, soils and food systems. Communities continue to bear the health and environmental costs. The purpose of the negotiations was to respond to that reality, not to create an indefinite process for describing it.
Norway’s funding decision may therefore prove useful if it forces governments to confront the obvious. Either the UNEP negotiations now become serious, political and outcome-oriented, or the countries that are serious about ending plastic pollution should create a pathway of their own.
That would not be a failure of multilateralism. It may be the only way left to save it.
Craig Boljkovac is a Geneva-based Senior Advisor with a Regional Centre for the Basel and Stockholm Conventions, and an independent international environmental consultant with over 35 years of experience in relevant fields. His opinions are his own. He has participated in several INCs and related meetings for the global plastics agreement.
IPS UN Bureau
CAIRO, May 14 2026 (IPS) - The word heard most often at a two-day parliamentary forum in Cairo last week was not “commitment”; it was “follow-up.” And the difference mattered.
Parliamentarians from Africa, Asia, and the Arab world gathered 28–29 April not to renew pledges made at last year’s TICAD9 summit in Yokohama, but to ask what had actually been done. The answer was uneven, and delegates said so plainly.
The meeting, organised by the Asian Population and Development Association (APDA) and the Forum of Arab Parliamentarians on Population and Development (FAPPD) with support from UNFPA, the Japan Trust Fund, and IPPF, focused on sexual and reproductive health, universal health coverage, youth investment, and gender equality. It convened against a difficult backdrop: shrinking donor budgets, deepening demographic pressure across Africa, and a persistent gap between legislation and delivery.
Japan’s Makishima Karen, a member of the House of Representatives, Vice Chair of the Japan Parliamentarians Federation for Population, and former Minister for Digital Affairs, set the tone early. “Once a conference is finished, it’s no longer the finish – we should follow up the outcomes and the concrete actions,” she told IPS on the sidelines.
Makishima was direct about where progress begins. “Wherever you live or wherever you are born, the right to live healthily is a human right,” she said. “That is why I focus on the necessity of universal health coverage (UHC) for all.” She argued that UHC cannot be achieved without bringing finance ministries into the conversation: “The understanding of the Minister of Finance is necessary. We are encouraging ministries of finance to join the process.”
On what actually drives change at the community level, she was equally clear: “When mothers cannot read, it must be difficult for their communities to live healthily and safely. Education of women and girls is essential to protect the next generation.”
She also raised a dimension of the agenda that often goes unstated: the role of digital tools. Drawing on her background in digital governance, she argued that technology is not a separate track but integral to delivery: “With one smartphone, every person can access information, check their own data, and have the ability to control it. That is part of democracy.”
Meeting chairs set the tone, demanding asking for action, not new pledges, at a recent two-day forum in Cairo. Credit: APDA
On the wave of aid cuts hitting development programmes globally, she did not deflect. “I believe in the necessity of multilateral organisational frameworks; otherwise, it is very difficult to continue the necessary programmes in each region.” The longer-term answer, she said, is not to wait for donors to return. “Within five or ten years, each government should take on the responsibility to continue these programmes. We must have a very long-term perspective.”
Tanzania’s Jackson Kiswaga, MP, offered the clearest example of what domestic ownership can look like. His country, with 71.5 million people, 60 percent under 24, growing at nearly three percent a year, has been moving fast. In 2023, Tanzania passed the Universal Health Insurance Act, integrating reproductive health services into mandatory coverage spanning formal and informal sectors. A dedicated Youth Ministry was established under the President’s Office. A national scholarship programme has since supported over 400 girls in science education, with measurable reductions in early marriage and pregnancy.
“Institutional innovations are models for other countries,” Kiswaga said. “Strong partnerships in the health sector are key to ensuring sustainability.”
Morocco’s Soukaina Lahmouch, MP, offered a sharper warning. Her country enacted landmark legislation against gender-based violence in 2018, but seven years on, implementation has stalled. Procedural complexity, weak enforcement, and cultural resistance, particularly in domestic violence cases, have blunted the law’s impact.
“Women in Morocco still suffer discrimination and exclusion,” she said, “despite the progress made.” She called on TICAD to support not just the drafting of laws but their enforcement through court reform, rural health infrastructure, and access to financing for women.
Parliamentarians were reminded that the outcomes from Cairo would be reported to the Global Conference of Parliamentarians on Population and Development in Tokyo 2027. Credit: APDA
Two other delegates raised pressures that seldom receive equal billing. Tunisia’s Ezzeddine Tayeb, MP warned that his country’s rapidly ageing population is straining its pension system and called for a comprehensive law guaranteeing the rights of elderly citizens, including enforceable standards for long-term care. Algeria’s MP Khaled Bourenane placed the forum’s agenda inside Africa’s continental trajectory: a population heading toward 2.5 billion by 2050, with over 20 million people displaced by climate events annually. Demographic challenges at this scale, he argued, cannot be addressed in silos.
JICA representative Yo Ebisawa pointed to Egypt as a live test case. In 2017, Egypt ranked the third globally in out-of-pocket health spending as a share of household budgets.
Since passing its Universal Health Insurance Law, the country has been rolling out coverage across all 27 governorates, targeting completion by 2030. So far, six million people across six governorates have been enrolled. In Port Said, the share of households facing catastrophic health expenditure has fallen by 40 percent. Japan has backed the rollout with a $400 million development policy loan and an $8 million joint JICA-WHO project providing equipment and training, including for facilities serving Sudanese refugees and medical evacuees from Gaza.
APDA Vice Chair Prof. Kiyoko Ikegami closed the first day with a pointed reminder: the outcomes from Cairo will be reported to the Global Conference of Parliamentarians on Population and Development in Tokyo 2027. The chain of accountability, she said, must hold.
Whether the commitments made in Cairo translate into budget lines, legislation, and services – that is the only measure that counts.
Note: The meeting was organised by the Asian Population and Development Association (APDA) and the Forum of Arab Parliamentarians on Population and Development (FAPPD). It was supported by the Japan Trust Fund (JTF), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) Arab States Regional Office (ASRO), and the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), in collaboration with the African Parliamentary Forum on Population and Development (FPA).
IPS UN Bureau Report
SYDNEY, Australia, May 13 2026 (IPS) - Péter Magyar, leader of the pro-democratic centre-right Tisza Party, which recently swept into power on an unstoppable wave of hope for change, has now been sworn into office as Hungary’s new Prime Minister.
After a decade and a half of increasing authoritarian governance by the former Fidesz regime, led by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, the pro-democracy movement in the central European nation delivered a democratic rebound at the general election held on 12 April.
“I will not rule over Hungary; I will serve my homeland,” the 45 year old Magyar pledged during the taking of the oath of office ceremony in the Hungarian parliament on 9 May. The formal beginning of a new era in the country was followed by a massive public festival dedicated to freedom and democracy in the streets of Budapest, Hungary’s capital. The celebration took place nearly a month after the Tisza Party leader stood in front of jubilant crowds as the election result became clear to declare, “Today the Hungarian people said yes to Europe. They said yes to a free Hungary.”
The new Tisza government, which secured a supermajority of 141 of 199 parliamentary seats, has promised a roll back of the democratic decline that occurred during the Orbán era. After being elected into power in 2010, the Fidesz regime steadily stifled opposition and dissent by manipulating the electoral system, eroding the independence of the judiciary and media, threatening government critics and undermining the work of civil society organisations.
Péter Magyar (L), Leader of the Hungarian Tisza Party, and Viktor Orbán (R), Leader of the Fidesz Party, at a European Parliament Plenary Session in Brussels, 9 October 2024. Credit: European Union/Alain Rolland
“The election results have opened the door to exercising public power within appropriate constraints. Checks and balances may be revived, social participation can have a greater role, and the constant attacks against NGOS and the independent press may cease,” Gábor Medvegy at the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union in Budapest told IPS.
These were the expectations of many Hungarians 37 years ago, when the nation severed ties with its Communist past. Located west of Romania and south of Slovakia and Ukraine, Hungary lived under Soviet-aligned rule from 1947 to 1989 when it began the transition to a multi-party democracy. It then became a member of NATO in 1999 and the European Union (EU) in 2004.
But the next generation after this moment of immense political and social change witnessed the gradual loss, rather than gain, in democratic rights, as Orbán implemented policies in line with his vision of “illiberal democracy”. Four years ago, the European Parliament declared that Hungary had become an ‘electoral autocracy’ which undermined the rule of law, freedom of expression, religion and association while failing to address corruption. According to Transparency International, the nation has a poor corruption perception score of 40/100. And soon it was penalised for its autocratic tendencies when the EU withheld billions of euros in funding.
The possibility of a political alternative emerged two years ago when Magyar, who held positions in the Fidesz Government, resigned to join the opposition. He remains a deeply patriotic leader speaking to Hungarian interests, but he has also articulated a clear commitment to change. The Tisza Party’s manifesto, ‘A Functioning and Humane Hungary,’ outlines a vision of accountable governance, return to the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and media and a renewed fight against corruption, while also improving public services and addressing the cost of living and rural disadvantage. At present the nation’s public spending on health is about half the EU average and its preventable mortality rate of 333 per 100,000 people is well above the EU average of 168, reports the European Commission.
The party’s focus on core voter concerns and strong policies is likely to have been a factor in the high voter turnout of 77 percent and strong youth participation in the April poll. An estimated 30 percent of the country’s population of 9.7 million people are aged under 30 years, and media reports claim that 65 percent of voters in this age group were Tisza supporters.
And the new government has made a rapid start on its policy promises. Negotiations with the EU have begun to re-establish democratic norms in Hungary and secure the release of the withheld funding. “What is important is the economic development in Hungary,” Dr Anton Shekhovtsov, Visiting Professor at the Central European University in Vienna, told IPS. “If Magyar is able to de-block the EU funding that was withheld for a few years now, the economic situation will hopefully improve.” It will also be important to enable Hungarian industries to thrive in order to boost the domestic economy, he added.
But, to achieve this, the new government will have to address nepotism in state institutions and key public office posts. “Essentially Hungary, under Orbán, is a captured state. The power of Fidesz has penetrated state institutions very deeply. So the task for Tisza is now to drain the swamp, get rid of the deep state,” Shekhovtsov emphasised.
Democracy more widely in Europe could also benefit from the influence of Hungary’s new leadership. The EU’s support of Ukraine, following the Russian invasion in 2022, was impeded by the Fidesz government’s repeated alignment with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Orbán opposed the bloc’s Russian sanctions and, in February, vetoed a critical 90 billion euro loan to Ukraine after a damaged pipeline halted the supply of oil from Russia. However, Hungary lifted its veto by 23 April, with oil flows resuming, and approved the EU’s next round of sanctions on Russia.
“Unlike Orbán, Magyar has no ties to Russia and, therefore, his government will not be subordinated to Moscow and its interests,” Bálint Madlovics, research fellow at the Central European University in Budapest, told IPS. He has also “clearly framed Ukraine as a victim of aggression, strongly opposing any external pressure on Kyiv to cede territory”.
However, on migration, another regional issue, Hungary’s new prime minister made it clear in the months before the election that he opposes illegal migration and intends to maintain the southern border fence which was constructed in 2015 to prevent unauthorised migrants from entering the country. Although Hungary may need to alter its stance when the EU’s new migration and asylum agreement, which requires member states to contribute to the regional responsibility for managing refugees, is implemented in June.
Yet, arguably, the new government has, in a short time, begun to build confidence with its own people and with other European nations that are committed to a democratic region. In the long term, strengthening civic rights and liberties and improving equality are crucial for the new Hungary, Medvegy said. And “we must help ensure that people are not merely spectators of politics but active participants,” he emphasised.
IPS UN Bureau Report
NEW YORK, May 13 2026 (IPS) - Violence has metastasized into humanity’s baseline condition. Yet international institutions remain paralyzed by vetoes and rivalry, offering hollow declarations while dehumanization becomes normalized. Coordinated action, not gestures, is desperately needed.
Global violence today is metastasizing, not contained; over 180,000 violent events reported globally by the International Institute for Strategic Studies signal a world in which conflict has become a baseline condition rather than an exception. More than 130 armed conflicts now rage—over twice the number of 15 years ago—shattering infrastructure, tearing apart social fabric, and normalizing dehumanization as a political weapon.
Women and children bear the brunt: hundreds of millions live within range of armed clashes, with millions of preventable deaths and lifelong trauma caused not only by bullets and bombs but by hunger, disease, and gender-based violence unleashed by war’s chaos.
Yet the UN system and the world’s democracies appear increasingly paralyzed—trapped in vetoes, geopolitical rivalries, and hollow declarations—offering gestures of concern rather than the coordinated, enforced accountability this modern plague of violence so desperately demands.
The global escalation of violence is a structural crisis rather than an aberration—one that reveals the failure of international institutions, exposing the normalization of suffering across political, economic, and societal dimensions.
The proliferation of violence signals not just an increase in armed confrontations but a breakdown in the very mechanisms meant to constrain conflict, rendering dehumanization a routine tool of power, as demonstrated in the following.
The Philosophical Angle
Violence represents the collapse of legitimate political authority and the rise of impotence masquerading as force. Hannah Arendt’s foundational insight remains essential: “Power and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course, it ends in power’s disappearance” (On Violence, 1970).
This speaks directly to today’s proliferation of conflicts, which indicate not state strength but institutional failure, where violence substitutes for the consent and legitimacy governments can no longer command. The resort to violence signals the exhaustion of political dialogue and the absence of legitimate power structures capable of resolving disputes.
Economic Disenfranchisement
Economic drivers are critical accelerants of contemporary violence through resource competition, commodity exploitation, and systemic inequality. Slavoj Žižek’s concept of systemic violence captures the pervasive economic roots: “Therein resides the fundamental systemic violence of capitalism, much more uncanny than the direct pre-capitalist socio-ideological violence: this violence is no longer attributable to concrete individuals and their ‘evil’ intentions, but is purely ‘objective,’ systemic, anonymous.”
The greed-driven exploitation of natural resources—from diamonds in Sierra Leone to oil in Venezuela and cobalt and other conflict minerals in the Democratic Republic of Congo—finances rebellions and turns conflict into a profitable enterprise. Economic deprivation, geoeconomic confrontation through weaponized tariffs and sanctions, and commodity price shocks directly shape military capacity and conflict outcomes.
The Political Compulsion of Violence
Political violence emerges not merely from divergent interests but from the deliberate choice to pursue objectives through coercion rather than negotiation. The paralysis of the UNSC and democratic institutions reflects what Arendt identified as bureaucratic tyranny: “In a fully developed bureaucracy, there is nobody left with whom one can argue, to whom one can present grievances, on whom the pressures of power can be exerted. … everybody is deprived of political freedom, of the power to act… where we are all equally powerless, we have a tyranny without a tyrant.”
This captures the international community’s inability to enforce accountability—vetoes and geopolitical rivalries create a structural void where violence thrives unchecked. Political fragility and weakening institutions, seen in Syria and Myanmar, make societies vulnerable to breakdown, radicalization, and violent dissent.
Societal Fragmentation
Societal conditions create climates where violence becomes normalized through inequality and the erosion of social cohesion. Thomas Hobbes’s bleak assessment of unconstrained human nature remains relevant: in the state of nature, “the life of man [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” While Hobbes described a pre-political condition, his insight applies to societies where governance collapses and fear dominates, conditions now afflicting millions living within range of armed clashes.
Social norms that accept violence as conflict resolution, combined with economic inequalities and a lack of community participation, create environments where aggression flourishes. This normalizes dehumanization, where, as in Nigeria, Israel and South Africa, gendered violence, ethnic tensions, and historical grievances fuel recurring cycles of brutality.
Nationalism, Repression and State Complicity
State-level factors amplifying violence include the failure to address ethnic marginalization, resource competition, and the absence of functional governance. Walter Benjamin warned of violence’s relationship to law and state power: “There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism” (On the Concept of History, 1940).
This observation underscores how national institutions perpetuate violence through their foundational structures and exclusionary practices. Nations repeatedly falling victim to civil and international wars demonstrate governments’ inability to recognize and address destabilizing issues like political, religious, or ethnic marginalization. The weaponization of state apparatus through totalitarian mobilization of violence destroys the very space where political thinking and resistance might occur, as demonstrated in China and Eritrea.
Religious Instrumentalization
Religion, when co-opted by political actors or stripped of its ethical core, becomes a potent catalyst for violence, sanctifying exclusion and legitimizing brutality. Sectarian divides—whether in the Middle East, South Asia, or parts of Africa—transform identity into a battlefield where compromise is heresy and annihilation becomes duty. René Girard’s insight is instructive: “Religion shelters us from violence just as violence seeks shelter in religion.” When faith is manipulated to justify power or grievance, such as in India, Israel or Iraq, it ceases to restrain violence and instead consecrates it, deepening cycles of retribution and rendering conflicts existential rather than negotiable.
The convergence of these dimensions explains why violence has become a baseline condition rather than an exception. Several measures must be considered to de-escalate global violence. Although effecting change is extremely difficult, every effort must still be made, provided the public leads the charge through sustained protest, continuous advocacy, and relentless pressure on policymakers to enact change.
Reform UN Security Council Veto Power
Governments must constrain veto authority by restricting its use in cases involving genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Permanent members should abstain when directly involved, transforming the veto from obstruction into accountability and addressing institutional paralysis that enables unchecked violence.
Establish Functional Early Warning Systems
International bodies should implement systems linking detection to preventive action, closing the warning-response gap. These must integrate predictive analytics, local expertise, and cross-border coordination to anticipate violence months before eruption, enabling timely diplomatic and humanitarian intervention.
Address Economic Inequality and Insecurity
Governments should implement policies that reduce income inequality—including wage increases, tax reform, and financial assistance—aimed at addressing violence triggers. Targeted lending, job creation, and redistributive policies alleviate financial strain that fuels conflict and crime, making structural prevention more effective than reactive measures.
Dr. Alon Ben-Meir is President of the Institute for Humanitarian Conflict Resolution.
IPS UN Bureau