The Human Consciousness Now...Our World in the Midst of Becoming...to What? Observe, contemplate Now.
LONDON, Oct 26 2026 (IPS) - Classrooms with mouldy walls, riddled with cockroaches and rats, stifling in summer and freezing in winter: this is how French high school students describe the places where they’re meant to learn. These impossible-to-ignore symbols of underfunding and neglect sparked a protest movement that has shaken the country.
Students’ complaints centre on underfunding, teacher shortages, crumbling infrastructure, crowded classrooms and an opaque university admissions system. These matter in their own right and raise broader questions about whose interests economies and governments serve, and what futures people can look forward to.
When high school students blockaded their schools, it struck a chord. University students quickly joined in. Within weeks, at least 250,000 people were on the streets, with teachers, trade union members and supporters of the left-wing France Unbowed (LFI) party among those joining in. The government opened a consultation platform for students, announced the release of fuel reserves and promised school improvement policies, but these limited concessions didn’t stop the protests. Meanwhile the message spread across Europe.
A continental wave
Students organised school blockades in several cities in Belgium, while in Italy, thousands took to the streets to demand increased education spending, better school buildings and action on the cost of living.
In Spain, the crisis of unaffordable housing has brought nationwide protests, with many young people to the fore. The trigger was the eviction of 87-year-old María del Carmen Abascal, known as Maricarmen, from the Madrid apartment that was her home for over seven decades, after the investment firm that bought her building pushed the rent up by over 230 per cent. Weeks of protests followed across Spain and Madrid’s Puerta del Sol filled with over 1,200 protesters’ tents. When right-wing parties blocked emergency housing legislation, Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez called a snap election.
In Portugal, thousands camped in public squares to protest at unaffordable housing, calling on the government to withdraw a draft law that will make it easier for landlords to evict tenants and end rent caps on new leases. In Greece, students protested against high student rents.
Protests have resurged in Albania. They were initially triggered by a luxury tourism development linked to the Trump family, which unleashed discontent over unaccountable politicians, oligarchical power and corruption. France’s protests gave the movement fresh impetus, with students mobilising against high education costs, poor university conditions and limited job prospects.
The triggers and demands of protest movements vary, but movements speak to a shared understanding among many young people that they aren’t being heard and growing economic difficulties aren’t being addressed.
Roots of a generational revolt
What has happened in France and other European countries is part of a broader global pattern. Young people expect few opportunities in economies that fail almost everyone but the super wealthy. They see bad public services get worse, including their schools and universities, while the cost of essentials soars, driven by the climate crisis and needless conflicts.
When young people leave education they enter impossible job markets and face handing over most of what they earn in rent. A housing crisis that has been bubbling up for years has become a mainstream issue. Private sector interests have turned a necessity into an object of financial speculation. Corporate landlords seek to extract as much rent as the market can bear and use their lobbying power to water down policies to control rents.
Many people view governments as not having the answers. In France, as elsewhere, the current plan is more economic austerity. Established centre-right and centre-left parties are widely seen as differing little.
At the same time, young people have seen the power of self-organising. Gen Z-led protest movements have arisen in many countries, motivated by anger at economic failures, corruption and unaccountable political power. In 2024, young people rose up in Kenya against a planned tax on essentials. In Bangladesh, young people protested against a quota that restricted entry to public sector jobs, toppling an authoritarian government.
In 2025, a ban on 26 social media platforms showed Nepal’s young people how out of touch their government was. Their protests ousted the prime minister, leading to an election that brought democratic change. This year, India’s Gen Z-led cockroach movement secured the resignation of the education minister over exam leaks and is now protesting against unfair changes to the electoral roll.
In 2025, Gen-Z led movements arose in countries as diverse as Madagascar, Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Serbia and Togo, among many others. Movements share remarkably similar characteristics, practising internal democracy and sharing inspiration, tactics and symbols across borders. When movements broaden their support beyond their origins, connecting with established groups and organisations, Gen Z remains at their heart, driving them forward.
Repression and political opportunism
Because they question the distribution of economic and political power, Gen Z-led protests have invariably been met with state violence. In France, Amnesty International has tracked the use of batons, teargas and mass arrests, including against children. On 7 October, amid public outrage, the government was forced to suspend the police’s use of stun grenades after a 15-year-old boy lost a hand. Police have detained thousands of under-18s.
Protesters have mobilised overwhelmingly peacefully, apart from isolated acts of vandalism. But cost-of-living protests joined by hundreds of thousands over the weekend of 17 and 18 October ended in much more significant violence, with rioting and looting in several cities.
With a presidential election due in April, politicians have been quick to capitalise on the violence. Government spokespeople sought to blame LFI, while far-right leader Marine Le Pen, who currently tops the polls, has blamed the violence on what she calls ‘anarchic immigration’. Donald Trump and the Russian government have done the same, while far-right politicians across Europe have followed her lead.
Protesters don’t want a far-right victory, and if France or other countries shift further rightwards, the blame won’t lie with them. Public anger that demands disruption and seeks to punish elites can be channelled towards far-right populist and nationalist ends when no better alternatives are on offer. Economic and political failures, in countries with large Gen Z populations, all but guarantee further protests. The political establishment must start listening and offer a more positive response.
Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.
For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org
YEREVAN and SHIKAHOGH STATE RESERVE, Armenia, Oct 26 2026 (IPS) - Less than 100 metres from military positions facing each other across the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, the forest suddenly disappears.
On 22 October, I travelled to Shikahogh State Reserve, a biodiversity hotspot in southern Armenia near the Azerbaijan border. At one point I stood less than 100 metres from military positions facing each other across the frontier. Looking across the landscape, what struck me most was not the presence of soldiers but the absence of trees.
Large patches of hillside were barren, interrupting what should have been continuous forest cover. From several points inside the reserve, stretches of land appeared stripped of vegetation. Armenian military positions and Azerbaijani posts were visible across the landscape, reminders that one of the South Caucasus’ richest ecosystems now sits at the edge of a heavily militarised frontier.
The reserve, located in Armenia’s Syunik Province, was founded in 1958 and spans almost 30,000 acres, about 94 percent of which is forested.
It is home to rare animals such as the Caucasian leopard, the Bezoar ibex, the brown bear, the Armenian viper and numerous bird species. It also has 1,100 plant species (70 of which are listed in the IUCN Red Data Book) and is regarded by conservationists as one of the ecological jewels of the Caucasus.
Yet today, biodiversity is only part of the story.
Local Armenian officials, led by Marat Harutyunyan, Deputy Mayor of Kapan, the municipality closest to the reserve and the Azerbaijan border, said the environmental changes have become more visible since the 2022 fighting that affected parts of southern Armenia.
Harutyunyan alleged that Azerbaijani forces had cleared sections of forest for military positions and access roads. The full extent of this clearing has not been independently verified. Visible signs of tree cutting and earthworks could also be seen on the Armenian side near military installations, although officials declined to discuss their purpose or scale.
Vladik Agatelyan and Harut Marzynyan talk about the impacts of war on the locals’ livelihood and wildlife. Credit: Stella Paul/IPS
Competing Environmental Claims
While Armenian officials and local residents in Syunik have linked environmental changes in and around the Shikahogh State Reserve to militarisation and forest clearance, Azerbaijani environmental representatives argue that environmental concerns in the region extend beyond forest loss and should be viewed more broadly.
No Azerbaijani government officials were present at COP17 to respond directly to questions about conditions in Shikahogh. Azerbaijan is not participating in the conference. However, Amin Mammadov, co-founder of the Environmental Protection First (EPF) Coalition and Chairman of the Public Council under Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources, said Armenia was selectively drawing attention to environmental problems in the region.
Mammadov argued that while Armenian authorities focus on alleged deforestation and ecosystem damage in border areas, they have remained largely silent on what he described as pollution of transboundary rivers resulting from mining activities within Armenian territory.
Referring to a statement recently issued by the coalition, Mammadov said the group had called on the COP17 Presidency and participants in the Leaders’ Summit to encourage Armenia to adopt “concrete and measurable decisions” on the protection of transboundary rivers, improved management of mining operations, transparent environmental monitoring mechanisms, and public access to environmental information.
Another coalition member, Mugabil Bayramov, Chairman of the Azerbaijani Cartographers Public Union, said the group had prepared a Geographic Information Systems (GIS)-based digital map in 2024 titled Mineral Raw Materials Resources of the Republic of Armenia. According to Bayramov, the map identifies mineral deposits, mining enterprises and rivers allegedly affected by industrial pollutants.
The competing allegations highlight how environmental issues in the South Caucasus are increasingly intertwined with political tensions and unresolved disputes. Independent verification of many claims remains difficult because of restricted access, security concerns and the absence of comprehensive cross-border environmental monitoring.
Installations and clearing of a large tract of forests along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border at Shikahogh State Forest Reserve. Credit: Stella Paul/IPS
Livelihood Along a Militarised Border
Harutyunyan said Azerbaijani forces occupy several heights overlooking parts of the reserve and surrounding communities. According to him, that has changed how residents use the landscape.
“People are afraid to go to certain places,” he said, often due to the fear of landmines in parts of the border.
Vladik Agatelyan, a 60-year-old farmer, said a mine blast killed two of his cows. “The risks are too many, so I have stopped raising cattle,” he said. Some of his neighbours still do, but they no longer graze livestock closer to the forest.
Whether the danger is widespread or localised, fear itself appears to be creating a social and economic impact, as pastures are abandoned and traditional livelihoods are slowly disappearing. For example, Agatelyan’s wife, also a senior citizen, took up a job to teach in a village school as income from their farm declined.
“The salary is very small (100 dollars a month), but it helps us to get by,” he said.
A Wildlife Corridor Under Pressure
Among those concerned about the reserve’s future is Manvel Arzumanyan, a retired veterinarian in his seventies. For decades, he worked with livestock in the region and closely observed the surrounding landscape. He remembers a time when bears, wild goats and other species moved freely through the forests and mountains around the village. The area, he said, served as an important ecological corridor linking habitats across Armenia, Azerbaijan and Iran.
Today, such sightings appear less frequent.
Harut Marzynyan, a zoologist at Shikahogh State Reserve who oversees wildlife monitoring, echoed his observations. Marzynyan said the conflict has made fieldwork increasingly difficult, limiting researchers’ ability to track animal movement and conduct regular surveys.
He noted that expanding roads, military infrastructure and fragmented landscapes can disrupt wildlife corridors and isolate animal populations. However, the reserve has been unable to carry out comprehensive studies because of security concerns and restricted access linked to the conflict.
Evidence From Another Frontline
The concerns emerging from Shikahogh are difficult to quantify. But scientists studying other conflict zones say the patterns sound familiar.
George Mitri, Professor of Environmental Sciences at the University of Balamand in Lebanon, said the environmental footprint of the ongoing Israel-Hezbollah conflict extends far beyond areas directly affected by fighting. More than 11,000 hectares have been affected by conflict-related fires, while thousands more hectares have suffered damage from explosions, military activity and vegetation loss.
“The ecological impact of war on biodiversity is much broader than the area directly affected by bombing,” Mitri told IPS.
Similar concerns emerged during an interview with Jen Maman, Senior Policy and Campaign Strategist at Greenpeace, the international environmental campaigning organisation.
Drawing on Greenpeace assessments and partner research, Maman said at least 65,000 olive trees have been burned during recent hostilities in southern Lebanon.
She said environmental damage extends beyond forests to include agricultural land, water resources and soil quality.
Maman also highlighted concerns surrounding the use of white phosphorus, which can ignite vegetation and potentially leave pollutants in soils and water sources. Maman shared some investigations that found elevated concentrations of phosphorus and heavy metals in some affected areas of Lebanon, raising concerns about long-term environmental impacts.
According to Maman, the consequences extend well beyond biodiversity. Environmental destruction has affected agriculture, fisheries, livestock production and food security, illustrating how ecological damage can quickly become an economic and humanitarian crisis.
Restoring Nature After Conflict
According to Mitri, meaningful restoration is an urgent need and must begin with “systematic documentation through satellite imagery, photographs, field surveys and scientific assessments”. Those records are critical not only for understanding the scale of destruction but also for future accountability and recovery efforts.
“Restoration must involve a wide range of specialists, including ecologists, biodiversity experts, hydrologists, soil scientists and toxicologists, to understand habitat loss, contamination and ecosystem disruption,” he said.
Displaced residents often possess detailed knowledge of ecological changes occurring in their landscapes and can provide information that may not appear in scientific datasets.
“The community has to be re-established where they were,” Mitri said, arguing that environmental recovery and community recovery are inseparable.
COP17: The Missing Finance Conversation
Restoration, however, raises another question that remains largely absent from international biodiversity negotiations: who will pay for it?
Restoring conflict-damaged ecosystems can require substantial investments in mine clearance, soil remediation, habitat restoration, reforestation, biodiversity monitoring and support for affected communities.
Mitri argues that environmental assessments must eventually be linked to compensation mechanisms, recovery planning and international financial support if damaged landscapes are to have a realistic chance of recovery.
Yet despite growing evidence of environmental destruction caused by armed conflicts in Lebanon, Gaza, Ukraine and the South Caucasus, conflict-related ecosystem restoration remains largely absent from biodiversity finance discussions.
At COP17, governments are debating how to mobilise billions of dollars to implement the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework. But despite a packed COP agenda with 50 items, there is little discussion of dedicated funding mechanisms for ecosystems damaged by war or of how affected countries and communities should finance their recovery.
An Overlooked Threat to Biodiversity
At COP17, Astrid Schomaker, Executive Secretary of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), declined to comment directly on the Armenia-Azerbaijan environmental dispute. However, during the conference’s opening ceremony, she stressed the broader significance of biodiversity loss.
“No nation, no economy, no society is immune from the impacts of biodiversity loss,” Astrid Schomaker told delegates. She also warned that “even the best decisions that you will take at this meeting will be meaningless if there is no capacity to implement, monitor, make informed decisions and manage risks.”
As negotiations enter their crucial second week, it remains unclear whether the environmental consequences of armed conflict and the challenge of restoring ecosystems affected by it will receive greater attention in biodiversity negotiations.
Yet for communities living along contested borders, the impacts are already visible. In Shikahogh, trees have disappeared from parts of the landscape, access to land has become more restricted, and residents describe livelihoods that are increasingly difficult to sustain.
For many conservationists, scientists and communities living in conflict-affected regions, the lesson emerging from Armenia, Lebanon and other frontlines is increasingly clear: biodiversity protection cannot be separated from the environmental costs of conflict.
IPS UN Bureau Report
Excerpt:
Armenia-Azerbaijan's border forests, a biodiversity hotspot, are being transformed by militarisation, fear, and environmental loss. Experts say the same pattern is unfolding in conflict zones from Lebanon to Ukraine.DHAKA, Bangladesh, Oct 26 2026 (IPS) - Bangladesh has achieved remarkable economic progress over the past few decades. Its garment industry has become globally important, millions of people have entered the workforce, and private businesses have expanded across manufacturing, services, technology and trade. But economic growth alone does not create a healthy business environment. Businesses also need predictable laws, safe workplaces, fair competition, protection of property and contracts, and respect for the rights of workers, consumers and communities.
Shahiduzzaman
There has been progress, but significant gaps remain. The World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys have repeatedly identified corruption, infrastructure, access to finance and regulatory obstacles among the challenges faced by businesses in Bangladesh. These problems increase the cost and uncertainty of doing business, particularly for smaller enterprises. The World Bank has also emphasised that effective regulations and institutions governing business registration, licensing, inspections and property rights are essential for reducing business risks while protecting consumers, public health and safety.
Corruption is particularly damaging because it creates an uneven playing field. When businesses believe that personal connections or unofficial payments are necessary to obtain services, licences or approvals, honest businesses can be placed at a disadvantage. It also weakens confidence in government institutions and discourages investment.
The problem is not necessarily a lack of laws. Bangladesh has numerous laws and regulatory agencies. The deeper problem is often implementation and enforcement. Rules that are reasonable on paper have little value if they are applied selectively, slowly or inconsistently.
This gap is also visible in the rule of law. The World Justice Project’s 2025 Rule of Law Index ranked Bangladesh 125th among 143 countries, although Bangladesh’s overall score improved by 1.3 per cent from the previous year. The index examines areas including fundamental rights, regulatory enforcement, civil justice, criminal justice and order and security.
Human rights and workplace safety are another critical part of responsible business.
Bangladesh has made important progress since the Rana Plaza disaster, particularly in the garment sector. More recently, the country took a significant step by ratifying ILO Conventions 155 and 187 on occupational safety and health and Convention 190 on violence and harassment at work in November 2025. The ILO described these ratifications as an important commitment to safer workplaces and workers’ rights.
However, ratification is not the same as implementation. The ILO itself makes clear that ratification represents a commitment to progressively align national laws and practices with international standards; it does not mean that full compliance automatically exists on the day of ratification.
The real challenge is therefore to ensure that workplace safety rules are consistently enforced, labour inspectors have adequate resources and independence, and workers can report violations without fear of retaliation.
Public safety and institutional trust are equally important. A business environment cannot be stable when citizens lack confidence in the institutions responsible for law enforcement and justice. The Asia Foundation’s 2024 survey of 6,510 Bangladeshis found that only 20.5 per cent considered the police to have very high integrity. Trust in the judiciary was 38.2 per cent. The survey also showed that trust in both institutions had declined from 2022 levels.
Other countries demonstrate that stronger institutions and economic development can advance together. Singapore provides one example of the importance of consistent enforcement and institutional integrity. According to Transparency International’s 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index, Singapore scored 84 out of 100 and ranked third among 182 countries. The index measures perceptions of public-sector corruption, based on expert assessments and business surveys.
Vietnam provides another useful comparison because, like Bangladesh, it has built a strong export-oriented manufacturing economy. The World Bank says Vietnam’s economic success over recent decades has been strongly supported by export-oriented foreign investment, but argues that further growth requires regulatory reform and higher productivity. Vietnam has introduced a programme to simplify or reduce business regulations and, by December 2023, had simplified or reduced 2,789 regulations. Its National Public Services Portal had also digitised more than 70 per cent of public administrative services.
So, what should Bangladesh do?
First, the government must close the gap between laws and enforcement. Regulations should be clear, simple and applied equally.
Second, government services such as licences, permits, taxation, customs and inspections should increasingly be digitised. Clear deadlines, published fees and traceable decisions can reduce opportunities for unofficial payments.
Third, regulatory agencies must be more accountable. Complaints against officials should be independently investigated, and disciplinary measures should follow transparent procedures.
Fourth, labour inspection must be strengthened. Workplace safety should not become a priority only after accidents occur. Employers who violate safety standards should face meaningful consequences, while compliant businesses should not be placed at a competitive disadvantage.
Fifth, police and justice institutions need to rebuild public confidence through professional training, independent complaint mechanisms, timely investigations and equal application of the law.
Finally, businesses, workers, civil society and consumers should have meaningful opportunities to participate in regulatory reform. Policies imposed without consultation often fail to address problems experienced on the ground.
Bangladesh does not have to choose between business growth and human rights. In fact, sustainable economic growth increasingly depends on both. Safe workers are more productive, predictable regulations encourage investment, fair competition rewards innovation, and trusted institutions reduce the risks and costs of doing business.
The ultimate test is simple: Can an entrepreneur compete without connections? Can a worker work without fear? Can a consumer obtain justice? Can a business receive government services without unofficial payments? And can every citizen expect the law to be applied fairly?
If Bangladesh can answer these questions through effective institutions rather than promises, it can build a business environment based not only on economic opportunity, but also on human rights, public safety, fairness and public trust.
Shahiduzzaman is the Editor and CEO of News Network. shahiduzzaman@newsnetwork-bd.org
This story was originally published by The Financial Express
TOKYO, Japan, Oct 23 2026 (IPS) - WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind. The United Nations was established with this commitment.
Children, while constituting nearly a third of humanity, are disproportionately affected by war. Yet, children’s voices are rarely heard and children are largely absent from peace processes.
From Machel to Security Council Resolution 2427
Graça Machel, thirty years ago, in her groundbreaking report “Impact of Armed Conflict on Children” already told the United Nations: “clearly the most effective way to protect children is to prevent the outbreak of armed conflicts”; “All people need to feel that they have a fair share in decision-making,” emphasizing that young people should be seen as “active participants in creating solutions, not just as victims”.
The need for child participation was emphasized in the Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups (2007). While the participation of children received less attention in the original Machel report, it was highlighted as an important issue in the 10-year strategic review (2009), having an entire chapter devoted to “Children as Peacemakers”. This recognition was followed by Security Council resolution 2427 (2018), which called on Member States and the UN system “to ensure that the views of children are taken into account … throughout the conflict cycle”, and to fully incorporate and prioritize “empowerment” of children in the post-conflict recovery, reconstruction and peacebuilding processes, taking into consideration the views of children.
Participation: a child’s right and a driver of peace
Participation is a right of the child under the most widely ratified Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). Children must be heard and have their views given due weight in all matters that affect them, including in the conflict context. Children’s participation is critical for conflict prevention, their protection in the conflict, recovery, reintegration and reparation. Children can also play an important role in bringing divided, torn communities together, as catalysts for social cohesion and building peace.
The momentum has been building for a further call for participation of children. The Security Council heard the views of a former child soldier from Colombia (2018), a 15-year-old girl from Mali (2020), and an 18-year-old peacebuilding activist from Cameroon (2023). All three speakers called for the participation of children.
In this year of special importance for children affected by conflict, 30th anniversary of the creation of the children and armed conflict mandate by the UN General Assembly, the Human Rights Council strengthened the scope of the call for child participation in its resolution 61/21 devoted to the rights of the child affected by armed conflict. It invites States to ensure the meaningful participation of children affected by armed conflict in the design, implementation, follow-up and evaluation of policies and programmes throughout the conflict cycle, including conflict prevention, peace and post-conflict processes, including protection, justice, accountability, reparation and recovery.
This resolution is particularly significant. Twenty-four children aged 12-17 from 10 countries in conflict situations shared their views in a consultation with the European Union, one of the penholders, and many of their recommendations helped shape the resolution (Child Rights Connect, meeting report and Child Friendly Guide, 2026).
The children and armed conflict agenda, deeply embedded in the Convention on the Rights of the Child as a basis for the Machel report, established by the General Assembly, strengthened by the Security Council, is now complemented by the Human Rights Council from the child rights perspective. This is very much in line with the call of the UN Secretary-General’s Guidance Note (2023) for mainstreaming child rights throughout the whole UN system including the peace and security pillar.
Three recommendations for the next steps
First, UN mechanisms, States and civil society should support and strengthen partnership with children and young people to make meaningful participation of children a reality. Second, children should be included in the Conference commemorating the 20th anniversary of the Paris Principles to be convened by France with UNICEF in February 2027, highlighting the transformative role that children associated with armed forces and armed groups can play as rights holders and agents of change. Third, children’s participation should be supported in the global peacebuilding architecture and space, starting from the annual peacebuilding week in June 2027, the beginning year of the International Decade of Strengthening of Peace for Future Generations (2027-2036) proclaimed by the General Assembly resolution 80/269 (2026).
Dr. Mikiko Otani, widely recognized as an international human rights lawyer, is currently the President of Child Rights Connect, a Geneva-based global NGO network promoting child rights. She was the Chair of the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (2021-2023) during her eight-year membership for two terms.
IPS UN Bureau
DENVER, Colorado, USA, Oct 23 2026 (IPS) -
Money chase
So, if Venezuela claims to be importing from the rest of the world roughly as much as it was exporting during those years, and the rest of the world confirms Venezuela’s story, then where could those additional $11 billion that presumably ended up in the bank accounts of Maduro’s cronies be?
Technically, there are some ways in which a country could spend as much as it earns and still have large sums go missing. The first obvious one is if there were $11 billion lying around to steal. Except we know there weren’t, because the Venezuelan government was broke and had all its international accounts frozen. Even the Central Bank didn’t have access to most of its international reserves at the time. And remember, the Times is telling us that these $11 billion were coming out of unpaid receivables. In other words, the oil was being sold, it was being loaded into ships, and the owners of these ships were promising to pay Venezuela for that oil but, according to the Times, never did.
Another possibility is that Venezuela was accumulating assets because someone was lending it money. But that explanation doesn’t pass the smell test either. Nobody in their right mind would have lent $11 billion to Venezuela in 2021 and 2022. The country was sanctioned, barred from issuing any type of debt in the United States, and even non-US investment funds wouldn’t go near it with a 10-foot pole. The country didn’t even have access to bank accounts where a loan of that size could be wired.
And, quite frankly, if, say, China or Russia had lent Venezuela $11 billion and somehow gotten those dollars to Venezuela, don’t you think the New York Times, or Reuters, or the Wall Street Journal, would have written a story about that? And, by the way, where is that $11 billion creditor trying to get their money back? No other Venezuela creditors seem to know about them, which is quite odd for a country that has just announced that it’s about to start restructuring its debt.
In sum, nobody lent Venezuela $11 billion in 2021–22 because anyone deluded enough to do so wouldn’t have been lending the money; they would have been giving it away. The country already had a debt that was well in excess of its capacity to pay, and country risk premiums were through the roof. The expected return on any Venezuela debt issuance in those years would have been zero.
Digging in
Now here it is actually worth stopping for a minute and looking carefully at the numbers in the country’s current account, because what the balance of payments data allows us to do is not just look at how much the country receives and spends in foreign exchange, but also where that money comes from and where it goes. And here the story gets interesting because, oddly enough, what these numbers seem to tell us is that the Venezuelan government did borrow around $11 billion (or, more precisely, $10.4 billion) in those two years. They also tell us that it accumulated some $14 billion in accounts receivable, precisely the ones that the New York Times is telling us were not paid.
So, say you had just come down from Mars, knew nothing about Venezuela’s pariah status at the time, and looked at these numbers. You would say: well yes, Venezuela borrowed $10 billion in those years and at the same time accumulated $14 billion in accounts receivable (that is, promises to pay in the future) for its oil sales. And if then, on your short trip from Mars, you picked up a copy of the New York Times and read it, you would say: well, it looks like of those $14 billion, around $11 billion never got paid.
So why does the country’s current account data get us these numbers that are so strange? Herein lies what I think is the resolution of the issue.
Below is a slide from a presentation prepared by PDVSA in late 2022, where it reports all of the oil that was sold between 2020 and 2022.[1] Note that $13.3 billion in invoices were ceded to the Republic. That’s actually a bit higher than the Times’ $11 billion because it includes 2020. In other words, the government was paying for its imports through oil shipments because it could not use international bank accounts as a result of US sanctions. Normally, PDVSA would have sold the oil, received dollars in payment, and sold those dollars to the Central Bank. Then the government would have gone to the Central Bank and bought dollars from it to pay importers.
Exhibit 1: November 2022 PDVSA Presentation Shows Receivables Ceded to Republic
Source: Ministry of Popular Power for Oil.
Since that mechanism could not be used, the government resorted to paying in-kind. It went to the importers and said: look, if you bring this much in imports into the country, we’ll let you go and collect from the people who bought our oil and who owe us money.
In fact, if you look at the decomposition of the supposed borrowing that the government did, you’ll find $6.3 billion of portfolio investment securities being issued by the government. And that rhythm of roughly $500 million per quarter continues until the end of 2025. That’s not because the government is issuing bonds. Believe me, if the government had issued a single bond, we would know about it (and whoever had bought that bond would have become the laughingstock of the securities world). But if you look at the fine print of the IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics Manual, you’ll find that what characterizes portfolio investment is the fact that securities have to be negotiable. And this is precisely what Venezuela was giving importers: negotiable IOUs that they could exchange for oil receivables entitling them to receive payment for oil that Venezuela had sold.
We find a very direct statement of this in another slide of the PDVSA 2022 presentation, where the board states, in discussing cases of cesión de facturas (assignment of invoices) corresponding to shipments requested by the National Executive, that these were used to compensate debts with providers of the Republic.
There it is: we’ve found our mystery lender: importers who were being issued debt so that they could exchange them for oil shipments. So, when you see the balance of payments accounts say that the government was accumulating receivables and issuing debt, what you are really seeing is the way in which balance of payments statistics handle a practice that is as old as humanity: barter.
Oil and prejudice
Reality is often much more prosaic than what we want it to be. Government cronies did not walk away with $11 billion in unpaid oil shipments. What really happened is something much simpler: Venezuela didn’t have a way to pay in cash for the imports it needed, so it ended up paying with oil. And because PDVSA, the state-owned oil company, is legally distinct from the Republic, it did not directly collect on the shipments but rather transferred them to the Republic in payment of its tax and royalty obligations.
American journalist Sydney Harris once wrote that “we believe what we want to believe, what we like to believe, what suits our prejudices and fuels our passions.” And yes, the idea that Maduro’s henchmen walked off with $11 billion in oil shipments feeds well into many stereotypes of Venezuela under Maduro. Even if it sits awkwardly with the fact that he doesn’t seem to have money to pay for his defense in a Brooklyn court, most of us are predisposed to believe it.
Yes, Maduro’s regime was highly corrupt. No one puts that in doubt. But there is a long distance between recognizing its corruption and claiming that regime insiders walked away with half of the country’s oil exports. That image may fit a lot of political stereotypes and be useful for many political narratives. It just doesn’t fit the facts.
Francisco R. Rodríguez is a senior research fellow at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (cepr.net) in Washington, DC and a professor and fellow at the University of Denver’s Korbel School of International Studies.
[1] I obtained this presentation two years ago from reporters who wrote stories on it and who asked me to see it to discuss their interpretation of it.
IPS UN Bureau
UNITED NATIONS, Oct 23 2026 (IPS) - The international day for the eradication of poverty, commemorated last week, was a grim reminder that the UN will not achieve its highly-ambitious target of helping eradicate extreme poverty—”in all its forms”– by 2030.
According to Secretary-General Antonio Guterres eradicating poverty by 2030 requires urgent political will, massive investments, and a commitment to justice rather than charity.
But that is unlikely to happen by the targeted date?
UN Deputy Spokesperson Farhan Haq told reporters last week the message to donors is that there is a crucial importance towards focusing aid on eliminating poverty as much as possible.
“It’s a disgrace that so many people – really, hundreds of millions of people around the world – still face acute poverty. Because of that, and because there’s still such a large gap in the needs that are to be addressed, it’s unlikely that we’re going to meet the targets by 2030. But the Secretary-General, as you know, continues to push for determination. The idea being, as he puts it, that he is neither hopeful nor pessimistic, but determined. And that’s what we have to do in the fight against poverty.”
Guterres has described poverty as an “insult” to human dignity, a denial of fundamental human rights, and an issue of social justice.
In 2026, an estimated 826 million people (or 1 in 10 people worldwide) were living in extreme poverty. If current trends continue, 9% of the world’s population will still live in extreme poverty by 2030.
Richard Ponzio, Director of the Global Governance, Justice & Security Program and a Senior Fellow at the Washington-based Stimson Center, told Inter Press Service (IPS) ending poverty in all its forms everywhere by 2030 is Goal #1 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
“While we saw tremendous progress on a similar Millennium Development Goal poverty alleviation effort from 2000-2015 — thanks in large part to advances in two large developing countries at the time (China and India) — we have seen less progress overall during the present period (2015-2030) for multiple reasons, including growing debt burdens, the COVID-19 pandemic, continued environmental degradation, and the drag on global economic growth stemming from tariffs and new major wars.”
Despite these obstacles, he pointed out, the Secretary-General and his UN system’s continued determination to fight acute global poverty merits the support and commensurate levels of commitment and determination by the world body’s 193 member states.
In the run-up to next September’s SDG Summit in New York, international efforts, including innovative developments strategies and new financing approaches, should be redoubled in support of the “No Poverty” SDG — while ensuring that steps to eradicate extreme poverty remain a central plank of an emerging Post-2030 Development Agenda, he declared.
Max Lawson, Oxfam International’s Head of Inequality Policy, told IPS extreme poverty can be ended by 2030—“but only if we radically reduce inequality.”
“Right now, for every new dollar of wealth created in the world, the richest one percent pocket 41 cents ―and the entire bottom half of humanity gets just a single cent. While everyday people are hit hard by rising prices, wars, and pandemics, billionaires have more than doubled their fortunes,” said Lawson.
According to one report, poverty has many dimensions. Its primary causes include unemployment, social exclusion, and the high vulnerability of certain populations to disasters, disease, and other crises that prevent them from earning a productive living.
The UN’s SDGs are a collection of 17 global goals and 169 specific targets adopted by UN Member States in September 2015 under the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
These goals also include an end to worldwide hunger, the need for quality education, good health and well-being, among others.
Anuradha Mittal, Executive Director, The Oakland Institute, told IPS: “As we look for solutions to end poverty, we need to focus on the causes of poverty.”
The international day for the eradication of poverty should be the day to eradicate wars around the world, she argued.
Global military spending continues to rise. Trump’s proposed defense budget for 2027 – a record high of US$1.5 trillion, nearly doubling the 2023 budget – is in line with projections estimating global military spending could reach $6.6 trillion by 2035.
The buildup of the military industrial complex comes at the expense of common good. A small fraction of annual military budgets – less than $300 billion could help eliminate extreme poverty. $93 billion per year – less than 4% of yearly global military spending – could help address global hunger, she said.
Today, over half the world’s 1.1 billion poor live in conflict situations. War diverts necessary funds for public health, education, and social safety nets. Destruction and pillage of war manufactures poverty and then maintains it,” said Mittal.
Danielle Nierenberg, President and Founder, Food Tank, told IPS “determination is good but in order to be effective, we need to have courage.”
With the cutbacks to international aid including the systemic dismantlement of USAID, we need to stand up to those who the aid is a waste of money, she said.
Millions of people are dying unnecessarily when only a very small percentage of rich countries budgets could help save them. Aid benefits us all—it’s not only the moral thing to do, but it helps strengthen national security, declared Nierenberg.
Frederic Mousseau, Policy Director at the Oakland Institute, told IPS focusing on “donors” to address the poverty and climate crises that the world faces today is misdirected.
Poverty goes hand in hand with growing inequities and cannot be addressed separately. There is plenty of money to go around to solve both these crises.
According to Oxfam, US$9 trillion could be raised just from increasing taxes on the wealth and income of the top one percent richest people and the profits of 722 of the world’s biggest corporations.
As the wealth of the billionaires and the largest corporations keeps increasing to insane levels, there is no other way to address poverty than to tax it. The UN should lead the way on an international tax reform that will allow a redistribution of the wealth towards the poor and the adaptation to the climate crisis, declared Mousseau.
According to the SDG 2026 report, poverty has many dimensions. Its primary causes include unemployment, social exclusion, and the high vulnerability of certain populations to disasters, disease, and other crises that prevent them from earning a productive living.
Why should I care about other people’s economic situation?
There are many reasons, but the simplest is that as human beings, our well-being is deeply interconnected. Growing inequality hurts economic growth and undermines social cohesion. This raises political and social tensions and, in some circumstances, drives instability and conflict.
Why is social protection so important?
Strong social protection systems are essential to cushion the blow of economic shocks and prevent vulnerable families from falling into poverty.
While social protection measures did expand during the COVID-19 crisis, approximately 46% of the world’s population—about 3.8 billion people, including 1.4 billion children—remained entirely unprotected in 2023.
In response to the subsequent cost-of-living crisis, 105 countries and territories announced nearly 350 social protection measures between February 2022 and February 2023. However, 80% of these programs were only short-term. To truly achieve the SDGs, nations must build permanent, universal, and sustainable social protection systems for all.
The contribution of science to end poverty has been significant. For example, it has enabled access to safe drinking water, reduced deaths caused by water-borne diseases, and improved hygiene to reduce health risks related to unsafe drinking water and lack of sanitation.
• If current trends continue, 9% of the world’s population may still live in extreme poverty by 2030, and only one in five countries will succeed in halving their national poverty levels.• In 2025, 7.9% of the global workforce (284 million workers) lived in extreme poverty, down from 11% in 2015.
• For the first time on record, over half of the world’s population receives at least one social protection benefit. Despite this milestone, 3.8 billion people remain completely uncovered.
• Development aid focused on poverty reduction has fallen sharply, erasing a decade of progress and returning to 2015 levels.
• Advanced economies spend a significantly higher share of government budgets on essential services (like education, health, and social protection) compared to emerging and developing nations.
• Guaranteeing basic social security floors in low- and middle-income countries requires an additional $1.4 trillion annually, equal to 3.3% of their combined GDP in 2024.
Source: The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2026
IPS UN Bureau Report
DHAKA, Bangladesh, Oct 22 2026 (IPS) - Bangladesh has earned global recognition for reducing deaths from cyclones and floods. Early warning systems, cyclone shelters, embankments and community preparedness have transformed the country’s disaster response. Yet another climate crisis is receiving far less attention: the economic damage climate change is quietly inflicting on households, farmers, workers, businesses and public finances.
Shahiduzzaman
The uncomfortable reality is that Bangladesh still lacks a comprehensive annual system for calculating climate induced microeconomic damage. Losses are recorded separately through agricultural damage, disaster assessments, health costs, infrastructure destruction, lost working days, business interruption, declining household income and climate induced migration. As a result, much of the country’s real climate bill remains invisible.
Available evidence shows that the cost is already enormous. The World Bank estimates that tropical cyclones cost Bangladesh around US$1 billion annually. It has also warned that a severe flood could reduce national GDP by as much as 9 percent, while climate change could cause around one third of agricultural GDP to be lost by 2050. As many as 13.3 million people could become internal climate migrants by 2050 because of climate related pressures on agriculture, water and land. The economic burden is no longer limited to cyclones and floods. Extreme heat is emerging as a major source of economic loss. A 2025 World Bank assessment found that heat related physical and mental health conditions resulted in an estimated 250 million lost workdays in Bangladesh in 2024. The resulting economic loss was estimated at between US$1.33 billion and US$1.78 billion, equivalent to around 0.3 to 0.4 percent of GDP.
This should fundamentally change how Bangladesh understands climate damage. A disaster does not have to destroy a house, factory or bridge to cause economic loss. When extreme heat reduces the productivity of a construction worker, garment worker, farmer, transport worker or street vendor, the economy loses output.
The hidden climate bill therefore extends far beyond physical destruction.
Consider a farmer in coastal Bangladesh. Rising salinity may gradually reduce agricultural production. The immediate result is lower household income. But the consequences do not end there. A family may sell livestock, borrow money, reduce food consumption or withdraw children from school. Eventually, one or more family members may migrate to Dhaka or another city.
A climate shock that begins in a field can therefore become a problem for the labour market, housing, education, health services and urban infrastructure.
The same chain of losses occurs during floods. A small shopkeeper can lose inventory. A transport worker can lose several days of income. A factory may remain physically undamaged but stop production because roads are submerged or workers cannot reach their workplace. Households may spend their savings on repairs instead of education, healthcare or investment.
At the same time, the government must spend more on emergency relief, damaged roads, embankment repair, reconstruction and public health.
Climate change therefore creates a double burden: private income and productive assets are lost while public expenditure increases.
This is why Bangladesh urgently needs a national climate loss accounting system. It should systematically measure household and productive asset losses, agricultural and fisheries damage, lost income and working days, health and productivity costs, business interruption, supply chain disruption, displacement and loss of human capital.
Such a system would tell policymakers not simply how much a cyclone or flood costs in physical damage, but how much income ordinary citizens lose and how much economic activity Bangladesh sacrifices.
This is particularly important because a large share of Bangladesh’s workers remain in informal employment. Agricultural labourers, construction workers, transport workers, street vendors and small entrepreneurs often have limited access to paid leave, insurance or social protection. When a flood, cyclone or heatwave prevents them from working, their income can disappear immediately.
Climate change is therefore also an inequality crisis.
A wealthier household may be able to repair its home, relocate temporarily or pay medical expenses. A poor household may have to sell productive assets or take on debt. For families living close to the poverty line, one climate shock can erase years of economic progress.
Bangladesh has taken important steps toward adaptation. Its National Adaptation Plan for 2023 to 2050 identifies major adaptation priorities and recognises the enormous investment required to protect people, livelihoods and development. (UNDP) But the gap between ambition and implementation remains a serious concern.
The first major gap is data. Bangladesh cannot effectively manage climate related economic damage without knowing its full scale. The government should publish an annual National Climate Economic Loss Report covering households, agriculture, businesses, labour productivity, health and public infrastructure.
The second gap is institutional coordination. Climate adaptation cannot remain primarily the responsibility of environmental or disaster management agencies. Climate risks must be integrated into agriculture, finance, labour, health, housing, transport, industry, education and urban planning.
The third gap is prevention. Bangladesh has become relatively successful at responding after disasters, but prevention deserves much greater economic priority. A resilient drainage system that prevents repeated business disruption may be more valuable than repeatedly repairing flood damage. A climate resilient crop can protect rural income for years. A heat resilient workplace can preserve thousands of working days.
The fourth challenge is finance. Bangladesh cannot meet its enormous adaptation needs through public budgets alone. International climate finance, concessional financing, private investment, insurance and innovative financial mechanisms will all be necessary.
International experience offers useful lessons. The Netherlands demonstrates how flood protection can be integrated into long term spatial planning, infrastructure and water management. Its experience shows that flood resilience can be treated as an economic strategy rather than simply an emergency response.
Singapore offers another important lesson, particularly for Bangladesh’s cities. Its approach to rising temperatures combines urban greenery, heat modelling, climate sensitive planning and protection of vulnerable populations. Dhaka could similarly treat trees, shaded public spaces, cool buildings, drainage and water management as economic infrastructure rather than merely environmental amenities.
Bangladesh can also build on its own success. Its cyclone warning system and community preparedness programmes demonstrate that locally rooted approaches can deliver remarkable results. The same principle should now be applied to protecting livelihoods, small businesses, agriculture and workers.
Most importantly, adaptation should be judged by economic outcomes. Instead of simply reporting how much money is spent on a climate project, the government should measure how many jobs are protected, how much income is safeguarded, how many working days are preserved and how much future economic loss is avoided.
The real climate bill is not simply the cost of rebuilding a bridge after a flood. It is the farmer who produces less for years because of salinity. It is the worker who loses productive days because of extreme heat. It is the small entrepreneur whose capital disappears in a flood. It is the child whose education is interrupted because household income collapses. It is the family forced to migrate after losing its land.
When millions of such individual losses accumulate, they become a national economic crisis.
Bangladesh has demonstrated that it can protect its people from the deadliest consequences of climate disasters. The next challenge is to protect their livelihoods and economic future.
The country cannot manage what it does not measure. It is time to move from simply counting disasters to counting lost income, lost jobs, lost working days, damaged productive assets and the GDP that climate change prevents Bangladesh from generating.
The objective should not simply be to calculate how much climate change costs Bangladesh. It should be to determine how much Bangladesh can save by investing in resilience today.
Climate adaptation is no longer merely an environmental responsibility. For Bangladesh, it is an investment in GDP, employment, poverty reduction, human development and long term economic security. The climate bill is already being paid. The failure is that we still do not know its full size.
The author is the Editor and CSO of News Network.
IPS UN Bureau