The Human Consciousness Now...Our World in the Midst of Becoming...to What? Observe, contemplate Now.
BELÉM, Brazil, May 21 2026 (IPS) - On Brazil’s northeastern coast, the Indigenous community, Tremembé da Barra do Mundaú, lives on a preserved stretch of land shaped by mangroves, dunes, and deserted beaches. The group of around 160 families is led by women and depends on the 3,500-hectare territory for fishing and subsistence farming.
In 2023, the Tremembé won federal recognition of their ancestral land in the state of Ceará – giving them formal control over the territory.
But their home remains under threat. As tourism has expanded, they have faced growing pressure from real estate developments and around 100 non-Indigenous settlers. A push for renewable energy has also brought nearby wind projects that the community says damage the environment and disrupt their way of life.
“We have many problems here, including trash in our rivers, cars scaring away animals, and people damaging the dunes,” said Cleidiane Tremembé, a local Indigenous teacher. “With the installation of wind farms, many fish species have also disappeared from our river, and we’re catching fewer fish.”
The Tremembé da Barra do Mundaú Indigenous Land protects 27 km of mangrove forest and 8 km of coastline. Credit: Samuel Tremembé
This May, the group will begin investing roughly US$300,000 in efforts to protect their territory. The funds come from the Ywy Ipuranguete (‘beautiful land’) project – an ambitious initiative that aims to distribute a total of US$9 million to 15 Indigenous Lands across Brazil by 2030.
The project is coordinated by Brazil’s Ministry of Indigenous Peoples (MPI), implemented by the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund (FUNBIO), and financed through the Global Biodiversity Framework Fund (GBFF). The GBFF, whose donors include the governments of Canada, Norway and the United Kingdom, is managed by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) – the world’s largest multilateral environmental fund.
According to the GEF, the goal is to support the protection of Indigenous territories as a strategy to conserve biodiversity and strengthen climate resilience.
“A growing body of evidence shows that territories managed by Indigenous Peoples — particularly where land tenure is formally recognised — consistently rank among the most effective settings for maintaining biodiversity, retaining carbon stocks, and preserving ecological integrity, often outperforming both unprotected lands and formally designated conservation areas,” said Adriana Moreira, Lead of the Partnerships Division at the GEF.
If fully implemented, the project would help protect 6.4 million hectares and reach around 61,000 Indigenous people.
Following the project’s launch in March 2025, the Tremembé will be among the first communities to put the funds into action.
Tremembé community member Mateus Castro says their goal is to preserve their land and culture for future generations. Credit: Julia Holanda
Mateus Castro, a community member coordinating the work locally, said the money will be used primarily to acquire drones, radio transmitters, vehicles and a boat to help secure the territory’s boundaries.
“We want to monitor and record the presence of outsiders,” he said in an interview. “This project will allow us to have the tools that give our territory security and autonomy.”
The same equipment would help the community inventory local ecosystems and animal species. Their coastal stretch is home to a wide range of species – from fish and crabs to endangered sea turtles.
“We want to record the species along our coastline so we can use that information as a defence against the licensing of new offshore wind farms,” he said.
With the funding, they also plan to reforest degraded areas, train local environmental brigades, and fund traditional festivals. The first will be the Farinhada Festival that takes place in July. During the festivities, families celebrate cassava as a sacred food and prepare traditional dishes for younger generations.
“In Indigenous culture, everything is connected,” Castro said. “Our goal is to preserve our land, culture, and identity for the children who are yet to be born. We are thinking 100, 200 years from now.”
Future Plans
The Indigenous communities selected to participate in the Ywy Ipuranguete project were chosen by FUNAI, Brazil’s federal Indigenous affairs agency, with input from Indigenous organisations.
The priority was given to groups outside the Amazon, including the Tremembé in Ceará, as part of an effort to decentralise environmental funding. Nearly half of Brazil’s 1.69 million Indigenous people live outside the Legal Amazon, according to the legal census.
“If we look at environmental projects in general, funding, implementation, and resources are usually focused on the Amazon,” said Francisco Itamar Gonçalves Melgueiro, FUNAI’s general coordinator for environmental policies. “That is why we distributed the project across five biomes in Brazil – the Amazon, Pantanal, Cerrado, Caatinga and Atlantic Forest.”
FUNAI also selected communities that had recently removed invaders from their lands, including the Kayapó and Munduruku, who have been in conflict with illegal miners in the Amazon for decades. “After that removal, we see an opportunity for Indigenous peoples to fully retake possession of their territories,” Melgueiro said.
Communities did not need their territories to be fully recognised by the federal government to qualify for the funding. However, they had to submit detailed plans, known as PGTAs, which are part of a broader set of Indigenous territorial and environmental management documents.
During the Farinhada Festival, families celebrate cassava and prepare traditional dishes such as tapioca crepes. Credit: Julia Holanda
“These plans serve as blueprints for their future and cover a wide range of themes and actions,” Melgueiro said. “They are an instrument of the peoples, built by the peoples.”
But many are still working on their PGTAs. More than a decade after Brazil created the framework for these plans, a 2023 civil-society report found that Indigenous communities have received little support for their development, especially during the administration of Brazilian right-wing President Jair Bolsonaro. To date, FUNAI has mapped just 148 PGTAs in a country with more than 800 Indigenous Lands.
The first year of the Ywy Ipuranguete project has been largely dedicated to helping participating communities finalise and detail their PGTAs. The Brazilian Biodiversity Fund (FUNBIO), GEF’s implementing agency, told IPS that this “is a massive and meticulous undertaking”, as they work with Indigenous communities to “determine which PGTA activities are to be undertaken, the best methods for executing them, and the specific implementation arrangements for each Indigenous Land”.
According to Brazil’s Ministry of Indigenous Peoples (MPI), only about 8% of the total budget has been spent so far, mostly on planning, coordination and initial activities. Eventually, MPI said, 75% of the budget will go directly to the communities, with much of the funding transferred to Indigenous organisations. “Investing in Indigenous peoples to maintain their own ways of existing is investing in the survival of humanity itself,” the ministry said in a statement.
Community members say fish species have disappeared from their river following the installation of nearby wind farms. Credit: Samuel Tremembé
In an email, Brazil’s Ministry of Indigenous Peoples (MPI) said only about 8% of the total budget has been spent so far, mostly on planning, coordination and initial activities. Eventually, MPI said, 75% of the budget will go directly to the communities, with much of the funding transferred to Indigenous organisations.
“Investing in Indigenous peoples to maintain their own ways of existing is investing in the survival of humanity itself,” the ministry said in a statement.
In Tremembé da Barra do Mundaú, where plans are underway, the community feels ready. The funding will build on years of work, from training young environmental agents to documenting food traditions.
“This is one of the largest resources the territory has ever received,” Castro said. “For us, it’s a huge opportunity to consolidate and strengthen our mission of caring for the land.”
Note: The Eighth Global Environment Facility Assembly will be held from May 30 to June 6, 2026, in Samarkand, Uzbekistan.
This feature is published with the support of the GEF. IPS is solely responsible for the editorial content, and it does not necessarily reflect the views of the GEF.
IPS UN Bureau Report
UNITED NATIONS, May 21 2026 (IPS) - Member states this week (May 20) deliberated over a draft resolution on states’ obligations in respect of climate change following the advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The General Assembly agreed to take measures to uphold the ICJ’s advisory opinion for member states to meet their existing obligations to climate justice under international law and multilateral frameworks.
The draft resolution (A/80/L.65) passed with 141 votes in favor, 8 votes against, and 28 abstentions. It was brought forward by the Republic of Vanuatu, along with the Core Group of States leading the UN General Assembly resolution responding to the ICJ advisory opinion. The resolution was introduced after a long period of consultations between member states. It outlines member states’ obligations to ensure the protection of the climate system by calling for multilateral cooperation to address what the ICJ has called an “existential problem of planetary proportions that imperils all forms of life and the very health of our planet.”
“This day will be remembered. It will be remembered as the moment the United Nations received the considered judgment of its highest court of its defining challenge of our time and decided what to do with it. Vanuatu and the Core Group believe this Assembly should meet that moment with unity, with seriousness, and with respect for the law and one another,” said Odo Tevi, Permanent Representative of Vanuatu to the UN.
Voting Record of Resolution A-80-L.65. Credit: UN TV
When introducing the draft resolution to the Assembly, Tevi remarked that the ICJ opinion “confirms that the protection of the climate system is a matter of legal obligation, not political discretion.” It would not replace or challenge existing agreements such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol or the Paris Agreement, but rather reinforce them as the primary legislations and forums for the world’s response to climate change.
Amendments to the resolution were brought forward by a small group of member states, which included Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Algeria. Those that argued for the amendments posited that the current resolution required further legal clarity, particularly as it related to the measures required to support developing countries in mitigation and adaptation. At the same time, there were concerns that the amendments weakened the language around the actions and responsibilities of member states, and tabling them so late into the provision would risk undermining the careful negotiations. Ultimately though, the amendments did not pass and the resolution was adopted without them.
In their remarks following the vote, member states welcomed the adoption of the resolution in light of recognizing climate change as a defining existential issue of the modern age, commending Vanuatu for its leadership in pushing for the resolution.
Speaking on behalf of the Pacific Small-Island Developing States (SIDS), Filipo Tarakinikini, Permanent Representative of Fiji to the UN, welcomed the resolution, remarking that it was an “affirmation of survival” for island nations that have been uniquely threatened by climate change, experiencing lasting damages to their homes and their connection to heritage.
“We do not come to this hall asking for mercy. We come demanding justice. Justice that is today grounded in the authoritative voice of the world’s highest court. The Pacific will not disappear, and neither will our resolve,” said Tarakinikini.
Jérôme Bonnafont, Permanent Representative of France, said that this General Assembly decision was welcome in light of an “international context marred by many crises.”
“[France] will continue to defend ambitious climate action, multilateralism, respect for international law, and a science-based approach for sustainable development and for future generations,” Bonnafont said.
James Larsen, Permanent Representative of Australia, hoped that this resolution would “galvanize practical efforts” to protect the climate system and that the case for multilateralism has “never been stronger.” With Australia set to host COP31 later this year, Larsen remarked his country would continue working together with member states to accelerate climate action.
Among those that abstained from voting or were against the resolution are states accused of being major carbon emitters, including G77 members like India and Saudi Arabia. Both the United States of America and the Russian Federation voted against the resolution.
Prior to the vote, the United States expressed that their opposition was based on their “serious legal and policy concerns” about the resolution. The U.S. delegate noted that the resolution called for states to fulfill alleged obligations based on a non-binding ruling from the ICJ, and opposed the resolution’s “inappropriate political demands” to address climate issues.
The Russian Federation’s delegate argued after that member states’ climate obligations, such as the 1.5 degree Celsius threshold, were more of a political obligation rather than normative and that the resolution was an effort to circumvent existing climate agreements.
UN Secretary-General António Guterres welcomed the adoption of the resolution, commending the leadership of Pacific Island countries, SIDs and the students and activists whose “moral clarity helped bring the world to this moment.”
“The world’s highest court has spoken. Today, the General Assembly has answered,” said Guterres. “This is a powerful affirmation of international law, climate justice, science, and the responsibility of states to protect people from the escalating climate crisis… Those least responsible for climate change are paying the highest price. That injustice must end.”
Reacting to the debate, Yamide Dagnet, NRDC’s Senior Vice President, International, said, “Climate justice prevails! The world sent a loud signal that multilateralism and science matter and can deliver for the people and the planet.”
While congratulating the Small Island States, the youths and frontline communities who refused to stand down for their energy, tenacity and leadership, she noted, “There will be a lot of noise about the difficulty in enforcing this resolution, but the reality is that it represents a watershed moment for polluter accountability. Moving forward, regulators and courts have an additional tool in their arsenal to force nations and companies to look at how they can put people over pollution and better protect the world’s most impacted communities and countries with dignity.”
The Prime Minister of the Republic of Vanuatu, Jotham Napat, said the country expressed profound gratitude to 141 Member States that voted in favor of the UNGA resolution welcoming the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ on climate change and to the 90 States that stood together as co-sponsors of this historic initiative.
“This outcome is a powerful affirmation that the international community remains committed to the rule of law, multilateral cooperation, and climate justice at a time when these principles are being tested,” Napat said while acknowledging that the resolution was the first step in a new journey.
IPS UN Bureau Report
May 21 2026 (IPS) -
CIVICUS discusses the cancellation of RightsCon 2026 with Barbora Bukovská, Senior Director for Law and Policy at ARTICLE 19, a human rights organisation that works on freedom of expression and information around the world.
Barbora Bukovská
Why does the cancellation of RightsCon matter?
This cancellation is significant on three levels. First, it means the loss of community. The human rights movement depends on relationships built across borders and over time. RightsCon was one of the few global spaces where civil society organisations, funders, governments, journalists, researchers and technology professionals could meet without political interference. Losing it means losing opportunities to build solidarity and strengthen the networks the movement runs on.
Second, it was a symbolic blow. RightsCon represented the idea that at least one global space existed where civil society could convene freely, protected from political pressure. That illusion is now shattered. The space proved vulnerable. It is yet more evidence of shrinking civic space globally, and the message it sends is chilling: no space is truly protected from state interference any more.
Third, it caused financial damage. Following funding cuts from the USA in early 2025 and reduced funding from other major donor governments, civil society is struggling to secure resources. Organisations had invested precious funding to attend RightsCon, covering travel, organising side events and preparing advocacy materials. These are resources vulnerable civil society organisations cannot afford to waste.
What does this episode reveal about transnational repression?
The cancellation lays bare how emboldened China feels to globalise its political red lines and exercise transnational repression. For years, it has applied pressure on governments to sideline Taiwanese participation in multilateral forums. Taiwan’s leading role in digital rights and technology has long irritated China. What’s new is other governments’ willingness to yield.
China’s tactics have grown more sophisticated. Rather than open confrontation, it leverages threats of diplomatic fallout or lost investment. The pressure now extends into spaces once thought beyond its reach, such as cultural institutions, rights conferences and universities. China has shown it can coerce governments across sectors and at multiple levels.
The wider context matters too. The USA, once a leading global supporter of internet freedom, has retreated from diplomatic and financial backing for digital rights. China’s influence on the African continent has expanded in the absence of rights-based alternatives. When democratic states withdraw support for civil society, authoritarian influence fills the void.
How do China’s leverage and Zambia’s democratic decline combine?
China’s leverage across Africa has grown substantially in recent years. Chinese funding has built major infrastructure in Zambia, including Mulungushi International Conference Centre, the venue where RightsCon was due to take place. Only days before the cancellation, China signed a new agreement to fund further development projects. Zambia carries roughly US$5 billion in debt to China, and that dependency comes with strings attached.
Domestically, the picture is similarly bleak. Despite President Hakainde Hichilema being elected in 2021 on a promise of democratic renewal, civic space has shrunk steadily since. In 2025, parliament passed cybersecurity laws now used to curtail freedom of expression online and detain political opponents. Ahead of the August 2026 general election, the government is enacting further laws designed to entrench its power. Political control is winning out over democratic commitments.
Yielding to Chinese pressure while restricting civic space at home calls Zambia’s commitment to the rule of law and human rights into serious doubt. The debt creates a channel through which China can extract political cooperation. Together, these dynamics create a dangerous precedent for other global south nations facing similar pressure.
What does this mean globally?
The danger extends well beyond Zambia. If a government can cancel a major international civil society gathering without serious diplomatic or institutional consequences, it sends the wrong signals. States must show that interference carries costs. Democratic states, multilateral organisations and regional institutions must impose costs through sustained pressure and exclusion from future convenings.
International human rights mechanisms, including the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, have already condemned Zambia’s decision. But statements alone are not enough. Zambia shouldn’t be considered a reliable host for rights-based global dialogue in future.
If governments can yield to authoritarian pressure at the expense of civil society protections without paying a price, the pattern will spread.
What steps should be taken to protect global civil society forums?
Civil society can adapt but cannot insulate its gatherings from state pressure on its own. Real responsibility lies with states that claim to support human rights. They must send a diplomatic and political signal that interference in global forums is costly and prevent other governments from following Zambia’s example. They must reaffirm their commitment to multi-stakeholder forums and invest in civil society’s ability to convene and participate.
That includes member states of international coalitions such as the Freedom Online Coalition and the Media Freedom Coalition. They must act against restrictions on civic space and freedom of expression, using these platforms to impose costs on governments that interfere with civil society. The behaviour Zambia has just normalised must be made costly.
The UN, other intergovernmental organisations and states must work to guarantee the safety and openness of global gatherings. As democratic states withdraw support and authoritarian states expand their reach, the spaces where global civil society can gather, build relationships and advance human rights will continue to shrink. What’s at stake is the infrastructure of global civil society coordination and solidarity.
CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.
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ROME, May 20 2026 (IPS) - The tea in your cup this morning began its journey in someone else’s hands. Hands whose work most of us never think about. Almost certainly, those hands belonged to a smallholder farmer tending a small plot of land, plucking leaves by hand beneath long mornings of mist and rain.
Two leaves and a bud. Two leaves and a bud. Thousands of times. Smallholders account for about 60 percent of global tea supply. The industry built on their labor is worth US$19.5 billion a year and supports the economies of some of the world’s poorest countries. Yet the conditions that sustain that work – ecological, economic and climatic – are under growing pressure.
Smallholders account for about 60 percent of global tea supply. The industry built on their labor is worth US$19.5 billion a year and supports the economies of some of the world's poorest countries. Yet the conditions that sustain that work – ecological, economic and climatic – are under growing pressure
Tea is the most popular drink on earth after water. Global production reached 7.3 million tonnes last year, and per capita consumption continues to rise steadily. From the outside, the sector appears healthy.
Yet the millions of smallholder farming families driving that growth in China, India, Kenya, Sri Lanka, Uganda, Malawi, Rwanda and beyond need stronger support if the sector’s momentum is to endure.
The geography of tea production is also a geography of economic necessity, linked to patterns of economic dependence and rural livelihoods. Kenya is the world’s largest tea exporter.
Sri Lanka, Uganda, Malawi and Rwanda rank among the global top ten. In these economies, revenues from tea exports help finance food imports and sustain rural livelihoods across entire regions. The sector remains a major source of employment and income for millions of poor families worldwide.
That income is more fragile than the industry’s headline numbers suggest. International tea prices, adjusted for inflation, have been declining for four decades.
The sector’s nominal value has expanded, while the real purchasing power of many producers has stagnated. FAO has documented what this means at the household level: when farmgate prices fall, smallholder families reduce spending on food, education and health care.
Smallholder producers also face limited market access, inadequate extension services, weak access to credit and technology, and persistent asymmetries in how value is distributed across the supply chain.
As production costs rise and price increases transmit unevenly through markets, many farming families struggle to generate sufficient returns to reinvest in farm renewal, climate adaptation or productivity improvements. These pressures heighten income volatility and make long-term planning increasingly difficult.
Tea production and processing are major sources of employment and income for women across East Africa and South Asia. When smallholder tea farming families prosper, women’s economic participation will determine whether that prosperity and stability hold.
Programmes that support women directly through training, market access and financial resources consistently produce stronger outcomes for both households and communities. In many tea-growing regions, women sustain not only household economies, but also the continuity of the knowledge and labor on which the crop depends.
Tea cultivation relies on highly specific agro-ecological conditions: altitude, rainfall patterns and temperatures shaped gradually over centuries in the regions where production became concentrated.
These conditions are becoming harder to predict and increasingly difficult to sustain. More erratic rainfall, fluctuating temperatures, and extreme weather events are already impacting both yields and quality.
For a smallholder farmer without savings or insurance, a lost harvest is not a temporary setback. It immediately affects household spending on food, medicine and schooling.
The unevenness of that burden is a central challenge. Larger operations often possess greater capacity to adapt through irrigation, diversification, upgrading and financial reserves.
Smaller producers, by contrast, frequently get trapped between increasing climate risks and limited investment capacity. Investment needs to be calibrated to the realities of smallholder tea farming rather than assumptions drawn from larger commercial operations.
What is at stake extends beyond a commodity market. Several tea-growing landscapes have been formally recognized by FAO as Globally Important Agricultural Heritage Systems. These landscapes were shaped over generations through accumulated farming knowledge and long relationships between land, crop and community.
Tea cultivation depends on delicate balances of shade, slope, rainfall, soil health, and inherited knowledge built gradually over generations. Climate-related stress threatens these landscapes alongside the livelihoods and agricultural continuity they sustain.
More efficient, inclusive and sustainable value chains, including greater local value addition and stronger producer participation in markets, are essential if the benefits of the growing tea economy are to reach both the people and the environments that sustain it. Per capita tea consumption in many producing countries remains relatively low, meaning the sector’s growth potential is still substantial.
Ensuring the sector’s viability, however, requires more than rising consumption levels. Smallholder producers need better access to finance, markets, technology, and climate adaptation support calibrated to their realities.
More transparent and balanced value chains, targeted investment that reaches women directly, and stronger incentives for reinvestment at farm level will determine whether the industry’s future growth will remain economically and socially sustainable.
The farmer who grew your tea will get up again tomorrow morning before sunrise. The future of the sector depends on ensuring this remains a viable livelihood option.
You want to see a bright tea future? Join us in celebrating International Tea Day on 21 May!
Boubaker Ben-Belhassen is Director of the Markets and Trade Division at the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
UNITED NATIONS, May 20 2026 (IPS) - The ongoing crisis in the Middle East and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz continue to put immense stress and risk on the global economy.
A new UN report highlights that slowing growth, re-emerging inflation rates and heightened uncertainty affect the world entirely, but they are playing out differently across different economic brackets. Developing and vulnerable economies are feeling the shocks more acutely without sufficient resources or robust policies to address incoming challenges.
Released this week on May 19, the World Economic Situation and Prospects as of mid-2026 report provides a breakdown of growth and inflation rates and the capacity of different regions to deal with the impact of the Middle East crisis. The consequences of the current conflict have reverberated across multiple sectors. Trade, energy and commodity prices, tourism, labor, and public and centralized financing have been disrupted as a result of the ongoing closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
“What began as a blow to energy markets on the 28th of February has turned into a broader supply shock of uncertain scope, magnitude, and duration that is ripping across the world,” said Shantanu Mukherjee, Director of the Economic Analysis and Policy Division of UN DESA.
Ingo Pitterle, Senior Economist and Officer-in-charge of the Global Economic Monitoring Branch of the Economic Analysis and Policy Division of UN DESA, remarked that the current crisis “did not arrive in isolation.” It is only the latest in a “series of shocks in recent years” that has left the global economy “more vulnerable than before.”
“What makes this shock so difficult to absorb is the range of transmission channels,” said Pitterle. “Ultimately, the impact on each economy will depend on two things: how exposed it is to these channels, and how much room for policy it has.”
Mukherjee and Pitterle emphasized that the findings of their report were based on early projections, even as policies are shifting at a faster rate than the forecast cycle can capture, and as such, acknowledged that there may be certain limitations to their forecasts.
Global GDP growth is now forecast at 2.5 percent in 2026—0.2 percentage points below projections from January and well below pre-pandemic norms. A modest recovery is projected at 2.8 percent in 2027. Solid labor markets, resilient consumer demand, and AI-driven trade and investment in select economies are expected to provide some support, but the downgrade underscores a further weakening of an already subdued global outlook. When it comes to the environment, high energy prices may signal a short-term return to carbon-intensive fuels, though the report suggests that this may strengthen the case for a structural shift away from fossil-fuel dependence and toward renewable energy.
The shock is primarily felt in the energy sector—through constrained supply, surging prices, and rising freight and insurance costs—with effects cascading through supply chains and increasing production costs globally. While the surge in prices delivers substantial windfall gains for energy companies, it has intensified cost pressures for households and businesses worldwide. So far, lower-income households have been particularly vulnerable to cost pressures with a dearth of resources to handle the shocks. The overall impact will depend on the duration of disruptions in energy markets, leaving the outlook highly uncertain.
The current downgraded global outlook understates the scale of the setback. The conflict in the Middle East threatens the hard-won gains toward the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and will only slow further progress. The economic shocks are eroding food security, income streams and investments. The report warns that renewed pressures also compound a development financing squeeze, where debt-service costs are crowding out spending on health and education, and the financing and development gap sits at USD 4 trillion.
Broadly, regional impacts have manifested differently across countries. There are mounting pressures on countries dependent on fuel exports from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, particularly in South Asia and Western Asia. Developing economies within these regions are expected to be hardest-hit by the conflict.
The report shows that Western Asia is projected to be severely impacted by the current crisis. Growth is projected to plunge from 3.6 per cent in 2025 to 1.4 per cent in 2026. In addition to energy shocks, the destruction of critical infrastructure, disruptions to oil production, trade and tourism, and escalating regional conflicts all contribute to the uncertain economic prospects for the region.
The economic outlook for Africa is weakened by shipping and energy market disruptions as well. Its growth in 2026 is projected at 3.9 percent, 0.1 percentage points below what initial forecasts predicted earlier in January. High food and fuel costs are expected to push inflation rates to 9.9 percent in 2026, an upward revision of 0.8 percentage points from January projections. Oil and gas exporters in countries like Algeria and Angola may benefit from higher prices, but gains may be offset by imports.
Remittances are a vulnerability, given that several economies in Africa, South and Southeast Asia are dependent on remittance inflows from migrant workers, including those in Gulf states. In Egypt and Ethiopia, where flows from Gulf states account for 73 percent and 20 percent, respectively, this represents an exposure to income shocks. In the case of South Asian countries like Bangladesh and Nepal, weaker remittance flows also threaten their GDPs.
According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), the current conflict will affect labor markets long after it has ended. As with economic growth, trade and energy prospects, it will be determined by the scale and duration of the conflict. At present however, the Arab states and the Asia-Pacific regions are likely the most affected by the economic shocks due to their integration with Gulf energy flows, trade routes, supply chains and labor migration. Disruptions have already manifested, such as weakening remittance flows and declines in labor deployments to GCC states.
Although these reports paint a somber picture of global prospects, they also reveal the potential for international cooperation to address these vulnerabilities and build resilience. Multilateral actors, including financial institutions, need to take deliberate measures to increase productive capacities and address structural barriers that restrict fiscal space. Renewable energy is increasingly shown to be strategically important for reducing exposure to fossil fuel shocks. Yet, investments toward renewable energy remain uneven, which limits the ability of developing economies to reap the benefits.
IPS UN Bureau Report
ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia, May 20 2026 (IPS) - Sharp surges in energy, fertilizer, and food prices triggered by the ongoing conflict in the Persian Gulf strikingly illustrate the deep interconnections between geopolitical conflict, food insecurity, and the fragility of fossil fuel–dependent food systems.
Besides carrying roughly 20 million barrels of oil per day (about 27 percent of global oil exports), the Strait of Hormuz also handles 20–30 percent of internationally traded inorganic fertilizers, which uses natural gas as a key ingredient in its production. Its closure has immediately disrupted the flow of these essential commodities, triggering sharp price spikes in fuel and key agricultural inputs.
This situation demonstrates how geopolitical instability can rapidly disrupt essential agricultural functions under current input-dependent, industrial production systems that rely heavily on external energy and supply chains. This crisis highlights, more clearly than ever, a critical reality: food systems tied to fossil fuels are inherently unsustainable, continually undermine food sovereignty, and disproportionately affect farmers, particularly smallholders in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). World Food Programme estimates warn that, if the conflict continues, the soaring oil, shipping and food costs will push an additional 45 million people into acute hunger, driving the global total beyond its record 319 million1.
Reducing food systems’ reliance on fossil fuels and external inputs is essential to strengthen our collective resilience to future shocks. The truth is that fossil fuels courses through every stage of the food system – from fertilizers and pesticides to processing, preservation, transportation, packaging, food waste disposal, and even food preparation. Moreover, entrenched economic and political structures lock in this fossil-fuel dependence through massive subsidies and price protections – estimated at over $1 trillion in recent years2.
Food systems account for at least 15 percent of total fossil fuel use – mostly through synthetic fertilizers 4 – but also to power machinery and vehicles, and generate electricity and heat for key processes like irrigation, grain drying, livestock housing, and food storage.
Agroecological approaches to food production offer an alternative to reduce our dependence on fossil fuels while still meeting the needs of a growing global population. This supports a transition from energy-sink systems to regenerative ones, radically enhancing food systems’ resilience in the face of escalating geopolitical instability and environmental vulnerability.
Agroecology is based on natural processes and local resources for sustainable soil fertility. Crucially, many of these practices draw directly from indigenous knowledge systems, where local communities have long maintained soil health through time. Practical steps include the use of organic fertilization (often blended with minimal synthetic inputs), efficient soil microorganisms, nitrogen-fixing plants, and soil health practices like crop rotation, cover cropping, intercropping, reduced tillage, and crop-livestock integration.
Research consistently shows that agroecological approaches – such as farm diversification and tree integrated systems – outperform conventional systems in climate resilience, nutrient cycling, and soil health5,6, often while boosting yields7-9. Agroforestry also provides a source of wood fuel, making it a valuable alternative during fossil fuel shortages and price spikes.
Examples can be found worldwide. Peruvian cocoa farmers are using bokashi and bio-oil amendments to restore soil organic matter, regenerate microbial activity, and enhance nutrient cycling10. In Vietnam, rice-fish coculture systems optimize nutrient cycling, curb pests, and diversify outputs – lowering costs while stabilizing farmer incomes11. Ethiopian farmers practicing wheat-fava bean rotations are cutting fertilizer needs while improving soil structure and building long-term fertility11. India’s agroecology programme, ‘Zero Budget Natural Farming (ZBNF)’, delivers biodiversity benefits while more than doubling farmers’ economic profits and maintaining comparable crop yields, than chemical-based farming 12,13.
Other farm-level steps to curb fossil fuel dependence include integrating renewable energy sources for on-site generation and operations – like solar panels, biogas digesters, and wind turbines; solar water pumps, adopting fuel-efficient engines and draft animals; and embracing practices such as minimum tillage, precision irrigation, integrated pest management, and low-input crop-livestock systems.
More fundamentally, shifting from global, industrial commodity chains toward territorial, agroecological food networks can relocalize production, processing, and consumption – shortening supply chains and reducing energy-intensive operations. Shorter, localized supply chains reduce reliance on long-distance transport, lower packaging demand, and promote reusable packaging systems, thereby decreasing fossil fuel consumption.
These efforts can be reinforced by complementary practices that strengthen food sovereignty, such as home gardens and urban agriculture. Crucially, agroecology also aligns with reduced production of ultra-processed foods – among the most energy-intensive products – helping to curb fossil fuel use while potentially improving public health.
In the short term, it is crucial that the allocation of emergency funds are earmarked to procure or purchase organic alternatives to synthetic fertilizers, particularly in the most affected regions. Longer-term, it is necessary to reduce structural barriers to farmers’ adoption of these agroecological approaches including reforms to agricultural subsidies and strengthening support for technical assistance and local governance.
References
1. Farge, E. Iran war may push 45 million people into acute hunger by June, WFP says. Reuters https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-war-may-push-45-million-people-into-acute-hunger-by-june-wfp-says-2026-03-17/ (2026).
2. IPES-Food. Fuel to Fork: What Will It Take to Get Fossil Fuels out of Our Food Systems? https://ipes-food.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/FuelToFork.pdf (2025).
3. FAO, UNDP, and UNEP. A Multi-Billion-Dollar Opportunity – Repurposing Agricultural Support to Transform Food Systems. (FAO, UNDP, and UNEP, 2021). doi:10.4060/cb6562en.
4. Global Alliance for the Future of Food. Power Shift: Why We Need to Wean Industrial Food Systems off Fossil Fuels. https://futureoffood.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/ga_food-energy-nexus_report.pdf (2023).
5. Niether, W., Jacobi, J., Blaser, W. J., Andres, C. & Armengot, L. Cocoa agroforestry systems versus monocultures: a multi-dimensional meta-analysis. Environ. Res. Lett. 15, 104085 (2020).
6. Beillouin, D., Ben‐Ari, T., Malézieux, E., Seufert, V. & Makowski, D. Positive but variable effects of crop diversification on biodiversity and ecosystem services. Glob. Change Biol. 27, 4697–4710 (2021).
7. Dittmer, K. M. et al. Agroecology Can Promote Climate Change Adaptation Outcomes Without Compromising Yield In Smallholder Systems. Environ. Manage. 72, 333–342 (2023).
8. Rodenburg, J., Mollee, E., Coe, R. & Sinclair, F. Global analysis of yield benefits and risks from integrating trees with rice and implications for agroforestry research in Africa. Field Crops Res. 281, 108504 (2022).
9. Jones, S. K. et al. Achieving win-win outcomes for biodiversity and yield through diversified farming. Basic Appl. Ecol. 67, 14–31 (2023).
10. Altieri, M. A. & Nicholls, C. I. Agroecology and the reconstruction of a post-COVID-19 agriculture. J. Peasant Stud. 47, 881–898 (2020).
11. FAO. The State of Food and Agriculture 2022. (FAO, 2022). doi:10.4060/cb9479en.
12. Berger, I. et al. India’s agroecology programme, ‘Zero Budget Natural Farming’, delivers biodiversity and economic benefits without lowering yields. Nat. Ecol. Evol. 9, 2057–2068 (2025).
13. O’Garra, T. Agroecology benefits people and planet. Nat. Ecol. Evol. 9, 1973–1974 (2025).
14. IPES-Food. Food from Somewhere: Building Food Security and Resilience through Territorial Markets. https://ipes-food.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/FoodFromSomewhere.pdf (2024).
15. Einarsson, R. Nitrogen in the Food System. https://tabledebates.org/building-blocks/nitrogen-food-system (2024) doi:10.56661/2fa45626.
Lulseged Desta, CGIAR Multifunctional Landscapes Science Program; Jonathan Mockshell, Alliance Biodiversity International – CIAT
IPS UN Bureau
HELSINKI, Finland / SANTIAGO, Chile / SUVA, Fiji / TOKYO, Japan, May 20 2026 (IPS) - Just four years of the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development remain. What comes after 2030 is already a political battleground.
The next global development framework is being shaped now: through quiet agenda-setting, shifting alliances, financing choices, contested norms, and decisions about who gets to participate and who is pushed to the margins. That matters because the world that will shape what comes next is not the world that adopted the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015.
The context is harsher, more fractured and less generous. Geopolitical fragmentation is deepening. Armed conflicts are distorting priorities. Climate impacts are accelerating. Development finance is under growing strain. Civic space is shrinking. Public trust in multilateralism is weaker. And too often, the rights, equality and accountability commitments that gave the SDGs their normative force are treated as negotiable.
“We step into the next decade against the background of climate chaos, growing inequality and increasing poverty. The scaffolding for positive change shall be to infuse democratic values in the blood stream of all our governments from the Right to the Left,” says Dr. Moses Isooba, executive director of the Uganda National NGO Forum and Vice-Chair of Forus.
The post-2030 debate must confront the political and structural weaknesses that limited implementation the first time around.
As a civil society network, we have been here from the very beginning. We have secured the adoption of the SDGs with the Beyond 2015 campaign, pushed for innovation and ambition, challenged power, brought forward the voices of communities, and held systems accountable. That role evolves and as we now look “beyond 2030”, we remain present, engaged, and determined to influence what comes next.
One message comes through clearly: the next agenda will only be credible if we are clear about three things — what must be defended, what must be demanded, and what must be declined.
What must be defended
Some foundations of the current framework remain essential and must not be traded away for the sake of political convenience.
The first is universality. One of the most important achievements of the SDGs was to establish that sustainable development is not only a concern for lower income countries, but a universal responsibility. Policies, consumption patterns and economic models that drive inequality, exclusion and ecological harm must be addressed in all regions. High-income countries must not only finance development but also reform their own adverse policies. If the next framework weakens the recognition that sustainable development must integrate social justice, equality, environmental sustainability, peace and human rights, it will not move us forward. It will mark a retreat.
The second is civic space. Civil society participation is one of the conditions that makes accountability, inclusion and implementation possible yet it is increasingly constrained by financial pressures, exclusion from global decision-making processes and erosion of fundamental rights. A future agenda which prioritises resources and protection for civil society supports the building of stable, sustainable societies.
The third is local leadership. Communities and local civil society actors remain closest to the realities that global frameworks claim to address, yet they are still structurally under-resourced and under-represented. Localisation beyond the “buzzword” can bring essential resources for problem diagnosis and planning, increasing effectiveness and legitimacy for sustainable development and peacebuilding.
And finally, what must be defended is multilateralism itself, not as an abstract ideal, but as the shared political space where common commitments can still be built.
“Safeguarding the structures created to advance peace, cooperation and rights sustains global hope and possibilities to address common global challenges. This is in the interests of us all, future generations and the planet.” Silla Ristimäki, Adviser at Fingo. “This is why ambitious reform of the UN cannot be separated from the post-Agenda 2030 discussion.”
What must be demanded
Defending core principles is not enough. Negotiations about the future must also correct what the Agenda 2030 left unresolved.
At the centre of this is financing. A credible post-2030 framework cannot rest on the same unequal financial architecture that has constrained implementation for years. Debt burdens, unequal fiscal space, volatile aid flows and weak commitments have all narrowed the room for governments and communities to act. Financing reforms must include debt restructuring and relief, fairer lending terms, increased concessional finance, stronger domestic resource mobilisation, tax justice, policy coherence and predictable support for civil society.
“Many countries are spending more on debt than education or health. We need to reform the current unjust international financial architecture,” says Aoi Horiuchi, Senior Advocacy Officer at JANIC, the civil society network for international cooperation in Japan.
Accountability must also be stronger. Voluntary reporting and soft review mechanisms have not been enough. A future agenda must be backed by mandatory, transparent and regular review, with independent oversight and a formal role for civil society and local actors in tracking progress and exposing implementation gaps.
And participation must mean more than consultation after decisions are already taking shape. Civil society needs a formalised, meaningful and safe role in both negotiating and implementing the future framework, especially for local actors and groups continuing to face structural or political exclusion.
“Meaningful change comes from meaningful participation. That’s why we need to defend civic space,” says Horiuchi.
What must be declined
Some directions already visible in early discussions must be rejected outright.
A thinner agenda that lowers ambition in the name of consensus must be declined. So must any attempt to weaken universality, rights, gender equality, civic freedoms or climate ambition for political expediency.
The continuation of a financial status quo that deepens inequality while speaking the language of partnership must also be declined. So must accountability arrangements that remain symbolic, selective or performative.
And tokenistic participation must be named for what it is. A process that brings civil society into the room for appearance’s sake while excluding it from agenda-setting, decision-making and follow-through is managed exclusion.
Finally, as development governance evolves, the expanding role of private and philanthropic actors must not come without public-interest safeguards, democratic oversight and accountability. Public goals cannot be left to unaccountable power.
We must get out of silos, create spaces of dialogue, of co-responsibility and raise the question of whether the post-2030 framework will be more honest about power, more serious about accountability, more capable of confronting structural inequality, and more open to those whose lives and rights are most at stake.
Our answer is here:
Defend what must not be lost.
Demand what must be corrected.
Decline what would weaken the future.
IPS UN Bureau